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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Following Schumpeter‟s (1939) exposition of the importance of understanding the 
coevolution of technology, firm and industry structure, evolutionary economists have 
taken on this dynamics to view economic growth as a differentiating, non-linear and 
complex process (Nelson, 2008). Taken together, any attempt to understand firms‟ 
successful transformation from technological followers to leaders requires a profound 
unravelling of the sectoral innovation system associated with technological leaps. 
Economic growth, thus, is not an aggregate phenomenon; rather, it is determined by the 
country‟s different sectors, each characterized by its own dynamics (Nelson & Winter 
1982; Nelson 2008). 
The integrated circuit (IC) industry has undergone major structural changes since its 
infancy in the 1950s, which is largely attributed to changes in firms‟ business models 
and technologies. The industry began life dominated by large-scale vertically integrated 
companies, referred to as the „integrated device manufacturers‟ (IDMs) in the United 
States. Born in the Bell Laboratory, ICs were first commercially produced by Fairchild. 
Subsequently, multinational corporations (MNCs) like Fairchild, Intel, International 
Business Machines (IBM), National Semiconductor and Advanced Micro Devices 
(AMD) internationalized their operations to East Asia since the 1960s. Since the 
emergence of the world‟s first pure-play foundry in Taiwan in 1987, the industry 
experienced a change of manufacturing landscape as firms began to vertically 
disintegrate to specialize in specific scopes. Since 2005, the IC industry experienced 
increasing stability of innovators and increasing concentration of innovations.  
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A pure-play foundry is a „dedicated‟ chip-fabrication service provider which fabricates 
wafers for other IC firms without its own brand name. By introducing the innovative 
business model, Taiwanese firms pioneered the disintegration activities to set into 
motion horizontal specialization in the IC industry. Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron 
(1952) pioneered the notion of latecomer effect. In addition, according to Gerschenkron 
(1952), the more backward a country is, the shorter period it requires to catch up with 
the forerunners. The extant literature on the catch-up experience of Korean and 
Taiwanese firms with those in the more technologically advanced nations have focused 
on the advantages latecomers enjoy in reaching the technology frontier (Amsden, 1989; 
Mathews & Cho, 2000; Lee & Lim, 2001).  
The remarkable story of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 
started when its architect, Morris Chang, helmed the administration of the Hsinchu 
Science Industrial park to fashion the launching of the firm in 1987 as a joint venture 
(JV) with Phillips. In the space of 25 years from its establishment in 1987, TSMC had 
become the largest pure-play foundry company in the world, enjoying in 2011 an annual 
revenue advantage of more than USD10 billion over the world‟s number two pure-play 
fabrication foundry, i.e. United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) (Gartner, 2012). 
Other latecomer countries in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia are trying to grow 
through technological upgrading. The Malaysian government realized its role to foster a 
knowledge-based nation by upgrading the country‟s human capital (NEAC, 2010). To 
create such a supportive environment, the government has set up a number of meso-
organizations, including public research institutes, such as, the Malaysian Institute of 
Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS) in 1985 to mimic the catch-up route of Taiwan. 
Unfortunately this remains as a vision unrealized due to the severe lack of the right 
strategies to manage and transfer technologies (Rasiah, 2010).  
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This study begins with a macro-level analysis by examining the evolutionary processes 
that have defined the IC industry through the lens of changing technological regimes. 
The study goes on to examine latecomer resource acquisition strategies through 
industrial structural change to catch up and leapfrog incumbents. Lastly, the study 
attempts to advance existing understanding by a micro-level analysis to explore why 
certain latecomer firms forge ahead to eventually become industry leaders while others 
remain at the catch-up or keep-up stages.    
1.1 Statement of Problem 
Despite starting as a contract manufacturer since 1987, the pursuit to reach the 
technology frontier has driven Taiwanese IC firms to target scale- and knowledge-
intensive research and development (R&D) activities. However, while the IC industry 
has undergone major structural changes, research focusing on this transformation 
process has remained scanty. While there are a number of works that examine particular 
industries to identify Schumpeterian cycles of innovation, few have actually attempted 
to discuss the industry‟s changing technological regimes. Consequently, the 
mechanisms behind the industry‟s transitional process after the emergence of the first 
pure-play foundry have remained vague. 
Also, existing research have lucidly discussed how several latecomer firms have caught 
up technologically in many industries by stressing the role of institutions (Amsden, 
1989; Mathews & Cho, 2000). However, several questions have remained unaddressed 
as latecomer countries like Malaysia tried to mimic the Taiwan catch-up model by 
spinning off pure-play foundries but failed. This indicates that the success or failure of a 
latecomer‟s catch-up also depends very much on firms‟ resource acquisition strategies 
and how they link with the complex mechanisms evolving in the industry, including 
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choices of organizational boundary, industrial structural changes and changing value 
systems. This thesis seeks to address this gap. 
While existing studies have provided useful examples of how latecomer firms have 
caught up technologically in many industries, they do not help much in addressing the 
popular questions of: „Why do firms differ and how does it matter?‟ (Nelson, 1991). 
More often than not, the question of why firms‟ performances diverge through time 
despite a similar start-up and catch-up model has been overlooked. This area of study 
can generate significant strategic and managerial implications as it demarcates the 
boundary between becoming an industry leader and becoming just a latecomer firm that 
has successfully caught up. 
1.2 Research Aim  
The development of the Taiwan IC industry has been a crucial factor in the successful 
transformation of the nation into a high income country. However, the story of the 
Taiwan IC industry has not been easily replicated elsewhere. In fact, several latecomer 
countries like Malaysia have not been able to even come close, despite after years of 
attempting to mimic the Taiwan catch-up model.  
In light of the remarkable catch-up experience of Taiwan in the IC industry, it is 
significant to extend the existing scope of studies. This includes the understanding of 
how the technological environment of a specific industry is changing in time; latecomer 
resource acquisition strategies, as well as, how certain latecomer firms could 
successfully be transformed to become an industry and technology leader.  
Extending these research areas could have important policy and managerial implications 
to other latecomer countries or firms who are seeking ways to catch up. Latecomers 
must consciously make strategic choices to upgrade their capabilities with the potential 
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for extending beyond the firm to the national level. Because it is necessary to learn from 
Taiwanese IC catch-up strategies, the problems identified above shall not be ignored. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Three research questions are identified in this study. Technological regime has always 
been used as a useful conceptual tool to examine the technological environments of 
innovating firms. To explain the transitional process of firms between different 
technological regimes, firms‟ choices of organizational boundaries shall not be ignored 
especially when the industry experienced vertical disintegration process due to the 
emergence of the latecomer‟s contract-manufacturing model. The first research question 
is, how does a high-tech manufacturing industry transit between different technological 
regimes and can the industry‟s technological regime be endogenous to firms? This 
question requires the mapping of the technological differences between the industry‟s 
downstream and upstream firms, how firms‟ choices of vertical boundaries are impacted, 
the resulting industry patterns of innovation, and how a technological regime eventually 
becomes endogenous. The answer to this research question has important implications 
for the subsequent analysis in this study. It is important to establish the importance of 
changing technological regimes, as it provides the fundamental pillar to understand and 
analyze innovative actives in a high-tech manufacturing industry. 
The second research question seeks to examine how, in particular institutional support 
and start-up strategies, structural changes of a high-tech manufacturing industry affect 
latecomer catch-up processes. To examine this question, the study incorporates the 
mechanisms of changing value systems and resource acquisition strategies into the 
analysis. Since strategies embodied in business models can collectively cause changes 
to industrial structures, it is also important to include a study of specialization in 
different production stages.  
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The third research question seeks to identify the underlying causes of diverging 
achievements over time of firms with similar start-up experience. Specifically, “What 
are the entrepreneurial roles and strategies deployed by firms in turning a latecomer 
firm into an industry leader in a high-tech manufacturing industry?” To answer this 
question, the study seeks to find out how the progress of a high-tech manufacturing 
industry is endogenous to firms and what lies at the heart of the generative process that 
leads to such progress? To answer this question, the analysis incorporates organization-
level theories, including organizational path dependence, coevolutionary lock-in 
between firms and industry, as well as, firm-level absorptive capacity.  
1.4 Research Objectives 
The research questions identified in this study are targeted at achieving the following 
objectives. Firstly, the study seeks to find out how the technological regime of a high-
tech manufacturing industry evolves through time and leads to different innovation 
patterns. In doing so, it seeks to examine the endogenous transition process of 
technological regimes, including how specific technological aspects affect firm choices 
of organizational and network boundaries, as well as how innovation patterns evolve in 
the process. 
Secondly, the study seeks to examine how can a latecomer firm in a high-tech 
manufacturing industry catch up and leapfrog incumbents as the industry experiences 
structural changes and different value systems, by analysing the resource acquisition 
process of successful and unsuccessful firms. In addition, the study seeks to examine 
differences in strategies of latecomer firms at different manufacturing stages across the 
value chain. 
Thirdly, the research seeks to find out how can a latecomer firm in a high-tech 
manufacturing industry become a leader in terms of technology and economic 
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performance, by examining firm strategies for organizational path dependence and 
inter-path dependence with the industry. These three research questions are targeted at 
providing important contributions to organizational theories and strategies for high-tech 
manufacturing industries, especially the IC industry.  
1.5 Theoretical Considerations 
Since the emergence of the fabless-ecosystem and the foundry-ecosystem in the late 
1970s and mid 1980s respectively, the landscape of the IC industry has changed 
significantly, characterized by the vertical disintegration of firms across the value chain. 
The second most important change in the IC industry landscape began in the mid 2000s, 
of which vertical integration (at least partial) or concentration of innovations was 
observed. It is important to examine the mechanisms behind the changes experienced by 
the firms in the industry. The study begins by reviewing some of the useful theories to 
explain this phenomenon; they are (1) technological regimes, (2) driving forces of 
organizational choices, (3) industry‟s innovation patterns, and (4) organizational 
feedback on technological regimes. The first research proposition examined is that 
transitions in technological regimes provide different environments at different points in 
time for latecomers to catch up and to leapfrog incumbents.  
The literature on latecomer effect also discusses the advantages sought by latecomers 
through the application of different strategies. The extant literature also examines how 
global value chains (GVCs) work as windows of opportunity for latecomers to catch up. 
The strategic choices of latecomers include linkages, leveraging and learning, while 
there is a set of criteria latecomers use to target the types of external resources to gain, 
which include rareness, imitability and transferability (Mathews, 2002, 2006). In 
addition, the study also reviews the critical concepts of firm-level core competency, i.e. 
Penrose‟s (1959) resource-based view, in an open innovation context where industrial 
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structural change takes place. The review also takes the cue that the concept of 
organizational core-competency is less prominent in open innovation systems when the 
industry experiences structural change. 
Finally, the literature review targets studies on organizational routines, followed by 
discussion of key concepts in theorizing process the mechanism of path dependence. 
The role of organizational absorptive capacity is helpful in determining an 
organization‟s trajectory. The model of organizational path dependence put forward by 
Sydow et al. (2009) is particularly important. The possibilities of path breaking or path 
creation are explored by incorporating the role of „vision‟ mustered by actors 
(entrepreneurial management). Of importance here is the concept of mutual 
reinforcement between an organization and its industry, which can lead to 
coevolutionary lock-ins. The research seeks to examine the following research 
proposition: actors can lead firms to escape from organizational path dependence 
through coevolutionary lock-ins. In doing so, the study examines the factors lie at the 
heart of the generative process to generate managerial implications. Figure 1.1 presents 
the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework 
Source: Authors. 
 
1.6 Methodological Considerations 
This research adopts both qualitative and quantitative methods. In line with the 
Fundamental Principle of Mixed Research, words, narratives and images add meanings 
to numbers while numbers add precision. On the one hand, open-ended questions were 
used and insights were sought through in-depth interviews with top management. It 
seeks to emphasize defined boundaries of categorizations to avoid diverging perceptions 
among interviewees. On the other hand, quantitative data was sourced from reliable data 
providers to corroborate and justify findings from the interviews. Secondary data was 
obtained from reliable documentation and databases such as IC Insights, CLSA 
Research and Gartner.  
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Nevertheless, the predominant research method adopted in this study is qualitative, 
which is widely used in ethnography (Buchanan, 1995). It relies on purposive rather 
than probabilistic research and seeks to intuitively and theoretically identify the key 
subjects, organizations and enterprises, and a network of agents to capture in-depth the 
dynamics of a phenomenon. As is well known, this analytical approach forsakes 
generalizability but allows a more holistic understanding of phenomena of the kind 
described above. For this study, it suffices to study the propositions by identifying the 
key actors involved. The identification of key actors will help facilitate the mapping of 
the subjects studied. 
The case study approach is adopted in order to provide analytical depth and to handle 
crucial but non-quantifiable factors, e.g. corporate decision-making, leaderships and 
constraints. In addition, the approach enhances the understanding of complex issues 
such as the role of entrepreneurial management in formulating strategies. The main 
units of analysis are the latecomer IC firms, although the thesis also examines some 
non-firm institutions with links to the firms, such as, public research institutes.  
The reasons for selecting Taiwan as the country of study are obvious. Not only that 
Taiwan has successfully caught-up economically, firms in the country have also arrived 
at the technology frontier in the IC industry through different strategies whereas 
Malaysia is a latecomer country still struggling to catch-up. As for the firm-level 
selection, the case-study approach is critical to provide opportunities for emphasizing 
practical lessons as other latecomers may learn from the successful examples, such as, 
TSMC. The Malaysian firms are used as shadow cases to improve generalizability.  
Major emphasis is placed on IC firms that undertake wafer-fabrication activities in this 
research. This is because a knowledge economy is embedded in the knowledge engine 
of particular economic activities. Wafer fabrication is the „learning centre‟ - the main 
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source of new productive knowledge in IC manufacturing. Technological innovation is 
driven by demands for practical solutions in productive, especially the manufacturing, 
sector. In contrast, knowledge-intensive services, such as, IC design or fabless firms can 
only be developed after a country first acquires the ability to fabricate the relevant 
products, thus the prosperity of services firms depends on the manufacturing firms. 
The overall timeframe of this study covers the period 1970 – 2013. However, each 
analytical chapter sets different timeframes to achieve specific research objectives. 
Taiwan began to formulate strategies to catch up in the IC industry from 1974 when the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was started (Mathews & Cho, 2000). 
Whereas the first spin-off from ITRI began life as an IDM and transformed its business 
model in the mid of 1990s, the world‟s first pure-play foundry was started in 1987. The 
1990s is the period when Taiwanese foundries began to grow to become industry 
leaders, as well as, the period when Malaysian foundries began to enter the industry as 
latecomers. Strong emphasis is given to the period after 2000 – the period when the 
pure-play foundries began to consolidate their operations.  
1.7  Thesis Outline 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review where the 
relevant theories are reviewed and the theoretical considerations for the research are 
discussed. The three identified research questions are examined separately with three 
different analytical frameworks in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Some of the research propositions 
use specific research methodologies and they are discussed in the respective chapters. 
Chapter 6 concludes with the synthesis of the study, implications for theory, strategic 
management and policy, as well as, limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first section of this chapter reviews the theories that explain changing technological 
regimes experienced by the IC industry; they are (1) technological regime and its 
relevant dimensions, (2) driving forces of organizational choices of vertical boundaries, 
(3) industry‟s innovation patterns, and (4) organizational feedback to technological 
regimes. To answer the second research question, the second section reviews studies on 
latecomer technological catch-up, latecomer insertion into GVC, resource acquisition 
strategies, and how open innovation affects value systems. The third section discusses 
organizational studies associated with routines, path dependence, absorptive capacity, 
vision construction, and coevolutionary mechanisms between firms and industry. 
2.1 Technological Regimes and Industry Patterns of Innovations 
A technological regime can be understood as the nature of technology representing a 
particular knowledge environment that enables firms to conduct problem-solving 
activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984, p.289) or the list of attributes that 
mould the development of physical technologies in a particular industry (Nelson, 2008). 
The process of technological learning is industry specific because different nature of 
technologies involves different uniqueness, tacitness and complexity (Winter, 1987). A 
similar notion of a technological regime was referred to by Teece (1996, p. 194) as 
constituting a set of „fundamental characteristics of technological development‟.  
2.1.1 Technological Regime and its Relevant Dimensions 
Technological opportunities and appropriability bring important impacts on an 
industry‟s innovation pattern. Empirical research by Gort and Klepper (1982), Cohen 
and Levin (1989), and Audretsch (1995) show that the factors determining the dynamics 
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of market structure and innovation go far beyond firm size or demand and are very 
much affected by aspects like opportunity and appropriability.    
The extant literature identified six key characteristics, namely uncertainty, path 
dependence, cumulativeness, irreversibilities, technological interrelatedness, tacitness 
and inappropriability (Teece, 1996). A technological regime is also defined by a 
particular combination of different technological dimensions, including the four 
prevailing ones identified by Breschi et al. (2000) – technological opportunities, 
appropriability of innovations, technical cumulativeness and the properties of 
knowledge base.  
To explain specifically the fabless eco-system, Yoon and Malerba (2010) developed a 
history-friendly model to show that technological interrelatedness, knowledge 
generalizability, economies of scale, and distance threshold of consumption cause 
changes to the vertical and horizontal boundaries of firms. Those changes happen in 
path-dependent ways. The following dimensions that form an industry‟s technological 
regime are considered; they are critical in understanding technological progress of the 
IC industry. 
2.1.1.1 Technological  Interrelatedness 
Technological interrelatedness between subsystems has a bearing on organizational 
choice of innovations and boundaries (Teece, 1996; Yoon & Malerba, 2010). In the 
fabless eco-system, decreasing interrelatedness in production stages has played an 
important role in the disintegration of design from manufacturing. Park et al. (2008) has 
examined in detail how technology relatedness, i.e. similarity of production process 
technology and technology innovation systems between two different business divisions, 
contribute to Samsung‟s success in diversifying into TFT-LCD business.  
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2.1.1.2 Cumulativeness 
The cumulative nature of technical advance in particular the knowledge regime helps 
transform present innovative activities into the technological innovation of the future. 
Any given innovation paves the way for a multitude of streams for further 
improvements to the original one, or spirals into new areas of innovation inspired by the 
original one. High levels of cumulativeness are therefore most apparent under 
environments where technological continuities and increasing returns underpin the 
nature of the industry (Breschi et al., 2000, p.392). The IC industry is characterized by 
such a condition, specifically Moore‟s Law, which states that transistor density in ICs 
doubles while the minimum line-width halves approximately every two years (Dubash, 
2005). Whereas the pace of node miniaturization has remained in logic chips, it has 
quickened to 12 months in memory chips (Rasiah et al., 2012). A firm‟s development at 
a technology node acts as a guide for the firm‟s future development of subsequent nodes.  
Under a specific regime, technological development progresses cumulatively along a 
path underpinned by that regime. Because technological progress builds on previous 
accomplishments, which are tacit and proprietary, technical development is therefore 
contingent on organization-specific characteristics (Teece, 1996). Hence, organizational 
technological development and capability building can be very much confined to 
previous achievements.      
2.1.1.3 Path-dependency 
There is a certain path of capability building, which organizations would follow at any 
given point in time. That path defines the set of strategies available to the organization; 
it also constrains the organization‟s future internal repertoire (Castaldi & Dosi, 2006). 
Following the theory of technological path dependence, a firm‟s technological 
knowledge base does not deviate too far away or too quickly from its preceding 
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direction because the firm‟s technical change follows along stable trajectories (Dosi, 
1982; Pavitt, 1986; Patel & Pavitt, 1997).  
The notion of path-dependency recognizes that „history matters‟ and within the studies 
of evolutionary economics as put forward by Nelson and Winter, the concept helps 
explain why technological change is mostly regular and its development is bounded 
(Nelson & Winter, 1977). Thus, a firm's previous investment decisions and its repertoire 
of routines determine and set bounds around its behaviour in the future (Teece, 1988). 
Some researchers have studied the levels of „historicity” in explaining how path 
dependence can range from mere dependence on origins to strong dependence on a 
specific series of events (David, 2001; Bassanini & Dosi, 2001; Castaldi & Dosi, 2006). 
New product and process developments of a firm often lie within the technological 
neighbourhood of previous developments.  
2.1.1.4 Degrees of Economies of Scale 
Degree of economies of scale also plays an important role in determining organizational 
boundaries in the IC industry. The capability gap among wafer fabs widens when the 
importance of economies of scale increases, which suggests that IDMs with low 
capability tend to outsource more to these independent fab owners. Malerba et al. 
(2008) noted that the comparative technological capability of upstream firms over 
downstream firms is an important factor in the organizational choice of vertical 
disintegration. It is reasonable for fabless firms to increase their outsourcing to 
foundries that have stronger manufacturing capabilities than them. In the IC industry, 
the capabilities concerned are fabrication capabilities to achieve high productivity, i.e. 
the yield rate.  
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2.1.1.5 Technological Opportunities 
Technological opportunities denote the likelihood of technological innovation for any 
given amount of research investment (see Breschi et al., 2000, p.395). High 
opportunities indicate that firms are easily motivated to undertake innovative activities 
as there are meaningful incentives and not much scarcity in the economic environment 
(Breschi et al., 2000). Therefore, high opportunities also mean that the majority of the 
newly developed technological innovations in the industry are impactful. 
2.1.1.6 Technological Appropriability 
Appropriability of innovations denotes the possibility of preventing innovations from 
being imitated and of benefiting, i.e. reaping profits, from innovations. An industry with 
high technological appropriability is one where technological innovations are easily 
protected from imitation. Low appropriability means that the economic environment of 
the industry is challenged with high level of externalities (Levin et al., 1987). Therefore 
the high appropriability condition provides incentives for firms to allocate resources for 
R&D.
1
   
2.1.2 Organizational Boundaries 
Formal structures of firms and their external linkages are vital determinants of 
organizational capability building (Teece, 1996).  There has been research to find out 
the factors and driving forces of organizational choices, including diversification into 
conglomerate firms (Kim & Lee, 2003). Through the use of a history-friendly model, 
Yoon and Malerba (2010) found that the entry of new downstream firms (fabless firms) 
can strengthen the capability of pure-play foundries. Therefore, the conditions of entry 
into the fabless market are able to determine the average vertical boundary of the 
                                                          
1 Technological appropriability condition affects the outputs of innovation in two ways, i.e. an incentive effect and an efficiency 
effect (Levin & Reiss, 1988). 
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industry. The feedback loop takes place when increasing demand for outsourcing 
enhances the capabilities of foundries which in return induces higher entry of fabless 
firms. 
2.1.2.1 Vertical Boundaries (Vertical Integration or Disintegration)  
Some examples depicting how vertical structures of organizations are linked to the rate 
and direction of innovations include Frankel‟s (1955) argument that the slow diffusion 
of innovations in the British textile, iron and steel industries around the turn of the 
century was attributed to the absence of vertically integrated firms.   
Vertical integration allows room for complementary investments among firms through 
the sharing of investments (Richardson, 1990; Williamson, 1975). The drivers of 
organizational integration to expand firms‟ scope of activities have been studied in 
detail (Teece, 1980, 1984, 1986). More often than not, firms choose to integrate or to 
diversify as a result of proprietary and technology transfer issues, provided that there are 
no existing well-established incumbents in their downstream activities and that 
downstream integration will not result in generating excess capacity (Teece, 1996). 
Therefore, vertical integration and product diversification are effective responses to 
contractual, proprietary and technology transfer problems in certain technological 
environment. The expansion of organizational boundaries can also come in other mixed 
mode forms, including JVs and different profit-sharing collaborations under different 
conditions of the above stated criteria (Teece, 1996). 
2.1.2.2 Virtual Vertical Integration 
The concept of virtual vertical integration is relatively new in existing studies. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon is gaining prominence in the IC industry. Few studies 
have explored this important concept. Among them are Kodama (2011) who, in his 
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efforts to examine how interactive business communities accelerate firm innovations 
through network boundaries, points to the role of value chain integration in TSMC‟s 
business model. Collaboration in the context of value chain integration means moving 
from a traditional segregated model to an integrated model (Kodama, 2011, p. 117). 
Virtual vertical integration is also referred to as a cluster, where firms from different 
specialization gather to collaborate and innovate (Lu, 2005). It is described as 
heterogeneous integration for system chips as the cluster combines firms specialized in 
chip design, application and subsystem design, wafer fabrication, and packaging and 
testing. 
2.1.2.3 External Linkages 
Analyzing the combined dynamics between the networks of collaborations and 
technology is complex. Networks of collaborations are dependent on the organizational 
choices and the industry‟s technological environments. A network is able to impact on 
technological change, firms‟ growth or even the competitive structure and that these 
changes can be self-reinforcing (Malerba, 2007). 
While establishing new boundaries within large MNCs, increasing inter-firm 
collaborations and open networked innovations have also led to blurred boundaries 
between firms (Cantwell, 2013). Networking and strategic alliances provide room for 
negotiations instead of authority and the opportunities for expanding organizational 
boundaries as the networked firms appropriate synergies from integration while 
avoiding significant costs. These collaborative arrangements come in various modes, 
including technology licensing, R&D JVs and consortia, manufacturing JVs and co-
marketing arrangements (Teece, 1996). 
Another interesting question to answer is how the dynamics of networks or external 
linkages are linked to technological discontinuities. Networks can have important 
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impacts on the technological environment of an industry, especially when networks that 
are created after certain technological discontinuities can consolidate within the 
stabilization of technology and large incumbent firms increase their dominance in the 
network structure (Madhavan et al., 1998; Malerba, 2007). 
2.1.3 Industry’s Patterns of Innovations 
Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II industries differ in the ways innovative 
activities are structured and organized.
2
 “Creative destruction” under Schumpeter Mark 
I is characterized by low barriers of entry into technological activities and a significant 
role played by new small firms and entrepreneurs in innovations. New firms and 
entrepreneurs challenge the incumbent firms and constantly disrupt the existing ways of 
manufacturing, organization and distribution, hence diminishing the quasi-rents 
attributed to earlier innovations. Schumpeter Mark II is characterised by `creative 
accumulation' where the dominance of large resourceful firms and barriers to entry 
prevent the birth of new innovators. These barriers consist of the accumulated stock of 
technological knowledge, R&D competencies, production, distribution and financial 
resources of established firms. The latter distinguishes firms with strong internalized 
R&D activities targeted at searching new stocks of knowledge. 
The Schumpeterian Mark I and Mark II patterns of innovation have also been 
characterized as „widening‟ and „deepening‟ respectively. A widening pattern of 
innovative activities is associated with continuously expanding the innovative base 
through the entry of new innovators and the progressive loss of competitiveness and 
technological dominance of established firms. A deepening pattern of innovation occurs 
with the concentration of a few innovators. These firms innovate from time to time 
                                                          
2 The terms Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II were introduced by Nelson and Winter (1982) and Kamien and Schwartz 
(1982) to explain the different dynamics of innovative activities explained by Schumpeter (1934) and Schumpeter (1942).  
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through the constant accumulation of technological capabilities (Malerba & Orsenigo, 
1994; 1996). 
Specifically, three dimensions of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation can be identified 
as attributed to the technological regime, i.e. the rate of concentration of innovative 
activities among firms, the degree of stability in the hierarchy of innovative firms, and 
technological entry and exit of the industry (Breschi et al., 2000). A Schumpeter Mark I 
industry is characterized by a large set of highly turbulent innovating firms, of which 
there are high technological opportunities, low appropriability and low cumulativeness 
within firms and a limited role of generic knowledge. These conditions result in low 
concentration of innovative activities, a relatively large number of innovators, high rates 
of technological entry and high instability in the hierarchy of innovators (Breschi et al., 
2000, p.395). Whereas a Schumpeterian Mark II industry is characterized by low 
opportunities, high appropriability and cumulativeness at the firm level with a strong 
internalized tacit and explicit knowledge base, which cause a high degree of 
concentration of innovative activities, low rates of entry and remarkable stability in the 
hierarchy of innovators (Breschi et al., 2000, p.395).  
Kamien and Schwartz (1982), through their „market structure and innovation‟ approach, 
dealt with the relationship between firm size and its rate of innovation on the one hand 
and monopoly power on the other. However, the approach did not recognise the mutual 
causation between innovation, market structure and firm size. Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Nelson and Winter (1982) argued that these variables are endogenously co-
determined. Nevertheless, such relationships of mutual causation and co-determination 
of factors that shape the structure and innovation patterns of the industry have remained 
rather unexplored.  
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2.2 Technological Studies on Latecomers’ Catch-Up  
Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron (1952, 1962) pioneered the notion of latecomer effect. 
Latecomers are regarded as countries or firms that arrive relatively late in certain 
industries with a clear target, which is to increase their real incomes by closing the gap 
they have with the advanced forerunners (Mathews, 2006: p.314). Latecomers can 
define a catch-up roadmap for themselves to capture the access of forerunners‟ 
knowledge and technology. In general, catching-up is analogous to the relative speed of 
runners racing on a path set by forerunners, while technology building is akin to the 
piling of bricks with an undefined vertical goal (Perez, 1988: p.86). 
The critical mechanism lies in the role of institutions and institutional change to 
overcome latecomer disadvantages and to benefit from latecomer advantages. The status 
of late arrival allows firms to strategize and access existing advanced technologies, and 
hence, exempts them from repeating the whole technological path advanced by the 
forerunners (Veblen, 1915; Gerschenkron 1952; Abramovitz, 1956; Mathews, 2006). To 
further exploit latecomer advantages, firms can hasten their catch-up process by 
breaking the organizational inertia faced by incumbents through strategic alliances and 
state support (Mathews, 2006). Because latecomers strategize around the possibilities 
inherent in their latecomer status, it is important to examine specifically the firm-level 
strategies deployed by different latecomer firms in order to identify the differences that 
distinguish successful catch-ups from the unsuccessful ones. 
2.2.1 Latecomer Catch-Up Strategies  
Gerschenkron‟s (1952, 1962) ideas stand diametrically opposed to Rostow‟s (1960) 
notion of „stages of growth‟, where development is perceived as following a series of 
linear and orderly steps in a sequence that cannot be changed. This "stage" concept 
obviously denies any possibility of catch-up and hence renders unnecessary any strategy 
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orchestrated to achieve this catch-up. Another example of a linear one-directional 
development model is Akamatsu's (1962) "Flying Geese" model, which was proposed 
to explain the rise of East Asian economies as a sequential process. 
Gerschenkron argues, on the other hand, that the building of new institutions and the 
pursuit of new strategies under the right circumstances that are supported by strong 
development policies can facilitate economic catch-up. 
3
 
Korea and Taiwan are two major Asia examples of how technological catch-up can help 
move countries from low-income to high-income status. Considering the case of Korea 
for which the government has pursued the Schumpeter Mark II model (creative 
accumulation), the country is characterized by a concentrated industrial structure and 
large conglomeration of firms since 1970s to focus on the growth of automobiles, 
semiconductors and telecommunications (Malerba & Nelson, 2012). To protect the 
successful chaebol - i.e. diversified business groups whose size and diversity are similar 
to those of Japan‟s keiretsu - from skyrocketing oil price in 1973-1975, South Korea‟s 
government provided strong insulation to these large firms through the maintenance of 
stable exchange rates, highly subsidized loans and a protected domestic market despite 
having to borrow extensively from abroad (Rasiah, 2011: p.167). The government also 
strategically used performance standards as strong institutions to support technological 
catch up in certain industries. Successful examples of this approach are Samsung, 
Hyundai and Pohang Steel Company (POSCO) in electronics, shipbuilding and 
automobiles and steel respectively (Amsden, 1989; Kim, 1997). 
During the technological catch-up process of firms in Taiwan, the national government 
applied a framework consistent with the sectoral system of innovations (SSI) approach 
                                                          
3  In the search for what explains technological advance, institutions are referred to as the rules of the game (North, 1990).  
Evolutionary economists often refer to them as whatever that shapes the behavioral patterns of actors in societies (Rasiah, 2011). 
The role of universities, government labs and professional societies are examples of critical institutions (Nelson & Winter, 1982).   
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by following initially the Schumpeter Mark I model (creative destruction) to support 
entry of new small firms into the industries like ICT, thereby stimulating the birth of 
numerous small and medium size firms, as well as, high industrial turbulence (Malerba 
& Nelson, 2012). The success of Taiwan‟s indigenous IC firms is also attributable to 
selective interventions by the government, through the creation of ITRI (Mathews & 
Cho, 2000). The government focused on the development of its vertically decentralized 
structure, in which firms were specialized in particular manufacturing stages (Rasiah & 
Lin, 2005). 
Consistent with the arguments of the evolutionary economists (Veblen, 1915; Nelson, 
2008), latecomers always evolve through the new conditions to effect the catch-up 
process. In the IC industry, as Rasiah (1988), Mathews (1997) and Brown and Linden 
(2009) have noted, crises have offered tremendous opportunity for latecomers to 
leapfrog ailing incumbents. The economic shakeout that accompanied the 1979-1980, 
and 1985-86 cases saw Samsung acquiring a number of American IC firms that helped 
it to leap ahead to create more advanced memory technologies (Edquist & Jacobssen, 
1987; Rasiah, 1988). Founded in 1980, UMC benefited from the technology acquisition 
from the financially troubled RCA by Electronics Research and Service Organization 
(ERSO) in Taiwan in 1976 (Rasiah & Lin, 2005). Morris Chang subsequently 
engineered the founding of TSMC between government capital and Philips in 1987 as 
the latter began to rationalize its losses in the semiconductor division. Hence, it is 
important to examine the catch-up process of past latecomers, and then seek to draw 
implications for new latecomers. Gerschenkron‟s idea, which he applied to countries 
can be extended to firms at which level strategies are drawn up and issues are dealt with 
(Mathews, 2002, 2006). Like countries, latecomer firms have accumulated knowledge 
on which to learn and draw up plans to achieve their catch-up objectives. 
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2.2.2 Global Value Chains 
Insertion into global value chains (GVCs) has helped latecomers to connect with global 
buyer and supplier activities around the world, without necessarily being controlled by 
MNCs (UNIDO, 2002/2003). These value chains, made possible by new technology, 
offer opportunities for latecomers to acquire the technology needed for participation and 
eventually to extend their role in these chains.  Leading firms in advanced countries 
who control and drive these strategies by providing the technology have increasingly 
outsourced segments of these chains in order to lower costs and risks.  In addition to 
strengthening their technological capabilities, latecomer firms also build links with that 
leading firms, learning from the latter specific organizational skills and market access, 
that are referred to as leveraging advantages (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  
Latecomer firms connecting to GVCs initially become subcontractors using the original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) business model (Hobday, 1995). These firms not only 
earn revenue, but through a gradual process of embedding themselves in GVCs, they 
build and strengthen linkages that enable them to ramp up their capabilities, including 
technological, and the country‟s industrial development (Mathews, 2006). Where 
production systems have not disintegrated and they are not connected with GVCs, 
latecomers face the challenging task of looking for strategic equivalents or seeking to 
work with international agencies to connect with GVCs. 
Latecomer firms were able to achieve their first competitive advantage when they 
recognize their own weaknesses. The strategy Taiwan created took full account of these 
weaknesses. Thus, Taiwan sourced its technology, knowledge and market access 
externally. Entry through low-cost contract manufacturing enabled national firms to 
gain a foothold in the world‟s production chains. Latecomer resource acquisition 
strategies can be analyzed using insights from the resource-based theory of firms 
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(Mathews, 2002). The resource-based view of firms, as coined by Penrose (1959), 
argues that the fundamental competitiveness of firms lie in the critical resources that 
enable production and product diversification. 
Specifically, the resource-based view argues that value is created if firms build their 
competitive advantage based on resources that are rare, non-imitable, and non-
transferable (Barney, 1991). But this theory is not as useful when applied to latecomer 
capability building, given their severe “resource position barriers” (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
To characterize the types of resources to be targeted by latecomers, drawing from 
insights of the resource based view, Mathews (2002, p. 481) argued that latecomers 
should target external resources that are least rare, most transferable (e.g. through 
reverse engineering), and most imitable.  
On top of that, the following stages are important for the latecomer firm‟s strategic 
choices based on Mathews (2002, p. 476): (1) Using linkage as the initial step that 
generates opportunities for the latecomer firm; (2) Leverage resources to take advantage 
of the linkages established; (3) Out of repeated applications of linkage and leverage, 
learning is achieved and that enabled the latecomer firm to acquire dynamic capabilities. 
Strategic shifts to outsourcing (i.e. OEM contracting) and technology licensing by 
incumbents in technology-intensive industries like the IC industry help create linkage 
opportunities for latecomers, of which opportunities for leveraging and learning may 
arise. Spillovers or externalities are therefore acquired by latecomers through linkages 
with foreign firms (Blomstrom & Kokko, 2001).  
2.2.3 Latecomer Resource Acquisitions in Open Innovation Context 
Changes in industries‟ technological regimes, emergence of new scientific discoveries, 
and increasing innovation costs and complexities induce growth of specialized 
innovating firms engaged in different modularized activities and interacting with other 
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actors across GVCs (Grandstrand et al. 1997; Brusoni et al., 2001). Given increasing 
modularization in technologies, a firm can capture benefits from the entire economy 
instead of relying solely on internal capabilities, no matter how capable it is (Langlois, 
2003: 375). This leads to the tendency of large firms giving way to specialized suppliers 
at the component-level and beyond (sub-components or knowledge or service inputs in 
intangible form) (Christensen, 2006). In time, it has also led to more prominent 
practices of open innovation in industries, which change the behavior of how firms in 
particular industries acquire external knowledge. 
2.2.3.1 Open Innovation  
Open innovation is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively” (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p.1). The outside-in dimension of open 
innovation can be divided into four areas (Chesbrough, 2003): (1) managerial strategies 
to create, capture and share values via the business model, (2) transactions or networks, 
(3) capabilities or competencies, and (4) dealing with technological and market 
uncertainty through real options.  
In the semiconductor industry, Christensen (2006) found that the organizational 
competencies of a system integration company, like Texas Instruments, depends on its 
capacity to reconfigure (1) its existing knowledge base (for example, via acquisitions 
and R&D integration) and (2) the mobilization of critical complementary innovative 
activities (such as chip design and marketing). Hence, in a vertically disintegrated 
industry, pursuing a core competency strategy with a strong inward orientation is not 
sufficient for firms to stay competitive.  
Indeed, the literature on innovation management since the 1970s had already identified 
the notion of open innovation by addressing learning and innovation that cuts across 
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disciplines and organizational boundaries (Rosenberg, 1982; Rothwell et al., 1974; von 
Hippel, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Rothwell, 1994; Pavitt, 1998). Hence, issues that have 
gained increasing traction include “how open is innovation” and “what determines the 
degree of openness” (Dahlander & Gann, 2010)?  
2.2.3.2 Business Model and the Creation and Capture of Value  
A firm‟s business model works as a mediator between technological development 
(input) and economic value creation (output) (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). 
Following Afuah (2004, p. 9), a business model is defined as “…the set of which 
activities a firm performs, how it performs them, when it performs them as it uses its 
resources to perform activities, given its industry, to create superior customer value… 
and put itself in a position to appropriate value”. Organizational strategies in business 
models determine the process of value creation and capture in open innovation systems 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). It involves how firms strategize the creation of 
value jointly with the other partners.  
Open innovation depends critically on value creation from innovation for a specific 
target group. A „value creating system‟ (Porter, 1985, 1990, 1996) is a vertical value 
chain extending from suppliers to customers (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). 
Understanding the firm‟s value chain and how it fits into the overall value system is key 
to the firm‟s ability to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. 
Open innovation can also be related to the concept of „co-opetition‟ as articulated by 
Brandenburger and Stuart (1996). In an open innovation platform, strategic 
collaborations enable the creation of value for the partners involved as different parties 
integrate their various skills and competencies. Because the creation of value is 
undertaken by multiple actors, cooperation is essential.  Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996, p. vii) noted, however, that while value creation is cooperative, value capture is a 
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competitive process. The role of trust relationships based on a blend of competition and 
cooperation was articulated lucidly by Piore and Sabel (1984). 
The “value constellation” concept is related to the value system as they emphasize the 
creation of value for customers (Normann & Ramirez, 1993). However, these two 
concepts differ in the way value is created. In the context of value constellations, firms 
pursue and practice collective competition, which means that competition is at the level 
of product offerings that the participating firms are collectively producing (Gomes-
Casseres, 2003; Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2006). Within each of these networks, a 
unifying vision is needed to bring partners together. Hence, leadership by a dominant 
firm presents within each network to govern and coordinate the group. 
Open innovation can also be viewed from the perspective of transaction value (Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993; Dyer, 1997; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008) rather than of transaction cost 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). By participating in open innovation, firms seek to maximize 
the transaction value rather than minimizing the transaction costs. They may therefore 
take actions to achieve joint gains even if costs are not minimized (Zajac & Olsen, 
1993, p. 138).  
When attempting to commercialize technology, establishing a value network requires 
distinguishing and shaping the role of suppliers, customers and other parties in 
influencing the value captured from the act (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002, p. 534). 
An alternative view of value creation is “value co-production”. In this alternative value 
system, value is not simply “added”, but is mutually created and recreated by combining 
or reconciling different values among actors (Hampden-Turner, 1990; Ramirez, 1999).   
Managerial strategies that shape organizational business models are therefore critical in 
this process. Not only are the innovating firms concerned with which and what types of 
technologies to be acquired from external sources (Vanhaverbeke & Peters, 2005), but 
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they are also concerned with how to leverage the externally sourced knowledge to 
create value for their customers and how to capture part of the resulting integrated 
value. Through strategic business models, firms also decide which innovations to be 
further developed in-house into products and which to be licensed out or divested as 
spin-offs (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). On the other side of the coin, latecomer firms are 
faced with increasing challenges of how to leverage on the external knowledge while 
securing and extending their role within the value system they operate in. 
2.2.3.3 Resource Acquisition to Complement Internal Knowledge 
As much as firms are increasingly placing more attention to source external knowledge 
through open innovation, studies have highlighted the importance of balancing the 
emphasis given to organizational ability to leverage on external knowledge and the 
organizational ability to build internal knowledge and technological capabilities 
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Gassmann & Enkel, 2004; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). 
Combining internal and external sources of knowledge can deepen the technological 
capabilities of firms since the two are complementary to each other (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2002). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) coined the term „absorptive capacity‟, which can be 
understood from the perspective of four different dimensions, namely, acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation and exploitation of external knowledge (Todorova & 
Durisin, 2007).
4
 Internal R&D capabilities affect firms‟ ability to recognize and monitor 
technological opportunities outside the firm; such capabilities are also crucial to 
facilitate those firms to exploit the external knowledge (Arora & Gambardella, 1994; 
Rosenberg, 1990; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).  
 
                                                          
4 More discussion of organizational absorptive capacity is included in the latter part of this section. 
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2.2.3.4 Resource-Based View in Open Innovation Context 
As discussed earlier, the resource-based view argues that firms should shape their 
competitive advantage to capture additional values by building or acquiring resources 
that are scarce, valuable and durable (Barney, 1991). The knowledge-based view is an 
extension of the resource-based view of Penrose (1959) by explicating knowledge as the 
most strategic and critical resource of firms (Spender, 1989; Nonaka, 1991; Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996). Hence, a sustainable competitive advantage of a firm is 
based on resources, more precisely knowledge, owned and controlled within the 
boundary of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and the differences between these firm-level 
resources explain differences in the level of performance among firms (Bierly & 
Chakrabarti, 1996). 
The resource-based view also expounds the concept of nurturing core competencies as a 
strategy to sustain long-term innovative and competitive performance (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Sanchez & Heene, 1997). However, a question that attracts increasing 
scholarly attention in this sense is how to bridge the “introspective viewpoint centered 
on the firm itself” to the concept of open innovation (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008, p.9). 
The concept of open innovation indicates that critical resources should not be closed off 
within the boundary of firms. The resources owned by independent firms have to be 
combined to create value for customers and the value network as a whole. With that, 
critical firm-level resources are extended beyond firms‟ boundaries and resource flows 
(i.e. knowledge flows) take place among the firms participating in that value network.  
Changing technological regimes and the rapid scientific and technical progress in high-
tech industries inform us that knowledge is broadly distributed and that no individual 
firm can possess internally all the required sources for a new commercializable 
innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996). This fundamental shortcoming of 
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the resource-based view has gained increasing traction as more studies seek to 
emphasize that inter-organizational linkages promote learning, innovation, and the 
creation of new knowledge within firms (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Powell et al., 1996; 
Tsai, 2000).  
Furthermore, research on open innovation has mainly focused on the interdependence of 
complementary knowledge in firms to introduce or commercialize a new innovative 
product (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). The study of latecomer catch-up requires other 
considerations to be included. While absorbing external knowledge and capturing part 
of the integrated value, latecomer firms need to technologically catch up to move up the 
value chain without compromising the overall value created for their customers. 
Throughout the process, the fundamental value created for customers may be altered as 
latecomer firms continuously fit themselves into the changing value system. It is 
important to re-examine the influence of resource-based view (i.e. the knowledge-based 
view) on latecomer catch-up literature by incorporating the concept of open innovation.  
2.3 Organizational Studies 
This sub-section reviews the relevant organizational studies by first discussing the key 
concepts in the theory of path dependence. It then explains why organizational 
absorptive capacity helps determine the organization‟s trajectory. Subsequently, it 
discusses the classical model of organizational path dependence advanced by Sydow et 
al. (2009). The section then explores the possibilities of path breaking or path creation 
by discussing about the role of „vision‟ mustered by actors (entrepreneurs or individual 
leaders). The review goes beyond the organizational level and incorporates the concept 
of mutual reinforcement between an organization and the industry, which leads to 
coevolutionary lock in.  
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2.3.1 Path Dependence 
To answer the question „why do firms differ‟, „routine‟ is the focal point in the 
formulation of evolutionary theory as expounded by Nelson and Winter (1982). Routine 
is defined as “……most of what is regular and predictable about business 
behaviour……especially if we understand that term to include the relatively constant 
dispositions and strategic heuristics that shape the approach of a firm to the non-routine 
problems it faces” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 15). Because firms often stick to a path 
and do what they previously have done (Nelson & Winter 1982, p. 134-135), 
organizational routines can evolve into organizational path dependence in time. 
The origin of the path dependence concept dates back to David's (1985) explanation of 
the „stickiness‟ in the use of the QWERTY keyboard from a historical perspective. He 
noted that a path-dependent chain of events is one in which the outcome is the result of 
intervening events, some of which may while others may not occur by chance. These 
intervening events do not necessarily cancel each other out and are therefore "non-
ergodic" - outcomes depend on the paths followed. Path dependence has found 
increasing acceptance in studies of social sciences (Lamberg & Tikkanen, 2006; 
Antonelli, 2008; Gruber, 2010), regional economics (Saxenian, 1994; Sydow et al., 
2010), technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982; Dolata, 2009), and strategic management 
(Koch, 2011).  
In theorizing „creative destruction‟, Schumpeter (1942) postulated that any system that 
is optimum at a point in time will not remain the same over time. At the organizational 
level, organizations follow a certain path of capability building at any given point in 
time. That path defines the set of strategies available to the organization, and it also sets 
bounds around what the organization‟s internal strategy set is likely to be in the future 
(Castaldi & Dosi, 2006). A firm‟s technological knowledge base also does not deviate 
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too far or too quickly from its preceding direction because the firm‟s technical change 
follows along stable trajectories (Dosi, 1982; Pavitt, 1986). Therefore a firm's previous 
decisions on technological investments and set of routines limit its future technological 
behaviour (Teece, 1988). Path dependence is thus important to explain how firms‟ 
capability building differs since it depends on organizations‟ ability to balance between 
continuity of the existing paths and redirecting their capabilities by competitively 
breaking out of the path (Dosi et al., 2000, p.6).  
Path dependence showcases the notion of „moving forward‟, thus takes into account 
technological opportunities that lie ahead. Most research posit that the growth of an 
industry is attributable to the technological opportunities present. Technological 
opportunities available to firms are, thus, argued to be exogenous to the industry itself 
(Teece et al., 1997: 523). However, technological opportunities may actually be 
endogenous, i.e. the availability of technological opportunities is firm-specific since 
opportunities are often created by the innovativeness of firms themselves (Teece et al., 
1997). 
2.3.2 Absorptive Capacity  
The dynamics of technological capability building at the organization-level affects 
significantly the catch-up process of latecomers (Amann & Cantwell, 2012). Absorptive 
capacity, which is defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p.128) as “the ability of a 
firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends”, is largely a function of the firm‟s level of prior related knowledge. 
This view has been applied to study firm-level technological capability building in 
explaining the successful catch-up of Samsung Electronics (Kim, 1997) and Hyundai 
Motor (Kim, 1998). 
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Two features of absorptive capacity can affect the innovativeness of organizations. First, 
acquiring and accumulating absorptive capacity in an area at one point in time can lead 
to more efficient accumulation of knowledge in the future to assimilate and exploit any 
external knowledge. Second, the possession of a related knowledge base is crucial for 
firms to better evaluate the outcomes of developing new technologies by assimilating or 
appropriating certain external technological knowledge. Hence, absorptive capacity 
leads to the formation of expectations, while revised expectations in return help 
determine subsequent investment in more absorptive capacity, which affects the firms‟ 
R&D intensity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, the development of absorptive 
capacity is itself path-dependent.  
Organizations with higher levels of expertise or absorptive capacity are more sensitive 
to potential technological opportunities and they are more proactive in exploiting 
external opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 1994). This self-reinforcing 
mechanism that affects organizations‟ sensitivity to new technological opportunities 
helps explain why certain firms succeed while others fail at times when technological 
dimensions change. 
2.3.3 The Sydow et al. Model  
Building on David (1985, 1994) and Arthur (1989, 1994), the classical model advanced 
by Sydow et al. (2009) begins with an open search process (Phase I in Figure 2.1). As 
organizations progress from Phase I to Phase II, the model experiences a moment that 
sets path dependence into motion, i.e. the “critical juncture” (Collier & Collier 1991), 
when prior decisions activate a series of self-reinforcing loops that leads organizations 
to progress along defined patterns. In Phase II, if a reinforcing process is triggered and 
once a critical mass is achieved, the process can be irreversible. Options are then 
increasingly narrowed to the point where organizations no longer have choices. The 
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transition from Phase II to Phase III is therefore indicated by a „lock-in‟ in Sydow et 
al.‟s (2009) model. During this phase, organizations face rigidity in courses of action 
due to reasons, including high switching costs, sunk costs and monopoly. The state of 
path dependence is therefore caused by positive feedback mechanisms that lead to 
inefficiencies.  
Sydow et al. (2009) distinguished path dependence from imprinting, structural inertia, 
or increasing commitment. However, strict demarcation is argued to limit the concept‟s 
empirical applicability (Manning & Sydow, 2011). To broaden the concept‟s 
applicability, it is helpful to extend it beyond the boundary of organizations and to 
incorporate concurrent movements in the industry. 
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             Figure 2.1: Organizational Path Dependence Model  
  Source: Sydow et al (2009). 
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2.3.4 Vision in Path Breaking and Path Creation 
The overtone of determinism in most studies on path dependence has resulted in an 
over-emphasis on initial conditions without sufficient recognition of the potential of 
human will to unlock paths (Bassanini & Dosi, 2001). The entrepreneurial role in path 
breaking is conceptualized as „mindful deviation‟ by Garud and Karnøe (2001) as 
entrepreneurs are the ones who break away from norms, by articulating and promoting 
new alternatives into organizations.  
Path dependence is affected by the „state‟ of variables including capabilities, visions, 
organizational set-ups, and their specific combinations, which are often influenced by 
strategic managerial discretions (Dosi et al., 2011, p.7). „Initial birthmarks‟ and 
subsequent historical paths of organizations involving both operational repertories and 
higher level collective visions - that help define the very identity of organizations - play 
key roles in the path-breaking process (Dosi et al., 2011).  
Vision can be defined as a “set of beliefs in the firm regarding the its internal and 
external circumstances, the shape of things to come in the future, and, in the light of 
these, the way the firm should play its cards” (Fransman, 1999, p.54). While Swann and 
Gill (1993) view vision as a tactical and strategic means to achieve various corporate 
objectives, this study adopts Fransman‟s (1994, 1999) notion that vision is constructed 
on a set of beliefs by the key decision-makers. With that, this study distinguishes the 
concept from the popular notion that vision is an indication of foresight, which is the 
ability to know what is required to achieve one‟s objectives. Because vision-
construction is led by entrepreneurs and it is capable of altering the orientation of a 
firm‟s trajectory, it offers firms the opportunity to break from path dependence 
(Fransman, 1999).  
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2.3.5 Mutual Reinforcement, Coevolutionary Lock-In and Escaping from Path 
Dependence 
Despite path dependence being largely driven by self-reinforcement, there can also be 
mutual reinforcement, i.e. interaction between „local‟ and „population-level‟ 
mechanisms (Dobusch & Schüβler, 2012, p.639). However, heterogeneity among 
industry agents and their imperfect adaptation within organizations and broader social 
networks lead to differences in pattern formation, which indicates that the system as a 
whole can never lock into a specific path (Coriat & Dosi, 1998; Bassanini & Dosi, 
2001). Thus, while the coevolutionary nature of various socio-economic adaptations can 
be a source of lock-in, it also opens the door to major discontinuities and path de-
locking. 
Deviations from the status quo may bring about a coevolutionary response from 
interdependent actors, each with their own idiosyncrasies (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992; 
Latour, 1987). Coevolution takes place when two or more components evolve together 
but not in perfect harmony across time and space. The coevolving parts may, through 
negative or positive feedback, both enable and constrain each other.  
In the study of the IC industry, most empirical works on coevolutionary reaction have 
focused on Intel (Burgelman, 1994, 1996, 2002; Burgelman & Grove, 1996, 2007) 
using firm-level longitudinal data. Burgelman posited that the path taken by Intel is an 
example of coevolutionary lock-in that has led to the firm‟s success, which has been 
extremely dependent on microprocessors. Because the technological roadmap of Intel 
focused on the development of the next generations of microprocessors, deviations from 
the firm‟s long-term technological trajectory is not easy.   
As much as Intel enjoys virtual monopoly of the highest value component of personal 
computers (PCs), which allowed the firm the appropriation of rents in the industry, such 
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asymmetries generated positive feedback loops that cost Intel higher and higher 
investments to enable the adoption of newer microprocessors. Nevertheless, the 
complementary effects allowed Intel to control its external environment and influence 
the pace of the industry‟s technical progress (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Being the 
driving force of the PC industry, Intel was able to dictate the tempo of changes in the 
other agents including customers, competitors, suppliers, and complementors. Intel‟s 
competitiveness also increasingly deepened the firm‟s knowledge base of the PC 
technology, thus constantly reinforcing the coevolutionary lock-in. In short, positive 
environmental feedbacks on Intel‟s choices of strategies intensified the relevance of the 
firm‟s selections, thus engendering high coevolutionary lock-in (Burgelman, 2002). 
2.4 Summary 
The notion of technological regime was first used to characterize the two models of 
Schumpeterian innovations (1934, 1942). The two different models are associated with 
two different Schumpeterian patterns of innovation that concern hierarchy of innovators, 
concentration of innovation activities and entry and exit of firms. Subsequent studies on 
technological regimes have sought to link the concept with different driving forces 
between upstream and downstream firms. There have also been studies attempting to 
explain how the driving forces lead to firms‟ choices of organizational boundaries, as 
well as, that show that different technological regimes present different catch-up 
opportunities for latecomers. However, what remains critically intriguing is the 
transitional process from one technological regime to another. While existing studies on 
technological regimes have generated significant impact on the concept of firm-level 
innovations, as the study has argued, it is important to integrate other concepts in search 
for a useful framework that can explain the mechanisms behind the transitional process 
for a better understanding of technological regimes. In so doing, the study posits that 
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transitions in technological regimes provide different environments at different points in 
time for latecomers to catch up and to leapfrog the incumbents.  
Understanding changes in particular industry‟s technological regime is the fundamental 
basis to understand firms‟ innovative activities. Thus, they are highly relevant in 
understanding firms‟ technological catch-up. In the search to find out why some 
latecomers have successfully caught up while the others have not (despite attempting to 
pursue the same catch-up model), the study proposes that the remarkable catch-up story 
of Taiwanese foundries goes beyond the existing argument that latecomers‟ catch-up is 
a form of insertion into GVCs from where they sought to link, leverage and learn. The 
research proposition is, the Taiwanese latecomers have deployed different resource 
acquisition strategies in order to catch up and leapfrog the incumbents as the industry 
experienced different structural changes and progressed through different value systems. 
The concept of organizational core-competency becomes less prominent in an open 
innovation environment as the industry experienced structural changes. 
The literature review goes on to include a brief discussion of the key concepts in the 
theorization of path dependence. The review also explains why organizational 
absorptive capacity helps determine the organization‟s trajectory. Subsequently, the 
classical model of organizational path dependence advanced by Sydow et al. (2009) is 
discussed. The possibilities of path breaking or path creation are explored by 
incorporating the role of „vision‟ mustered by actors (entrepreneurial management). The 
review eventually discusses the concept of mutual reinforcement between an 
organization and its industry, which can lead to coevolutionary lock-ins.  
Integrating the related concepts (e.g. path dependence, structural inertia and 
coevolutionary lock-ins) can be done by using positive feedback as an explanatory 
variable and as a conceptual bridge (Dobusch & Schüβler, 2012). Moreover, simulating 
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positive feedback mechanisms and boundary conditions at different levels of analysis 
provides a different but insightful perspective to the understanding of path dependence, 
as well as, the related concepts (i.e. avenues of escaping from path dependence). 
Because path dependence emphasizes that history matters, this study reckons the 
importance of conceptualizing the role of actors in creating history (Garud & Karnøe, 
2001). However, if coevolutionary lock-ins enable a firm to control its external 
environment and to shape the progress of the industry, whereas „vision‟ offers the 
possibilities of path breaking, actors can also lead firms to escape from organizational 
path dependence through coevolutionary lock ins since firms‟ technological trajectory 
depends very much on the strategic interpretations of actors and its absorptive capacity. 
New technological opportunities can then become endogenous to firms with important 
managerial implications. 
Therefore, conforming with Dobusch and Schüβler‟s (2012) suggestion that the concept 
of path dependence should be applied appropriately instead of theorizing it simply as “a 
corset that is methodologically and conceptually too constricting” (p.639), this study 
integrates other concepts to stretch it beyond organizational boundary to explore the 
potential of coevolutionary lock-ins so as to escape from internal path dependence to 
explain firm differences. The evolutionary approach allows the study to conceptualize 
critical factors contributing to the role of actors (i.e. the entrepreneur or the individual 
leader) in the generative process of path creation or path breaking. We will then be able 
to know why TSMC has performed much better than UMC in the industry, despite a 
similar start-up and catch-up process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TECHNOLOGICAL REGIMES, ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES, AND 
INDUSTRY’S INNOVATION PATTERNS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the research proposition being analysed is that transitions in 
technological regimes provide different environments at different points in time for 
latecomers to catch up and to leapfrog the incumbents. The chapter first presents the 
analytical framework for the research proposition and discuss the rationale behind the 
development of the framework; it then discusses the research methods used for this 
chapter. Subsequently, the chapter presents its findings, discussion, and summary. 
3.2 Analytical Framework 
The proposed framework in Figure 3.1 seeks to explain the transitions of technological 
regime in the technology-intensive IC manufacturing industry, under the condition that 
the environment is free of externalities. Because the focus of this chapter is to examine 
how the transitions of the regime are contingent on the actions of industry players, i.e. 
firms, the analysis is done on the basis that the processes take place under a static 
institutional environment with no path-breaking institutional forces aimed at interfering 
the industry‟s status quo. Six key dimensions that mould the technological regime of the 
IC industry were identified from the review of previous studies – technological 
interrelatedness, technological path-dependency, cumulativeness, degree of economies 
of scale, technological opportunities and technological appropriability. 
Following earlier studies, these dimensions of technological regime determine the level 
of the key driving forces in the industry; namely technological interdependency, impact 
of technological discontinuities, gap of manufacturing capabilities and gap of 
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technological capabilities between downstream and upstream firms in the industry. 
These driving forces cause different impacts on firms‟ vertical boundaries, affecting 
their decisions to vertically disintegrate, specialize, outsource or vertically integrate, 
affecting the industry‟s patterns of innovation. 
Firms‟ network systems are subsequently affected as firms respond to the patterns of 
innovations by strengthening their external linkages, creating a feedback loop to the 
technological regime. The external linkages are formed to „fortify‟ the firms against 
their competitors to achieve synergies such as lower costs of R&D, secured supplies of 
components or locked-in customer orders. Smaller and specialized firms see the need to 
fortify themselves against the large and vertically integrated firms, i.e. the IDMs. 
Among the IDMs, firms expand their external linkages in order to strengthen or to 
maintain their leading positions in the industry. Firms‟ choices of external linkages and 
the consequent network system of each firm collectively interfere with the industry‟s 
status quo, resulting in changes in specific technological dimensions, and hence the 
overall technological regime. With the exception of a change of policy targeted 
specifically at interfering the status quo of a certain technological dimension (i.e. the 
emergence of a path-breaking forces), the technological regime of the industry evolves 
in a process described above.  
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Figure 3.1: Changing Technological Regimes through Endogenous Transitions 
Source: Authors.  
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3.3 Research Method 
This chapter uses insights and information drawn from a number of interviews 
conducted from 2012 - 2013. The interviewees are industry experts who help us identify 
the key industry highlights during two different phases categorized in this chapter. The 
focus is on the period after the emergence of the fabless and foundry eco-system. The 
study focuses on examining how Taiwanese IC firms emerged late as pure-play 
foundries through vertical disintegration and by specializing among industry players. 
This period of time is referred to as Phase I, i.e. the period after the introduction of the 
first pure-play foundry and before the 21
st
 century (1987 - 1999). On top of that, the 
major trends of the overall industry as direct impacts of the emergence of vertical 
disintegration or specialization are analyzed. This period is referred to as Phase II, i.e. 
the period after the 21
st
 century (2000 - 2012). 
To achieve internal validity and reliability, the key informants in this study represent 
different organisations, including technology or R&D institutes, government agencies, 
IC firms, market research firms, and academia. Multiple sources of evidence ensure the 
quality of the interviews and allow the researcher to maintain neutrality while 
capitalizing on each individual‟s information and insights (Yin, 1994, 2014). Table 3.1 
lists the interviewees and their respective role in the IC industry.  
The industry experts provided the study with important insights on the dynamics and 
specificities of high-tech manufacturing with a major focus on the IC industry. They 
also provided the researcher with perceived causal inferences and helped relate the 
details to the key concepts in the proposed framework. The findings are explained in 
paragraphs while the data gained from different reliable database providers are 
presented. The data corroborate the interview findings and work as useful conceptual 
indicators. 
46 
 
The focus of analysis for this study is the Taiwanese latecomer firms in the IC industry, 
specifically the pure-play foundries. More often than not, the study draws findings from 
the world‟s largest pure-play foundry –TSMC. TSMC was the world‟s first pure-play 
foundry and the firm has evolved to become the world‟s largest and most advanced 
logic IC foundry by the middle of Phase II, accounting for almost 50% of the industry‟s 
total market share. 
To simplify the analysis of upstream and downstream firms, this chapter does not 
incorporate backend packaging and testing firms as the technological regimes that 
underpin back-end IC manufacturing and front-end IC manufacturing are different. 
Upstream firms are referred to as customers providing designs for manufacturing 
whereas downstream suppliers are wafer fabrication service providers. Vertically 
integrated IDMs are included into the analysis as these firms used to be the chip 
fabrication service providers to fabless firms, prior to the emergence of pure-play 
foundries. Furthermore, the foundry services are also offered to IDMs as the vertically 
integrated firms switch to the fab-lite model. Changing technological regimes will affect 
the interactions between the IDMs (suppliers) and the fabless firms (hence the upstream 
customers), as well as, the interactions between the IDMs (upstream customers) and the 
pure-play foundries (downstream suppliers).  
This chapter organized the collected data from interviews by using the qualitative 
content analysis method as posited by Gläser and Laudel (2013). This method extracts 
and processes only the relevant data or information using categories derived ex ante 
from the theoretical framework. Patterns in the extracted data are identified and 
integrated into typologies (Yin, 2011). To ensure the classifications match both 
the theory and data, theory was modified throughout the process when needed. 
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Table 3.1: List of Interviews 
Organization 
type 
Organization Position Key expertise 
R&D 
institutes/ 
Government 
agencies 
1.Bell 
Laboratories, 
New Jersey 
R&D engineer          
(1963-1989)
A
 
Well known for co-inventing the 
non-volatile semiconductor 
memory which enabled the 
development of all modern 
electronic systems. He was asked 
by the Taiwanese government to 
return to Taiwan in 1990 to 
nurture engineering students.  
 2.ITRI 
 
From engineer in ERSO to 
President of ITRI         
(1976-2003)
B 
 
One of the seven engineers who 
was sent by the Taiwanese 
government to US in the 1970s to 
be trained under the RCA 
technology transfer programme.  
3.ERSO Chief Director  
(late 1980s)
C
 
Led Taiwan‟s largest and most 
ambitious National R&D 
„Submicron Project‟. The project 
developed Taiwan first 8-inch 
CMOS submicron manufacturing 
technology and transformed 
Taiwanese IC industry to global 
standard. 
Academia 4.National 
Chiao Tung 
University 
(NCTU)  
National Endowed Chair 
Professor and UMC Chair 
Professor
A
 
Called by the Taiwanese 
government to return to Taiwan 
from Bell Lab in 1990 to nurture 
engineering students. 
 5.Tsing Hua 
University 
Professor of Technology 
Management, Morris 
Chang Chair Professor
B
 
Taiwan‟s leading professor in 
Technology Management  
IC Firms 6.Macronix President 
C
 Led Macronix to be the world‟s 
fourth largest IDM that 
specialized in non-volatile 
memory industry. 
 7.TSMC  Senior Executive of 
Integrated Technology  
The leader of the Integrated 
Technology division of TSMC. 
He has been leading the R&D and 
technological development of 
Moore‟s Law in TSMC for the 
past 16 years. 
 8.Vanguard  Co-founder then President Vanguard International 
Semiconductor (VIS) Corporation 
is a subsidiary of TSMC. It was 
co-founded by Morris Chang.  
 9.UMC Manager of Asia Sales 
Division and Business 
Management 
A key leader in UMC‟s top 
management.  
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Table 3.1, continued: List of Interviews 
Organization 
type 
Organization Position Key expertise 
  Two ex-senior engineers Involved in UMC‟s R&D 
projects. 
 10.Advanced 
Semiconductor 
Engineering 
(ASE) 
R&D Director Leads ASE‟s global R&D 
projects. Also a researcher in 
technology management. ASE is 
the world‟s largest and most 
advanced service provider of 
semiconductor packaging and 
testing. 
Market 
research 
firms 
11.CLSA Asia-
Pacific Markets 
Technology consultant and 
guest author for CLSA 
semiconductor technology 
reports (official email 
communications) 
 
Semiconductor lithography. 
Besides professing at University 
of Texas (Austin), his experience 
ranged from working in 
established technological 
organizations including National 
Security Agency and 
SEMATECH.  
 12.Macquarie 
Securities Korea 
Limited 
Managing director – Korea 
Technology Hardware 
Research 
Technology analysis of 
semiconductor industry.  
Note: A, B, C = Change of professional roles in the industry. 
Source: Interviews by authors, 2012 – 2013. 
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3.4 Findings 
This section evaluates the empirical evidence of the industry‟s evolution using the 
analytical framework presented in the previous sub-section. The findings are presented 
according to Phase I and Phase II of the IC industry. Each phase is first presented with 
how a technological regime leads to the choice of organizational boundaries, followed 
by the feedback from the firms onto the technological regime. 
3.4.1 Phase I: Technological Regime and Driving Forces in Choice of 
Organizational Boundaries 
3.4.1.1 Technological Interrelatedness and Interdependency 
The introduction of the fragmented business model heralded a technological revolution 
that changed the industry‟s landscape as fabless firms began to mushroom in the 
industry without having to inject lumpy investments into wafer fabrication facilities. 
Instead, the capital was spent on R&D and the firms‟ IPs would not have to be shared 
with giant MNCs again, which propelled the growth of fabless firms. As the industry 
was rather fragmented at this point, the interrelatedness (and so the interdependency) 
between fabless firms and foundries were considered lower as compared to Phase II. 
3.4.1.2 Technological Cumulativeness, Path-Dependency and Impact of 
Technological Discontinuities 
The IC industry is a knowledge and technology intensive industry that has been 
governed by Moore‟s Law since the introduction of the theory by the co-founder of 
Intel in 1965.  Moore‟s Law states that transistor density in ICs doubles while the 
minimum line-width halves approximately every two years (Dubash 2005). The IC 
industry is therefore considered as technologically cumulative as firms are driven by the 
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law, which requires that a firm‟s development of a smaller technology node acts as a 
guide to its future development of subsequent nodes. 
SEMATECH developed the first National Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 
(NTRS) in the early 1990s. The roadmap identified the key technology challenges for 
the US integrated circuit industry to keep up with Moore's Law. SEMATECH was 
originally driven by the US-member firms. By 1999, it renamed itself International 
SEMATECH and expanded its membership to include global semiconductor 
manufacturers. Over the years, it has regularly updated the roadmap and has 
significantly expanded its scope (CLSA Research, 2012). Firms in the IC industry 
progressed at Moore‟s prediction and firms built their capabilities following the 
predefined technological trajectory. Consequently the development of the IC industry is 
also path-dependent. 
Where technological cumulativeness and path-dependency are high, the event of 
technological continuities tends to have a larger impact to the firms‟ decisions in 
vertical boundaries. However, no major technological discontinuity took place during 
Phase I. As will be discussed later, technological cumulativeness and path-dependency 
have a more critical role when the industry evolves into Phase II.  
3.4.1.3 Economies of Scale and Resulting Capability Gap Among Manufacturers 
In the IC industry, a high degree of economies of scale has always been important to 
regulate the wafer fabrication process. However, when compared to Phase II, the degree 
of economies of scale required in Phase I is lower than that of in Phase II. Therefore in 
Phase I, the gap of manufacturing capabilities between manufacturers is smaller. 
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3.4.1.4 Technological Opportunities and Resulting Technological Capabilities 
In Phase I, intellectual property (IP) vendors already existed although was not 
popularizing, and physical design tools were available from third-party electronic 
design automation (EDA) vendors which enabled system designers to freely develop 
their own chips and fabless firms without investing into manufacturing facilities to 
emerge (Saito, 2009). Because the costs of designing became significantly low due to 
the easy availability of design tools and fabless firms diverted virtually all their 
resources into chip designing and R&D, innovations became easier. Thus, technological 
opportunities were high in Phase I. 
Given high technological opportunities and the fact that the fabless firms were still 
emerging in the industry, any new and small design house in the industry could have 
similar innovation opportunities. Hence there was no clear distinction between fabless 
firms and foundries in terms of their technological capabilities.  
Although a very large foundry arm of an IDM can avoid such problems, IDMs had to 
choose spending on design over spending on production. Hence many IDMs in the 
industry eventually experienced a switch towards a fablite model, in which their chips 
of increasingly smaller nodes are now outsourced to pure-play foundries that continue 
to invest in more advanced wafer fabs.  
3.4.1.5 Technological Appropriability and Resulting Technological Capabilities  
The IC industry is considered as having lower appropriability in Phase I when compared 
to Phase II. Although Intellectual Property (IP) vendors existed at that time, the 
appropriation of IPs was less intense among the industry players. As the number of 
transistors on a chip incessantly increases due to the miniaturization process, the 
smallest process node was 0.18 micron meter by the end of 1999 and there was 1 
million transistors placed on a single chip (ITIS, 1999). Due to the rapid technological 
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progress, the complexity of Large Scale Integration (LSI) design increased and the 
conventional ways of using Standard Cell or Full Custom to design millions of „gates‟ 
became almost unviable towards the end of Phase I. Figure 3.2 shows that there has 
been an increasing design gap between the number of available gates in silicon and the 
number of utilized gaps, indicating that there is a huge gap between the capability to 
design and the capability to produce.  
 
Figure 3.2: IC Design Capabilities and IC Production Capabilities 
Source: Industrial Technology Information Services (ITIS), 1999. 
IP began to become an efficient tool to manage and to reuse technologies. The use of IP 
was further induced when firms in the industry faced difficulties to meet the order-lead 
times had they designed everything in-house as the types of applications were also 
broadening.  Because the trend of using IP was merely emerging towards the end of 
Phase I and firms were yet to exploit the advantages of IP, the appropriability of 
innovations was considered low. The low appropriability condition indicates that there 
were no major firm significantly controlled the use of IPs in the industry at that time. 
Such condition therefore indicates that there was no major gap of capabilities between 
the downstream and the upstream firms.    
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3.4.1.6 Organizational Choices of Vertical Boundaries and Industry’s Patterns of 
Innovations 
The abovementioned technological regime induced the consequent driving forces and 
has overall increased the demand for independent foundry services. Such conditions 
motivated more firms to enter as foundries, more IDMs to outsource their production or 
to vertically disintegrate in order to specialize. These in turn induced the growth of 
fabless firms in the industry and motivated more entries of IP vendors and design 
houses. In other words, the industry experienced further disintegration and small firms 
emerged specializing in different vertical scopes. The industry was observed as 
experiencing less stability in the hierarchy of innovators, high level of entry and exit 
thus low concentration of innovations.  
3.4.2 Phase I: Feedback on Industry’s Technological Regime 
When the industry has low stability of innovators, high entry and exit thus leading to 
low concentration of innovations, it is found that smaller and specialized firms tend to 
strengthen their external linkages through strategic alliances, JVs and R&D consortiums. 
However, such activities are less aggressive in Phase I when compared to Phase II. 
Before the 1990s, the IC industry was still dominated by IDMs. As the IC industry 
experienced vertical disintegration throughout Phase I, the production of IC was 
significantly disintegrated into specialized IP providers, design service firms, EDA 
vendors, chip prototyping companies, IC foundries for wafer-fabrication, packaging and 
testing firms.  
These firms responded to the industry‟s patterns of innovations by strengthening their 
external linkages. In Phase I, the target of external linkages by foundries was the IP 
providers (ITIS, 1999). Foundries at this juncture began to form strategic alliances with 
IP providers or design houses besides maintaining the basic Cell Library in order to 
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ensure more comprehensive supplies of application-specific-intellectual-property 
(ASIP). Because barriers of entry into System-Level-Integration were high, the 
Taiwanese foundries strategically formed alliance with IP vendors and began to build 
their „IP Libraries‟. Strong development of IP support within the foundries subsequently 
fed back to the technological regime and affected concepts such as technological 
opportunities and appropriability.  
TSMC began to involve in various IP alliances, including the IP Library Alliance, the 
EDA Alliance, and the Design Center Alliance. TSMC has since been well-known for 
its services in IP compilation. The compilation contains TSMC‟s own IP as well as the 
industry's largest library of third-party IPs. Designs for third parties are tested in TSMC 
and each design must comply with TSMC design rules and models. IP alliance members 
sold their IPs directly to TSMC; the designs were then stored by TSMC. Customers paid 
TSMC to look through the library to choose the designs to be used. The alliance 
members who sold the IPs were also under contract to support their individual IP by 
providing each customer's specific wafer design and business model. The EDA Alliance 
which consists of leading EDA firms compiled a set of process technology files to 
simplify the design process. Some selected members of the alliance established close 
collaborations with TSMC‟s design technology services team to implement TSMC‟s 
designs.  
To ensure higher manufacturing accuracy, TSMC also introduced Unified Design for 
Manufacturing (UDFM), which was developed through strategic collaborations with 
EDA and other partners specialized in design infrastructure. TSMC provided its 
customers with unified access to its foundry data and the copy of its factory tool chain 
and process models. This method effectively compensated for the increasing 
manufacturing complexities and variances in advanced process technologies.  
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To accelerate chip prototyping to production and to shorten design cycle time, TSMC 
developed a free IP prototyping programme - Quickstart. The programme includes a 
pool of free IPs from TSMC and its selected third-party providers. Hence, qualified 
customers did not have to pay licensing fees to IP providers until their design begins 
manufacturing. Customers‟ risk was significantly lowered since customers received 
prototypes at no cost. The IP portfolio was built from TSMC's internal IP portfolio, as 
well as, TSMC‟s IP partners including Cadence Design Systems, Mentor Graphics and 
Barcelona Design. The programme worked simultaneously with TSMC's Cybershuttle 
programme; the prototype designers can have cost-sharing with other parties over a 
common mask set. 
The abovementioned strategic alliance combined service capabilities and capacity 
which dramatically helped reduce the risks of manufacturing, design, and schedule of 
foundries‟ customers. In sum, the alliances allowed TSMC to forge strong working 
relationships with its customers and such alliances increased the interdependency 
between the foundry and its upstream customers due to vital mutual benefits, e.g. cost 
and R&D. The study will subsequently discuss how these organizational choices in 
return change the industry‟s technological regime. 
3.4.3 Phase II: Technological Regime and Driving Forces in Choice of 
Organizational Boundaries 
From the earlier discussion on Phase I of the IC industry, strategic alliances with a wide 
diversity of customers and solid establishment of IP infrastructure significantly 
strengthened the technological capabilities of foundries and changed the industry‟s 
technological regime.  
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3.4.3.1 Technological Interrelatedness and Interdependency 
Phase II of the industry is considered as having higher technological interrelatedness, 
especially when IP vendors, design houses and fabless firms needed to work closely 
with foundries. As manufacturing processes became more complex, numerous 
challenges existed due to reasons including signal integrity, timing closure and power 
dissipation (CLSA Research, 2012). These complexities have caused design firms to 
adopt the concept of „design for manufacturability‟. Figure 3.3 shows that in Phase II, 
design complexity significantly outpaced productivity. A closer relationship with the 
foundries is required to make practical and feasible designs.  
 
Figure 3.3: Design Complexity and Productivity (normalized to 2001 level) 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
While manufacturing poses one challenge, a bigger challenge came from the changes in 
market demand. Integrated products that satisfy various needs of consumers, such as, 
memory, computing, wireless communication and entertainment were trending the 
market during Phase II. IC design firms therefore needed to develop more integrated 
chips to keep device sizes small and costs low. Concepts like system-on-a-chip (SOC) 
were gaining more appeal during the beginning of Phase II.  
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Hence, it was imperative for IC design houses or fabless firms to develop a more 
system-based approach rather than continuing with the „part-of-a-solution‟ strategy 
(CLSA Research, 2012). These firms established closer working relationships with 
foundries that have stronger IP libraries thus allowing them to be exposed to various 
technologies thus enjoy stronger R&D capabilities. 
Due to the continuous miniaturization process, the development costs for ICs were 
increasing (see Figure 3.4). More specifically, the proportion of development costs from 
masks and design was rising sharply (see Figure 3.5) which affected competitiveness of 
foundries. Rising costs of masking and designing discouraged IC designers from 
designing their products on multiple foundry processes. Thus the fabless-foundry 
relationship had to be strengthened and the interdependency between these firms was 
high. TSMC has benefited from this trend due to its having a large customer base, scale, 
technology capabilities and service infrastructures. 
 
Figure 3.4: Total Development Costs at Different Process Nodes 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
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Figure 3.5: Breakdown of Total Development Costs at Different Process Nodes 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
3.4.3.2 Cumulativeness, Path-Dependency and Impact of Technological 
Discontinuities 
As the IC industry progressed, more miniaturized process nodes required higher 
accumulation of technological capabilities in firms in order to keep up with the 
advancements. However, technology migration to finer geometries no longer allowed 
the same cost savings, as foundries were challenged with increasing capital intensity. 
The transition beyond 28 nanometre (nm) became especially difficult to smaller and less 
advanced firms. Reaching commercially viable yields coupled with the ever increasing 
capital intensity (as a result of expensive lithography tools) made it difficult for the IC 
industry to continue relying on the migration to finer geometries at the wafer-level 
process in order to achieve cost savings.  
When there is high path-dependency, large resourceful firms resort to virtual vertical 
integration for prevention of production bottlenecks. Large foundries such as TSMC 
began to vertically integrate their scope of R&D and ventured into advanced 3D 
packaging. This is one of their strategies in looking for technological discontinuities to 
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help mitigate technological bottlenecks. Because the industry has become highly path-
dependent throughout the years, new discoveries like 3D packaging can replace the 
conventional ways of chip packaging and cause major impacts to the packaging 
incumbents. Therefore the impact of technological discontinuities at Phase II can be 
very high. 
3.4.3.3 Economies of Scale and Resulting Gap of Manufacturing Capabilities 
Economies of scale is a crucial force in IC technological advancement. A 200 
millimetre (mm) wafer produced with the 180nm process costs approximately 
US$1,600 to manufacture. Migrating that same chip to the 130nm process only add 5-
10% to the wafer manufacturing cost, but it doubled the number of good dies yielded 
off that wafer, bringing cost-per-die down by almost a factor of two (CLSA Research, 
2012). To keep reducing costs, the industry also migrated the wafer size to larger 
diameters which can hold more chips. For instance, moving from 200mm (eight inch) to 
300mm (12 inch) wafers increased the cost of processed wafers by approximately 67%. 
However, the wafer area and the number of dies per wafer increased dramatically by 
125% which yield a 30% net cost reduction at the chip level. Due to the same design but 
with a more mature process technology, the yield on the wafers increases because there 
is less edge-loss and there are more obtainable chips.
5
  
Defect density, rather than yield, is another key determinant of an IC factory‟s 
manufacturing capabilities. Yield can be misleading due to the various die sizes. 
Smaller die sizes can achieve higher yields given the same defect density. In other 
words, if foundry production process technology remains unchanged, IC firms can 
reduce chip costs by shrinking die sizes. 
                                                          
5 Edge-loss refers to the percentage of dies lost due to the edge of the wafer cutting of the printed design (CLSA Research, 2012). 
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At the beginning of Phase II, the technology differences between the foundries and the 
IDMs were not significant enough to retain the IDM orders. However, when the 
technology gap widened towards the mid of 2000s as foundries aggressively moved to 
12-inch wafer production and their advancement to 0.13-micron technology, IDM 
insourcing became increasingly difficult. Due to the widening technological gap 
between foundries and IDMs, IDMs eventually outsourced a larger portion of their 
production to the foundries as they need to use the foundries‟ advanced processes.  
Where foundries experienced structural change, such as, the aggressive move to a 12-
inch wafer and the advancement to 0.13-micron technology, economies of scale became 
so high that it induced most other firms to be very stringent with their manufacturing 
capacity including the IDMs. The 12-inch technology was a big entry barrier for the 
IDMs because the scale of a 12-inch fab could cause overcapacity to IDMs. A full-scale 
12-inch fab is approximately two to three full-scale 8-inch fab in terms of output of 
silicon area (CLSA Research, 2012). Most IDMs did not need that much of capacity and 
migrating into such capacity could decrease their economies of scale. The uncertainty of 
the industry cycle and of demand also caused many IDMs to refuse committing to a 12-
inch facility. At this juncture, large foundries like TSMC which moved aggressively 
into 12–inch production had higher manufacturing capabilities as compared to those 
IDMs.  
The other driving force for IDM‟s outsourcing is the comparable manufacturing 
capabilities enjoyed by the fabless firms. Fabless firms have outgrown the IC market as 
a whole and substantially outpaced the growth of the IDMs since the beginning of Phase 
II. Sales of fabless companies in 2000 grew approximately 68% while IDMs grew 
approximately 39% (Gartner, 2013). Fabless firms use foundries‟ advanced and efficient 
processing as a base for their technology to gain market share. These firms mainly 
compete on the basis of better and more cost effective designs. These competitors of 
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IDMs, i.e. the fabless firms, were using 12-inch (300mm) fabrication facilities as a 
competitive advantage to gain market share in Phase II (30% cost saving per wafer 
compared to 200mm facilities) (CLSA Research, 2012). That eventually further induced 
the IDMs to also use 12-inch just to be as competitive. That was one of the critical times 
when IDMs became more aggressive in outsourcing to foundries. 
To sum up, large foundries, with strong support of their fabless customers through 
strategic alliance, have outpaced the IC industry since the middle of Phase II. Further, 
their efficiency and advanced technology have attracted the IDMs to outsource part of 
their production. Fabless industry growth outpaced that of the IC industry with stellar 
sales growth of 68% in 2000 and the fabless firms accounted for approximately 70% of 
foundry revenue (CLSA Emerging Markets, 2005). By 2010, the fabless industry was a 
US$ 73.6 billion industry (see Table 3.2 for the ranking of firms). The fabless industry 
continues to grow and the firms constantly outsource their chip fabrication to foundries. 
However, due to Taiwan foundries‟ leadership in technology and fabless firms‟ 
flexibility, IDMs were also forced to outsource part of their production. In 2000, IDM‟s 
outsourced $3billion worth out of the global $206billion of IDM revenue, 
approximately 1.5% of total IDM production.  
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Table 3.2: World‟s Top 25 Fabless Firms, 2010-2011 
Rank Firm Origin  2011 
Revenue 
2010 
Revenue 
2011 Growth 
Rate (%) 
1 Qualcomm U.S 9910 7204 38 
2 Broadcom U.S 7160 6589 9 
3 AMD U.S 6568 6494 1 
4 nVidia U.S 3939 3575 10 
5 Marvell U.S 3445 3592 -4 
6 MediaTek China 2969 3590 -17 
7 Xilinx U.S 2269 2311 -2 
8 Altera U.S 2064 1954 6 
9 LSI Corp U.S 2042 1616 26 
10 Avago Singapore/U.S 1341 1187 13 
11 Mstar China 1220 1067 15 
12 Novatek China 1198 1149 4 
13 CSR Europe 845 801 5 
14 ST-Ericsson Europe 825 1146 -28 
15 Realtek China 742 706 5 
16 HiSilicon China 710 652 9 
17 Spreadtrum China 674 346 95 
18 PMC-Sierra U.S 654 635 3 
19 Himax China 633 643 -2 
20 Lantiq Europe 540 550 -2 
21 Dialog Semiconductor Europe 527 297 77 
22 Silicon Labs U.S 492 494 0 
23 MegaChips Japan 456 337 35 
24 Semtech U.S 438 403 9 
25 Smart  Mixed-Signal 
Connectivity (SMSC) 
U.S 415 397 5 
Source: IC Insights, 2012. 
3.4.3.4 Technological Opportunities and Resulting Technological Capabilities 
In Phase II, production became more efficient when carried out in independent 
foundries rather than in IDMs. From the perspective of technological capabilities, the 
foundries used to be behind the top-tier IDMs, which defined the most advanced 
process technology. However, since the beginning of Phase II, foundry process 
technology has caught up with that of the top-tier IDMs, and in some cases, exceeds that 
of many IDMs (see Figure 3.6). This is due to their ability to invest in leading-edge 
equipment and capability to develop process development in the down cycle of the 
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industry. Thus, foundries in Phase II were actually leading the industry process roadmap, 
according to the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS). 
Leading designers have chosen the foundries to prototype some of their new circuit 
designs. 
 
Figure 3.6: Process Nodes of Foundry versus Process Nodes of ITRS (IDMs) 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
The process development cost for each smaller node in Phase II is shown in Figure 3.7. 
As the R&D cost for miniaturization has been increasing dramatically, technological 
opportunities of the industry were no longer abundant as not every foundry has such 
high financial resources as firms progress through Phase II. Moreover, the technologies 
became highly complex so that not every R&D project brings positive results. At this 
juncture, in the pure-play foundry segment, only large and advanced firms that have 
accumulated high technological capabilities, sufficient financial resources and strong 
R&D alliances could continue to miniaturize its process nodes. 
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Figure 3.7: Process Development Cost by Technology Nodes 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
Consequently, there was a diverging trend between the large and small foundries in the 
industry. On the one hand, the industry has become concentrated as the four largest 
foundries, i.e. TSMC, UMC, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation 
(SMIC) and GlobalFoundries, were tapping a total market share of 68% by year 2011 
(Gartner, 2013).  The industry‟s largest foundry, TSMC, even began to integrate partly 
through various strategies. On the other hand, the smaller foundries in the industry 
remained highly fragmented and continued to command very minimal market shares. 
3.4.3.5 Technological Appropriability and Resulting Technological Capabilities 
In Phase II, the use of IP became popular and it was a necessary tool among large IC 
firms. Figure 3.8 shows that in Phase I, the conventional ASIC (application-specific-
integrated-circuits) designs were through the use of Cell Library where there was only a 
minimum use of IP. Whereas in Phase II, the use of IP became critical in order to 
minimize the design time, to optimize at system level and to reuse the elements. Hence, 
the IC industry experienced high appropriability during Phase II.   
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Figure 3.8: The Transformation of IC Designing, Phase I and Phase II 
Source: ITIS, 1999.  
 
3.4.3.6 Organizational Choices of Vertical Boundaries and Industry’s Innovation 
Patterns 
Low technological opportunities among smaller firms but high appropriability among 
the larger firms further consolidated the industry. High degree of economies of scale 
also propelled firms to be highly concerned with their manufacturing capabilities, which 
include efficient utilization of their production capacity. Technologically, IDMs are at 
least at par with foundries. IBM Microelectronics, Toshiba and Fujitsu were among the 
top in the list in terms of leading-edge IDM foundry-service providers. IBM re-launched 
its foundry-service group within the Microelectronics division in June 2001 and has 
since attracted a group of leading fabless companies to utilize its manufacturing services. 
Historically, many IDMs have offered foundry services to fill their capacity, including 
Texas Instruments, LSI Logic and Japanese IDMs which have been offering foundry 
services to competitors in Japan such as Toshiba, NEC and Oki Electrics.  
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On the other hand, there were also IDMs which moved towards a fab-lite model. Figure 
3.9 shows that more and more IDMs have transformed into the fab-lite model as the 
industry experienced further miniaturized process nodes. In May 2009, TSMC and 
Fujitsu announced a partnership on process technology production for the manufacture 
of Fujitsu‟s products. Under the agreement, the mass production of the 40nm generation 
of logic products would be outsourced to TSMC. This is in line with Fujitsu‟s broad 
strategy to move to a fab-lite model and its decision not to upgrade its facilities in Japan. 
The two firms were also doing a joint research on 28nm and smaller technologies 
(CLSA Research, 2012). Fujitsu‟s migration to an asset-light model enabled it to focus 
on its strengths in the miniaturization process and on promoting businesses that leverage 
design technologies on its existing customer base. The importance of software 
continued to increase, as the company used its strength in software development to 
improve its SoC LSI devices. 
TSMC‟s extensive R&D has resulted in a wide range of technical expertise as well as 
service offerings. The firm possesses one of the most extensive process technology 
portfolios, giving it the ability to serve a wide range of customer needs ranging from 
embedded memory to advanced radio frequency-related processes. In addition to its 
advanced manufacturing capabilities, TSMC also has one of the most extensive service-
related technology offerings, including design-for-manufacturing to advanced photo-
masking services, forming a true one-stop-shop total solution IC foundry offering.  
 
 
 
 
67 
 
130 nm 90 nm 65 nm 45 nm 28 nm 22 nm 
Intel Intel Intel Intel Intel Intel 
Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung 
IBM IBM IBM IBM IBM   
STMicro STMicro STMicro Crolles 
alliance 
Crolles 
alliance 
  
Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic Panasonic   
Crolles 
alliance 
Crolles 
alliance 
Crolles 
alliance 
Renesas     
Renesas Renesas Renesas Texas 
Instruments 
    
Texas 
Instruments 
Texas 
Instruments 
Texas 
Instruments 
Toshiba     
Toshiba Toshiba Toshiba NEC     
NEC NEC NEC Fujitsu     
Fujitsu Fujitsu Fujitsu       
AMD AMD AMD       
Motorola Freescale Freescale       
Infineon Infineon         
Sony Philips 
Cypress 
Sony NXP 
Cypress 
        
Sharp Sharp         
Hitachi       FOUNDRIES   
Mitsubishi           
Siemens           
ADI           
Atmel           
On Semi           
Rohm           
Sanyo           
Figure 3.9: Number of IDMs in the IC industry at miniaturized process nodes 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
3.4.4 Phase II: Feedback on Industry’s Technological Regime 
When the industry has high stability of innovators and low number of entrants but with 
high a high number of exits, the highly concentrated innovations provide large firms the 
opportunity to strengthen their external linkages in order to secure their leading position. 
To counter TSMC‟s strengths, Samsung participated in the Common Platform Alliance, 
which is a unique foundry model developed together with IBM and GlobalFoundries in 
the State of New York. Each of the firms sent hundreds of their process development 
engineers to work together at Albany Nanotech and IBM‟s 300mm wafer fab in East 
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Fishkill, New York. Enabled by the Common Platform technology collaboration, this 
alliance is dedicated to developing CMOS technology in order to standardize the 
process technology across the production fabs of the three firms. Began at the 90nm 
process node, this collaborative R&D has progressed to 65nm, 45nm, 32/28nm and 
20nm process nodes.  
Following the Common Platform Alliance, TSMC and Samsung also participate in a 
joint development called the Global 450 Consortium, together with IBM, 
GlobalFoundries and Intel. The five firms committed to a $4.4B investment in New 
York State (CNSE, 2012). To support the R&D project, the State of New York invested 
$400 million in the State University of New York (SUNY) College for Nanoscale and 
Science Engineering (CNSE) in Albany.
6
 Furthermore, Intel also decided to build its 
450mm East Coast Headquarters to provide support to the project management in 
Albany. The consortium plays a crucial role in moving the IC industry to next 
generation wafer size – 450mm.  
Besides strategic alliances to develop smaller process nodes and a larger wafer diameter, 
giant firms in the industry further fortify their positions by developing advanced 
technologies to mitigate the impacts of the slowing Moore‟s Law. Through a strategic 
alliance with Xilinx, a global leader in programmable logic solutions, TSMC was able 
to introduce chip-on-wafer-on-substrate (CoWoS) technology on a commercial scale to 
fabless firms like Xilinx. CoWoS can generate a more than 30% of cost savings; while 
for dies larger than 600mm, CoWoS can realize a 60-90% cost reduction – providing a 
strong incentive for customers to adopt this new technology (CLSA Research, 2012). 
By 2012, almost 50% of chips larger than 120mm were transforming to adopt CoWoS. 
Other economic and technical benefits associated with CoWoS technology include 
superior performance, lower power consumption, improved heat dissipation, cost 
                                                          
6 CNSE is a unit of the University at Albany, one of the four University Centers of the SUNY College (CNSE, 2012).  The allocated 
R&D amount is also inclusive of $100 million for energy efficiency and allowances for low cost energy. 
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savings, flexible designs, shorter time-to-market, and the de-bottlenecking of Moore‟s 
Law. 
In return, Xilinx was the first firm to announce the commercialization of 2.5D through-
silicon-via (TSV) technology with its Virtex-7 series FPGA, i.e. a chip that can be 
programmed to carry out specific functions (CLSA Research, 2012). Due to the new 
technology, for the first time, dies can be sliced and placed side-by-side instead of 
stacked on a single package for applications under 28nm. Power consumption is 
reduced by 50%, providing a significant cost advantage over previous generation 
FPGAs. The new technology development has allowed for significant cost reduction, 
achieved by enhancing yields during wafer-level manufacturing processes. This 
strategic alliance between TSMC and Xilinx again intensify the technological 
interrelatedness (thus interdependency) between the downstream and the upstream firms. 
Furthermore, concepts of technological regime such as degree of economies of scale 
and technological opportunities will be impacted. 
Given the technical difficulties and higher capital intensity required for these types of 
technologies, strategic collaborations across players of different scope are becoming 
critical. TSMC is leading the technology of CoWoS among pure-play foundries, aiming 
to provide a one-stop-center business model to penetrate into mid-end and back-end 
businesses. UMC, the world‟s third largest pure-play foundry, partnered with Elpida 
and Powertech to develop alternative 3D IC packaging by leveraging their expertise in 
wafer, memory and packaging respectively (CLSA Research, 2012). 
The technology alliance, based at IBM's facility in East Fishkill, New York, includes 
Global Foundries, IBM, Infineon Technologies, Renesas Electronics, Samsung 
Electronics, STMicroelectronics and Toshiba. Members of the Common Platform 
Alliance (i.e. IBM, GlobalFoundries and Samsung) collaborated with 
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STMicroelectronics to develop and standardize advanced 28nm process technology with 
the objective to streamline global manufacturing for electronics and device producers. 
In these advanced processes and technologies, only a very few IDMs and foundries can 
afford the required R&D expenses and equipment costs. Only Intel, Samsung and 
TSMC emerged as the dominant companies manufacturing on 28nm nodes and below. 
Given the limited number of competitors and TSMC‟s early lead in CoWoS technology, 
the innovations of the foundry industry is becoming even more concentrated. 
Foundries, especially the larger ones, have the advantage of volume over IDMs. Not all 
IDMs enjoy the same advantage, but they are increasingly forced to choose between 
spending resources on design and spending resources on production. As nodes transition 
to smaller geometries, an unstoppable movement towards a fab-lite model continues to 
take place because these IDMs face limited resources. Only two IDMs - Intel and 
Samsung – are able to survive this at and beyond the 22nm process node (CLSA 
Research, 2012). Compare that to 16 IDMs at the 90nm node, or 10 IDMs at 45nm – the 
demand for foundry services will dramatically rise (Figure 3.9).  
3.5    Discussion  
The question of how technological regime affects the possibilities of catch-up has been 
rather left open in the existing catch-up literature. The catch-up process can be 
examined from a broader perspective – the industry technological regime determines the 
possibilities for the occurrence and process of catch-up. The emergence of the pure-play 
foundry model was a disruptive organizational innovation. When the industry was 
transiting from the vertical integration model to the vertical disintegration model, higher 
technological opportunities but lower technological appropriability result in a smaller 
gap of capabilities between the newly emerged pure-play foundries and small IC design 
houses. Such dimensions of technological regime allow small firms to work together 
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through strategic alliances to overcome and catch up with the large incumbents (i.e. the 
vertically integrated firms). However, because a vertically disintegrated industry also 
leads to a smaller technological gap among the outsourced firms (i.e. pure-play 
foundries), small and new firms face stiff competition with each other (see Table 3.3). 
These conditions symbolize the Schumpeterian Mark I patterns of innovation. The 
transition took place when smaller firms, i.e. the pure-play foundries, began to seek 
strategic alliance with IP providers, EDA vendors and design houses to grow larger – 
creating a feedback loop that changes the industry‟s technological regime (see Table 
3.4).  
Choices of organizational boundary affect firms‟ strategies to form external linkages. In 
Phase I when the IC industry experienced vertical disintegration, small and specialized 
firms sought to form external linkages that help overcome what they lack. However, due 
to the specific technological dimensions and dynamic driving forces as discussed, these 
firms remained highly specialized and the value chain of the industry was highly 
modularized. Nevertheless, in time, strategic collaborations in the industry caused 
impacts to the industry status‟s quo in a cumulative manner that changed the industry‟s 
technological dimensions. In Phase I, the choices for external linkages and network 
boundary caused the industry‟s technological interrelatedness, cumulativeness and 
production scale effect began to rise (see Table 3.4). The industry subsequently 
progressed to a different technological regime. 
When a technology-intensive industry transits to virtual vertical integration as large and 
specialized firms integrate their activities, a higher degree of economies of scale, lower 
technological opportunities and higher technological appropriability can provide a 
promising environment for latecomers to leapfrog vertically integrated incumbents in 
order to become industry leaders. Although begun as a pure-play foundry, TSMC has 
managed to achieve successful industry and technological leadership in Phase II. 
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However, it can be observed from Table 3.5 that there was then a smaller technological 
gap between the pure-play foundries and the large incumbents in Phase II. A wider 
technological gap among the pure-play foundries also means that only large and 
advanced firms get to survive and the industry was concentrated. The environment 
symbolizes Schumpeterian Mark II characteristics, with higher barriers of entry and 
higher stability of innovators. The transition cycle goes on when larger firms in the 
industry seek strategic alliances to grow even larger. External linkages among larger 
and more advanced firms in Phase II caused the large but specialized firms to be closely 
„networked‟ with other players in the industry (see Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.3: Phase I – Transition to Mark I 
      Note* VI = vertically integrated, SD = specialized designing, N.A = not applicable. 
      Source: Authors, interviews. 
 
 
 
Dimensions of 
technological 
regime 
Driving forces (direction of impact) Resulting organizational boundaries 
Relationships Outsourced 
firms with SD 
firms 
Outsourced 
firms with VI 
firms 
Among 
outsourced 
firms 
(foundries) 
VI firms SD firms 
Lower 
interrelatedness 
Interdependency Lower (+) Lower (+) N.A  
 
 
Disintegrated/ outsourced 
Higher path-
dependency and 
cumulativeness 
Impact of 
technological 
discontinuities  
N.A (no major technological discontinuities in 
Phase I) 
Lower degree of 
economies of 
scale 
Gap of 
manufacturing  
capabilities  
N.A Wider (-) Smaller (+) 
Higher 
opportunities  
Gap of 
technological 
capabilities  
Smaller (-) Wider (+) Smaller (-) 
Lower 
appropriability 
Gap of 
technological 
capabilities  
Smaller (+) Wider (-) Smaller (+) 
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Table 3.4: Feedback Loop from Firms and the Endogenous Transition Process 
Phase Firm choices of 
organizational 
boundary  
External linkages Network boundary Effects on industry status quo  Impacts on technological 
dimensions 
Pre 1987 Vertical 
integration  
The first pure-play foundry 
emerged in 1987. The existing 
cycle was broken and the 
technological regime changed.  
Closed innovation.  Fabless firms began to outsource 
to pure-play foundries. 
Interrelatedness began to 
increase; cumulativeness 
decreased; economies of 
scale decrease; opportunities 
increased; appropriability 
began to increase.  
Phase I Vertical 
disintegration 
(outsourcing)  
Foundries seek strategic alliances 
with IP providers and design 
houses.  
Modularized and 
specialized; emphasized 
organizational core 
competency but participated 
in strategic collaborations. 
Certain foundries grew large 
with strong IP library.  
Interrelatedness increased; 
cumulativeness increased; 
economies of scale began to 
increase; opportunities and 
appropriability increased.  
Foundries seek strategic alliance 
with EDA vendors.  
Unified design for 
manufacturing was introduced. 
Fabless firms design according 
to foundries manufacturing 
rules.  
Phase II Virtual vertical 
integration 
Common Platform Alliance by 
IBM, Samsung, Global Foundries; 
Global 450 Consortium. 
„Networked‟ specialized 
firms; emphasis on 
organizational core 
competency and open 
innovation practices that 
lead to the integration of 
external and internal 
knowledge. 
To develop smaller technology 
nodes; to migrate to 450mm 
wafer diameter. 
Interrelatedness, 
cumulativeness, economies 
of scale and appropriability 
increased and became even 
higher; opportunities 
decreased.  
Strategic alliance between the 
largest pure-play foundry (TSMC) 
and the largest fabless firm 
(Xilinx). 
To develop 3D advanced 
packaging (CoWoS).  
Source: Authors, interviews. 
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Table 3.5: Phase II – Transition from Mark I to Mark II 
   Note* VI = vertically integrated, SD = specialized designing, VVI = virtual vertical integration, N.A = not applicable. 
   Source: Authors, interviews. 
Dimensions of 
technological 
regime 
Driving forces (direction of impact) Resulting organizational boundaries  
Relationships Outsourced 
firms with 
SD firms 
Outsourced 
firms with 
VI firms 
Among 
outsourced 
firms 
(foundries) 
 
VI firms 
 
SD firms 
 
Outsourced 
firms 
(foundries) 
Higher 
interrelatedness 
Interdependency  Higher (+) N.A N.A  
 
 
 
Exited or 
disintegrated 
(fab-lite) to 
form VVI with 
downstream 
and upstream 
firms  
 
 
 
 
Outsourced 
and grew 
larger to form 
VVI with 
downstream 
and upstream 
firms 
 
 
 
 
VI to form 
VVI with 
downstream 
and upstream 
firms or 
remained 
small and 
fragmented 
Higher path-
dependency and 
cumulativeness 
Impact of 
technological 
discontinuities  
Impact of technological discontinuities is 
higher on SD, VI and outsourced firms in 
Phase II (+) 
Higher degree of 
economies of scale 
Gap of 
manufacturing 
capabilities  
N.A Smaller (-) Wider (+) 
Lower opportunities  Gap of 
technological 
capabilities  
Smaller (+) Smaller (+) Wider (-) 
Higher 
appropriability 
Widening gap of 
technological 
capabilities (+) 
Smaller (-) Smaller (-) Wider (+) 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter examines the mechanisms of the changing technological regimes. The 
framework shows how each technological dimension within a regime affects the 
industrial relationships between downstream and upstream firms. The framework is also 
used to explain how those changes lead to firms‟ strategies for their organizational 
boundaries. The analysis in this chapter also shows how choices of organizational 
boundaries affect network boundaries among firms, which eventually impacts relevant 
technological dimensions of the regime. The formation of industry‟s technological 
regime is endogenous as firms make choices to their organizational boundary that create 
feedback loops to different dimensions in that technological regime. 
The findings in this chapter provide insights to how technological regimes shape 
industry innovation patterns and how they provide different environments for 
latecomers to catch up and leapfrog the incumbents. It also shows the transition process 
of an industry shifting its characteristics between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter 
Mark II. As compared to the previous studies of Schumpeterian patterns of innovations, 
this chapter examines the transition mechanism by positing it as a process that goes 
through changing technological regimes, dynamic driving forces of downstream and 
upstream firms, and strategies for organizational boundary and network boundary. 
Analyzing the technological transitions of an industry, especially a technology-intensive 
one, is fundamental and critical to understanding the related mechanisms including 
catching up, technological upgrading and capability building. This chapter has shown 
that choices for organizational boundary can lead to changing network boundaries that 
impacts the industry‟s status quo. Further analysis of how the changes in these 
boundaries can affect latecomers‟ resource acquisition process to catch up and leapfrog 
is important. These aspects are examined in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESOURCE ACQUISITION STRATEGIES AND CATCHING UP IN 
DIFFERENT VALUE SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the research proposition that the Taiwanese latecomers have 
deployed different resource acquisition strategies in order to catch up and leapfrog the 
incumbents as the industry experienced different structural changes and progressed 
through different value systems. The concept of organizational core-competency 
becomes less prominent in an open innovation environment as the industry experienced 
structural changes. 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
The purpose of the proposed framework in this chapter is to examine the catch-up 
process of latecomer firms as the industry progresses into different industry structures 
that change the value systems of networks. To systematize the analysis, Figure 4.1 
shows how the study divides the period of analysis into different phases and spaces. The 
pre fabless-foundry era is the period before the emergence of Taiwanese pure-play 
foundries. The focus of this study is on Phase I where the industry experienced vertical 
disintegration, and Phase II where leading firms in the industry began to form virtual 
vertical integration. The analytical framework for this chapter is shown in Figure 4.2. 
The framework distinguished three different forms of industry structures, i.e. vertical 
integration, vertical disintegration and virtual vertical integration, and shows how the 
industry‟s value system varies at those changing industry structures.  
The framework divides the interface between latecomer firms and incumbents into six 
dimensions throughout the different phases. The focus of this study is from vertical 
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disintegration to virtual vertical integration and the interface is divided into Dimension I, 
II, III(a), III(b) and IV(a) and IV(b). First, latecomers could have accumulated the back-
end manufacturing capabilities when large MNCs relocated their production lines in less 
developed countries (pre-1980s). When firms in latecomer countries start to operate as 
contract manufacturers (Dimension I), they seek to acquire external knowledge from 
incumbents and MNCs that are technologically advanced in order to build internal 
capabilities. In time, the latecomer firms moved from Dimension I to III(a) and III(b) 
before arriving at the technology frontier – IV(b). Alternatively, the latecomer firm 
could have moved from Dimension I to Dimension II. This is the model posited in 
existing studies (e.g. Hobday, 1995), which argue that latecomer firms should begin as 
an OEM and upgrade to become an original design manufacturer (ODM) and eventually 
an original brand manufacturer (OBM). It is not the interest of this study to examine 
how a latecomer firm can upgrade from OEM to OBM. Existing evidence has also 
shown that this is often a difficult task for the latecomers. In fact, the proposed 
framework seeks to analyse how latecomers can arrive at the technology frontier 
without having to become an OBM. 
The framework also seeks to highlight that, while the industry is progressing through 
different phases, the concept of organizational core competency in resource-based view 
also evolves in tandem with increasing practices of open innovation. However, such 
changes do not progress in perfect harmony with the changes in industry structure, but 
with slippages across time and space. The changes in industrial vertical structure and the 
practices of open innovation result in different value creating systems. The objects of 
analysis are therefore latecomer contract manufacturers seeking to catch up and leapfrog 
the incumbents as they progress through different dimensions. In most cases, the actor 
in this framework is a latecomer firm. However, in the absence of a latecomer firm, the 
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actor might be a public institute, such as Taiwan‟s ITRI before firms entered the IC 
industry.  
Following the framework postulated by Mathews (2002, 2006), strategizing on how to 
find a gateway into the GVCs requires three stages, namely linkage, leverage and 
learning. Mathews (2002, 2006) have identified three key characteristics of latecomers‟ 
targeted resources: least rare, most imitable and most transferable. These resource 
acquisition strategies are included into the analysis in this framework to find out how 
latecomer firms shape their business models to offer values into their networks. In order 
to examine latecomers‟ resource acquisition strategies, it is also important to find out 
whether the types of targeted technologies are substitutable, have potential for growth 
and competitive. This study emphasizes that, across different dimensions, the 
latecomers‟ strategy of (re)inserting themselves into the GVCs requires strategic choices 
that allow them to create values for other actors within their value systems. 
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Figure 4.1: Changes in Industrial Structure and Value System, IC Industry 
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 4.2: Latecomer Resource Acquisitions to Catch Up in Changing Value Systems 
Source: Authors. 
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Towards Virtual vertical 
integration	
Focus of the study	
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4.3 Research Method 
In the light of the research gap identified earlier, this chapter uses six firm-level cases 
from two latecomer countries: TSMC, UMC, ASE, Silterra, Globetronics and Inari 
Amertron. Whereas TSMC and UMC are two Taiwanese front-end IC manufacturing 
firms that have successfully caught up and the former has become the world‟s largest 
pure-play foundry, the Malaysian owned IC foundry (i.e. Silterra) is a typical example 
of latecomers being trapped at lower tiers despite mimicking the Taiwanese business 
model. The objective of incorporating Silterra into the analysis is not to make direct 
comparisons, but to examine how the timing of entry (hence different industrial 
structures and value systems) affects the catch-up process. Only by examining both the 
successful and unsuccessful cases, the key determinants and firm-level strategic choices 
through different points in time can be identified. 
To provide a stronger test of the framework, the study also incorporates Outsourced 
Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) firms as shadow cases to examine how the 
conditions vary for firms specialized in back-end production stages. ASE is Taiwanese 
largest OSAT whereas Globetronics and Inari Amertron are two Malaysian-owned IC 
OSATs that experienced growth since the 2000s. 
The data collection for the proposed framework involves 26 interviews conducted from 
2012-2013, with a major focus on organizations in Taiwan and Malaysia. The study 
examines the propositions by identifying the „key informants‟ to be interviewed (Yin, 
2014). In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted and information was further 
updated via official email exchanges and phone calls with the key informants after the 
interviews. Table 4.1 shows the list of semi-structured interviews undertaken from 2012 
– 2013 for the study.  
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To achieve internal validity and reliability, the key informants in this study represent 
different organizations (Yin, 1994, 2014). These industry experts provided the study 
with important insights on the dynamics and specificities of the IC industry. They also 
provided perceived causal inferences and helped relate the details to the key concepts in 
the proposed framework. The insights and information gained from the interviews are 
explained in paragraphs. Meanwhile, the study corroborates the interview findings with 
secondary data obtained from official records and statistical databases, including IC 
Insights, CLSA Research and Gartner. These data are especially useful to work as 
relevant indicators to the proposed concepts. 
Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter organized the collected data using the qualitative 
content analysis method (Gläser & Laudel, 2013). Only the relevant data or information 
are processed using categories derived ex ante from the theoretical framework. The 
process helped us identify patterns in the extracted data and integrate them into 
typologies (Yin, 2011). 
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Table 4.1: List of Interviews 
Organization type Organization Position 
Technology or 
R&D institutes/ 
Government 
agencies 
Bell Laboratories, New Jersey 1.R&D engineer (1963-1989)
 
who 
co-invented the non-volatile 
semiconductor memory
 A
 
Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI), Taiwan 
2.Engineer in ERSO - President of 
ITRI (1976-2003)
B
  
ERSO, Taiwan 3. Chief Director (late 1980s)
C
 
 Industrial Economics and Knowledge 
Center (IEK), Taiwan 
4.Deputy General Director 
 Science and Technology Policy 
Research and Information Center 
(STPI), National Applied Research 
Laboratories, Taiwan 
5.Director General 
 Northern Corridor Implementation 
Authority (NCIA) Technology 
Development Centre, Malaysia 
6.Senior Manager, Manufacturing 
Division 
 
 USAINS Infotech, Centre of 
Excellence for E&E, Malaysia 
7.General Manager 
8.Senior Business Development 
Manager 
 Collaborative Research in Engineering, 
Science and Technology Center 
(CREST), Malaysia 
QAV Technology (Test lab and 
certification company), Malaysia 
9.Program & Research Director 
 
 
10.Managing Director 
Academia NCTU, Taiwan  National Endowed Chair Professor 
and UMC Chair Professor
A
 
 Tsing Hua University, Taiwan Professor of Technology 
Management, Morris Chang Chair 
Professor
B
 
IC Firms Macronix, Taiwan President 
C
 
 TSMC, Taiwan  11.Division Leader at Integrated 
Technology 
12.Senior Project Manager  
 Vanguard (TSMC‟s subsidiary), 
Taiwan 
Co-founder then President
 C
 
 Global Unichip Corporation (TSMC‟s 
design-service subsidiary), Taiwan 
13.Account Manager 
 UMC, Taiwan 14.Manager of Asia Sales Division 
and Business Management 
  15.Two ex-senior engineers 
 ASE, Taiwan 16.R&D Director 
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Table 4.1, continued: List of Interviews 
 Silterra, Malaysia 17.Chieft Executive Officer (CEO) 
18.Senior Manager, Corporate 
Development & External Affairs 
 X-Fab, Malaysia 19.Human Resource Director 
 Globetronics, Malaysia 20.CEO 
 Inari Amertron, Malaysia 21.CEO 
 Altera, Malaysia 
Malaysian Investment Development 
Authority (MIDA), Malaysia 
22.Senior Project Manager 
23.Senior Executive 
Market research 
firms 
CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets 24.Technology consultant and guest 
author for CLSA semiconductor 
technology reports (official email 
communications). 
 Macquarie Securities Korea Limited, 
South Korea 
25.Managing Director – Korea 
Technology Hardware Research 
 Samsung Economic Research Institute 
(SERI), South Korea 
26.Chief Center Manager (Complex 
Systems Center) 
Note: A, B, C = Change of professional roles in the industry. 
Source: Interviews by authors, 2012 – 2013. 
 
4.4 Resource Acquisition Strategies of Taiwanese and Malaysian Latecomer 
Firms 
The study begins by examining how the latecomer firms from Taiwan and Malaysia 
have, in the earlier stage of their catch up, deployed different organizational strategies to 
shape their business model and to target the types of technologies they acquire. The 
technology targeted by these latecomers showcased specific characteristics. As 
discussed, organizational strategies help latecomer firms to create values for their 
customers, hence securing their role in the GVC. In time as leading firms in the industry 
seek to form virtual vertical integration, the value systems of the industry experience 
changes and affect the catch-up process of later comers. Firms that participate in more 
production stages open up themselves to more gateways to external collaborations in 
order to source more advanced knowledge. 
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4.4.1 Phase I: Vertical Disintegration 
In Phase I, the IC industry experienced vertical disintegrations as fabless firms emerged 
and outsourced their production to specialized foundries and OSATs. As the industry 
progressed, large incumbent IDMs also began to outsource to these contract 
manufacturers. In Phase I, the Taiwanese latecomers entered into the GVC and their 
activities are discussed below as Dimension I. In the later part of Phase I, Malaysian 
latecomer firms began to enter the industry. These latecomer firms have pursued 
different catch-up strategies at different points of entry and as they progressed from one 
dimension to the other.  
4.4.1.1 Taiwanese Latecomers 
As both TSMC and UMC were spin-offs that were incubated from ITRI, their early 
productions were chips in calculators, watches, toys and musical cards. In 1976, ITRI 
and RCA began their agreement on a 10-year technology transfer from RCA to ITRI. 
The first 5 years were to transfer IPs and technologies whereas the remaining 5 years 
were to provide technical trainings.  
According to Mathew (2002, 2006), the targeted technology during the initial stage of 
latecomer catch-up should be the “most imitable” and “most transferable”. However, as 
opposed to what was posited, the latecomer firms from Taiwan did not opt for least rare 
(most common) technology. At that time, the mainstream IC process technologies 
included N-type metal-oxide-semiconductor (NMOS), P-type metal-oxide-
semiconductor (PMOS) and Bipolar methods. For instance, NMOS technology was led 
by large MNCs at that time, including AT&T and IBM. However, Taiwan‟s Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) decided to transfer Complementary metal–oxide–
semiconductor (CMOS) technology from RCA, which was a non-mainstream (most 
rare) technology at that time. CMOS was a newly developed technology in 1968. 
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During 1974 to 1975 when ITRI was discussing the technology transfer agreement, 
CMOS was not easily adopted in scale even in advanced firms. Both the US 
government and RCA agreed to transfer CMOS technology because CMOS was a non-
mainstream technology and the transferred technology involved 7.5 micron process 
nodes, which was one generation behind RCA‟s most advance process node at that time 
– 5 micron. 
TAC believed that transferring the CMOS technology could bring several advantages to 
Taiwan‟s IC industry at that time. Adopting a mainstream technology would have them 
face stiff competition with the incumbents at the initial stage of their capabilities 
building. Moreover, the Taiwanese foundries began by producing technologically 
obsolete chips of calculators, toys, musical cards and timing devices. The incumbents 
had ceased producing these chips at that time and hence viewed them as not posing any 
threat. As a result, Taiwanese foundries actually had 7 years to build internal 
capabilities before competing with large MNCs. Also, since CMOS was an emerging 
technology, it provided the Taiwanese latecomers the opportunities to leapfrog the 
incumbents if they managed to advance the practicability of CMOS technology. 
Nevertheless, TAC also requested RCA to transfer the NMOS technology, so as to have 
a substitute if CMOS could not work out – the “back-up” plan.  
When the firms began to operate on their own, they deployed different resource 
acquisition strategies. During the initial stage of TSMC‟s catch-up (Dimension I), the 
firm has created a path for itself by introducing a new business model into the IC 
industry, i.e. the pure-play foundry. The firm ensured itself linkages to external MNCs 
by being a contract manufacturer of front-end wafer fabrication. The targeted customers 
were fabless firms or chip design houses. UMC was established in 1980 as an IDM but 
it began transformation to a pure-play foundry in 1995. During the initial stage of catch-
up, TSMC acquired external knowledge from Intel as Intel provided training and 
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transferred its obsolete technologies to TSMC. UMC pursued a fast-following strategy. 
Although the firm only began transforming to the IDM model in 1995, the firm‟s 
technological capabilities were at par with TSMC in Phase I.  
ASE was established in 1984 and specialized in back-end packaging and testing 
services, namely OSAT. It was considered a path creating strategy at that time, given 
that the business model of pure-play foundry was yet to be introduced. Moreover, the 
future prospects for outsourced contract manufacturing were considered to be unclear 
during the early 1980s. At that time, ceramic packaging was the mainstream technology 
for back-end manufacturing. However, ASE began its operations with the then non-
mainstream technology, i.e. laminated packaging. Therefore, the targeted technologies 
were also considered to be rare. Although it was only an emerging technology, ASE 
faced stiff competition from major incumbent IDMs which had advanced packaging and 
testing technologies at that time.  
4.4.1.2 Malaysian Latecomers 
The Malaysian firms have pursued a path-following strategy to become a pure-play 
foundry. Silterra was incubated from MIMOS as a promising firm to follow the 
footsteps of successful firms like TSMC and started manufacturing as a pure play 
foundry in late 2000.
7
 Globetronics was a humble SME start-up in 1991 whereas Inari 
was established in 2006. Globetronics and Inari are two Malaysian firms that operate as 
OSATs, offering back-end IC packaging and testing services to advanced MNCs. 
Entry by latecomers at different points in time denotes the different technology life 
cycle as faced by the latecomer firms. The point of entry for the Malaysian firms was 
the time when the telecommunication products began to boom. In late 2000, Silterra 
                                                          
7 The company was acquired by Khazanah - the government-linked investment corporation - in 2004 to provide additional capital 
for expansion. 
89 
 
began fabricating 0.25 micro CMOS chips. After more than a decade since the 
emergence of TSMC, CMOS had become the mainstream process technology. In 2005, 
SilTerra successfully fabricated 8MB SRAM chips using 0.13 micron CMOS 
technology through a strategic alliance with IMEC – a Belgium-based nanotechnology 
research center. Although Silterra‟s point of entry shows that advanced firms in the 
industry were already in Dimension III(a) at that time, Silterra lagged behind in 
Dimension I. 
Globetronics started by serving a single customer and single manufacturing service to a 
giant MNC in Penang, Malaysia – Intel. Intel was a customer of, and partner and trainer 
to Globetronics. Intel also transferred critical knowledge to the latecomer at its initial 
stage of catch-up. Intel transferred operations systems and set-up, equipment and tool, 
human resource training, skills and technology transfer. Meanwhile, Inari Technology 
focused on the radio frequency (RF) mobile segment, including back-end wafer 
processing, package assembly, and RF testing. Its major customer was Avago 
Technologies. The Malaysian firms exemplify the characteristics outlined by Mathew‟s 
argument of beginning with the technologies that were the most common, imitable and 
transferable. Both Globetronics and Inari have used the relevant strategies in Dimension 
I and Dimension III(a) respectively at their points of entry into the industry. The 
findings for organizational business models and resource acquisition strategies of these 
firms in Phase I are summarized in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Phase I – Catching Up in a Vertically Disintegrated Industry 
Phase I 
Vertical Disintegration 
Taiwan Malaysia 
Front-end Back-end Front-end Back-end 
TSMC 
Dimension I 
UMC 
Dimension I 
ASE 
Dimension I 
Silterra 
Dimension I 
Globetronics 
Dimension I 
Inari Amertron 
Dimension III(a) 
Point of entry into GVC (Year) 1987 1980 1984 2000 1991 2006 
 
 
Business model 
Contract 
manufacturer 
Pure-play foundry Pure-play foundry 
since 1995  
OSAT Pure-play foundry OSAT OSAT 
Production 
specialization 
Front-end wafer 
fabrication 
Front-end wafer 
fabrication 
Back-end 
packaging and 
testing 
Front-end wafer 
fabrication 
Back-end 
packaging and 
testing 
Back-end 
packaging and 
testing 
Targeted 
customers 
Fabless firms, chip 
design houses 
Systems 
integration firms 
Fabless firms, 
IDMs, systems 
integration firms 
Systems integration 
firms 
Systems 
integration firms 
Systems integration 
firms, 
IDMs. 
End-consumer 
market 
Calculators, 
watches, cards 
Calculators, 
watches, cards 
General electronics 
products 
Smart phones Timing devices Personal computers 
and telcos   
 
 
Resource 
acquisitions 
(Targeted 
technologies) 
Rareness Non-mainstream 
(CMOS) 
Mainstream Non-mainstream 
(laminated 
packaging) 
Mainstream (CMOS) Mainstream Mainstream 
technology 
Imitability Imitable Imitable Imitable Imitable Imitable Imitable 
Transferability Transferable Transferable Transferable Transferable Transferable Transferable 
Substitutability Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Maturity  
(Life cycle) 
Emerging (CMOS 
technology) 
 
Emerging (CMOS 
technology) 
 
Emerging demand 
for laminated 
packaging 
Emerging demand 
for Display Driver 
ICs) 
Maturity  
(Transferred from 
Intel) 
Growing (wireless 
telco products)  
Competitiveness No major 
incumbent in 
CMOS 
Limited 
competitors 
adopting CMOS 
Major incumbents 
exist 
 
Stiff competition 
Major incumbents in 
CMOS, telecom 
products 
Competitive Competitive 
(Technological 
entry barrier was 
low) 
Catch-up path Path-creating Fast-following Path-creating Path-following Path-following  Path-following 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on interview findings, 2012-2013. 
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4.4.1.3 Changing Value Systems 
Towards the later part of Phase I (i.e. when Dimension III and IV began), smaller or less 
advanced firms in the industry began to participate in open innovations to gather and 
access external knowledge. Meanwhile, the industrial value-adding concept subsided 
among larger firms that are seeking to leapfrog advanced incumbents. Instead of just 
adding values to each production stage, these firms seek to co-create values with 
upstream and downstream firms. Due to stiff competition at the frontier of technology, 
these firms still emphasized organizational core competency and avoided collaborations 
that could narrow their technological gaps with competitors.  
(a) The creation of collective values 
ARM is a leading IP licensor for low-processor designs. The technological performance 
of its processors is not as high as Intel‟s, but its lower power consumption has allowed 
nearly 100% adoption of its processors in mobile devices as of 2012, including 
smartphones and tablets.
8
 Since Phase I, the driving force behind the progress of the IC 
industry, as well as the performance and power convergence between Intel and ARM is 
a combination of the increasing performance and lowering the cost of an IC. Advanced 
pure-play foundries have played a significant role in meeting this critical requirement. 
The competition among the advanced pure-play foundries has driven the speed of node 
miniaturization and has pushed the limits of process nodes. More importantly, these 
manufacturing technologies are made available to fabless customers in the industry. 
Technical analysis by industry experts show that, while the cost of designing and 
manufacturing chips increases with every new technology generation, the performance 
and the functionality of the chips increase at a faster rate (see Figure 4.3). Therefore, the 
                                                          
8 ARM earns revenue from upfront license fees. The firm does not sell its own chips. Instead, it provides its clients access to certain 
microprocessor or core designs and subsequently collects royalties per IC sold in the market that incorporates its design. The high 
development costs and long period of development time are amortized across many IP licensees (CLSA, 2012). 
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cost per function of the chips actually decreased over the years, allowing the industry to 
continue to progress. 
 
Figure 4.3: Collective Engine that Drives the IC Industry 
Source: IC Insights, 2014. 
 
Shrinking the circuit geometry on a chip improves the performance and functionality of 
the transistors while reducing power consumption. However, reducing the circuit 
geometry on a chip to allow more transistors to fit in a given area requires a 
combination of a few key areas of innovation, including transistor design, interconnect 
technologies, patterning or lithography, and packaging. This means that, in order for 
firms to gain both increasing performance and cost reduction so that they could 
progress, upstream and downstream firms within the value network have to collaborate 
closely in order to achieve the collective values.     
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(b) Collaborations to keep up with technology competitions 
As the development costs for new generations of process node keep increasing, 
practicing open innovation has also provided critical advantages to firms aiming to keep 
up with the race for process miniaturization. IC firms in the industry have formed 
strategic alliances and participated in cooperative organizations towards the end of 
Phase I to leverage from third parties the required manufacturing technology, assets, 
tacit knowledge and experience, scale to shorten new process development time, lower 
manufacturing costs, and reduce time-to-market. Based on technical analyses by 
industry experts, innovations through collaborations helped reduce the process 
development costs for firms. Figure 4.4 shows the difference in overall cost for a firm to 
develop a new process node individually as compared to firms that develop the 
technology in a consortium, taking into account technology, assets, knowledge, scale, 
time, and manufacturing costs.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Process Development Cost Comparison 
Source: IC Insights, 2014. 
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As discussed in the earlier chapter, the Common Platform Alliance was established by 
IBM and GlobalFoundries in 2002. Later, Samsung joined and the alliance was named 
the “Manufacturing Alliance Partners”. While TSMC did not participate in this alliance, 
Samsung and GlobalFoundry gained important advantages through this collaboration as 
the new collaborative-foundry model provides the firms the access to advanced CMOS 
process technology, an open design ecosystem and global sources of manufacturing to 
enhance capacity as compared to the traditional foundry models (Common Platform, 
2013).  
Together with STMicroelectronics, Infineon, Freescale, Renesas, and Toshiba, the three 
firms (i.e. IBM, GlobalFoundries and Samsung) formed “Joint Development Partners”. 
However, only STMicroelectronics has participated in the development of technologies 
beyond 28nm (Phase II). Table 4.3 shows the list of the alliance members which also 
consists of 16 Design Enablement Partners. The alliance shows that open innovation 
requires firms from different specialization to come together to ensure different 
knowledge is transferred and shared between upstream and downstream firms to ensure 
values are created for the value network as a whole. This alliance consists of more 
industry players, mostly technology followers in their respective specializations. The 
main objective is not to minimize the transaction cost, but to gain access to the external 
knowledge of different specialized firms. The end result is to develop the process 
technologies collectively so as to reduce their gaps with the technology leaders in their 
respective segments.  
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Table 4.3: Common Platform Partners 
R&D Partnership Participating firms 
Manufacturing Alliance 
Partners 
Globa1Foundries (2002), IBM (2002), Samsung (2004) 
    
Joint Development 
Partners 
Globa1Foundries (2002), IBM (2002), Samsung (2004), 
STMicroelectronics (2007) 
Infineon, Freescale, Renesas, and Toshiba have also been Joint 
Development Partners, but not for the advanced process nodes 
(i.e., <28nm) 
Design Enablement 
Partners 
Amkor Technology, Analog Bits, Apache Design Solutions, 
Aragio Solutions, ARM, Cadence Design Systems, 
ChipEstimate.com, Cosmic Curcuits, Infotech, Kilopass, Mentor 
Graphics, QuantumThink Group, Synopsys, True Circuits, 
Uniquify, VeriSilicon 
Source: Common Platform, 2013; IC Insights, 2014. 
 
(c) Organizational core competency  
In Phase I, organizational core competency remains critical for leading firms whereas 
smaller competitors gather to collaborate in innovation. For instance, in 2000, UMC 
established R&D partnership with IBM and Germany‟s Infineon Technologies to 
develop 130nm and 100nm technologies. UMC reckoned that the increasing complexity 
and costs of relentless miniaturization made it impractical and difficult for any firm to 
independently commercialize the new process nodes. In contrast, TSMC had already 
begun R&D on those process nodes alone at that time. Historically, a number of IDMs 
have opened up their foundry facilities and offered foundry services to fill their 
capacity, including Texas Instruments, LSI Logic, and IBM. IBM was considered a 
major competitor to TSMC in the early 2000s, given its cutting edge technology, a 
dedicated 300mm platform and an extensive IP portfolio. 
Following TSMC‟s strategy to internally develop the technologies, Figure 4.5 shows 
that the R&D expenditure between TSMC and UMC began to diverge since 2000 and 
continued to diverge dramatically in the following years. The result is a dramatic lead 
over its competitors in R&D output, including SMIC and Chartered Semiconductor 
which was not acquired by GlobalFoundries until 2010. Figure 4.6 shows that there is a 
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huge gap between the numbers of US patents granted to TSMC and UMC since the 
divergence of R&D expenditure. The IPs developed by TSMC are now offered as a 
suite of services to IDM and fabless customers to shorten the required period of time for 
design and pre-production phases of chip manufacturing.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: R&D Expenditure by Leading Pure-Play Foundries 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Number of US Patents Granted to Leading Pure-Play Foundries 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 2011; CLSA Research, 
2012.
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4.4.2 Phase II: Towards Virtual Vertical Integration 
In Phase II, larger firms in the IC industry change their business model and the types of 
technologies they seek to build with the objective to achieve virtual vertical integration. 
This requires the firms to continue seeking and building stronger linkages within their 
value network, causing changes in the industry‟s value systems. In Phase II, it was 
found that the Taiwanese latecomers have moved into Dimension III(b) whereas the 
Malaysian latecomer firms have not moved beyond Dimension III(a). However, only 
TSMC has moved into Dimension IV(b).  
4.4.2.1 Taiwanese Latecomers 
In Phase II, the Taiwanese foundries have developed strong vertical integration through 
time. From a pure-play foundry merely fabricating wafers, TSMC and UMC have 
developed capabilities to participate in almost all the key production stages. The 
Taiwanese foundries have pursued both radical and incremental innovations. For 
instance, TSMC has pursued the miniaturization league of Moore‟s Law, as well as, 
More than Moore‟s Law (horizontal expansion). At the back-end operations, Taiwanese 
ASE has vertically expanded its scope of operations in a less intense manner, by 
collaborating closely with customers for vertical upgrading. The Taiwanese latecomers 
have also sought to expand their markets within their respective specialization by 
advancing into new process nodes. 
(a) Virtual vertical integration by Taiwanese foundries 
The typical stages of IC development are R&D, EDA technology kit, IP library, chip 
design, taping out and masking, wafer fabrication, wafer bumping, wafer sorting, 
packaging, and final testing. To pursue virtual vertical integration, TSMC has vertically 
upgraded into all these stages by participating in the activities partially or fully. The 
integrated services offered by TSMC are categorized into design infrastructure, mask 
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service, wafer fab service, assembly and testing, as well as, failure analysis and 
cybershuttle service. Figure 4.7 shows how the activities of a traditional IDM can now 
be segregated into different services offered by a foundry seeking to pursue virtual 
vertical integration. The examples of virtual vertical integration by the selected cases 
are presented in Figure 4.8. UMC as a follower has tried to pursue TSMC‟s strategy of 
virtual vertical integration. However, UMC has accumulated lower capabilities in all 
stages and participation beyond its specialization is limited.  
 
Figure 4.7: Segmentation of Foundry Sector 
Source: CLSA Emerging Markets, 2005. 
Global Unichip is a chip design firm founded in 1998 to provide application-specific 
integrated circuit (ASIC) design services, non-recurring engineering (NRE – one time 
design/ partial design fees), multi-project wafer services (MPW), and silicon IPs to 
fabless firms, IDMs and system houses. In 2003, TSMC invested in Global Unichip 
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(37% of ownership) and became the primary shareholder with the objective to speed up 
time-to-market and to solve design complexities and manufacturing integration issues. 
As part of its efforts to pursue virtual vertical integration, TSMC‟s ownership in Global 
Unichip enables the firm to integrate design and manufacturing at increasingly smaller 
and complex process nodes in Phase II. The foundry-design combination allows TSMC 
to provide complementary service offerings to its customers, and to ensure faster time-
to-market and technology migration plans. 
The design and pre-production costs per chip for new process nodes have been 
increasing. As of 2009, the total design and pre-production cost at the 65nm process 
node is US$ 34million, more than 2.5 times the cost at the 180nm node (see Figure 4.9). 
At 65nm, the costs for photo-masking and testing have risen and account for 32% of 
total pre-production costs, as compared to 19% at the 180nm process node (see Figure 
4.10). To create additional values for its customers, TSMC has vertically integrated into 
this segment. By combining its photo-masking and testing facilities, TSMC is able to 
shorten the time-to-market for new designs and to reduce cost for its customers.  
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Figure 4.8: Virtual Vertical Integration by Advanced Pure-Play Foundries 
Source: Interview findings, 2012-2013. 
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TSMC UMC Silterra 
By IDM and fabless customers.  
Supportive R&D for 
back-end processes 
Integrated into R&D for advanced 3D 
and CoWoS packaging. 
Outsourced to OSATs including ASE. 
But also integrated into Advanced 3D 
packaging in 2012. 
Advanced wafer bumping process. 
Established Xintec to integrate into 
wafer-level packaging. 
The world’s largest pure-play foundry, 
integrated into wafer bumping process, 
first-mover in miniaturization of process 
nodes. 
Collaborative R&D with customers by 
offering advanced process technologies 
to facilitate the introduction of new 
products, e.g. collaborations with ARM 
for microprocessors. 
Collaborations with customers, 
establishment of Global Unichip. 
Began as an IDM but changed 
its business model to be a pure-
play foundry.  
Owns a number of chip design houses, 
including Faraday, Holtek, Novatek, 
ITE Tech, PixArt, Harvatek, etc. 
Outsourced to OSATs. 
No wafer-level packaging. 
Pure-play foundry. Has not moved 
beyond its specialization.  
IP library is weak. 
Owns only 3.17% of KYEC,  
mainly outsourced to OSATs 
including ASE. 
IP library 
Built the largest IP library among 
foundries worldwide.	
Chip design customers in Taiwan 
include Novatek, Himax and Orise. 
Also secured contract orders from 
TSMC for Omnivision and Richtek. 
No wafer bumping process.  
Limited wafer-level packaging. 
Limited R&D for advanced 3D and 
CoWoS packaging.  
No supportive R&D for back-end 
processes. 
Collaborative R&D with OBM 
customers on process technologies 
(not frontier technologies). 
Strong IP library.	
Process flow Vertical integration No participation 
EDA tech kit 
Photo-masking 
TSMC offers EDA tech kit to 
customers.	
No EDA tech kit offered. 
	
No EDA tech kit offered. 
	
Advanced and one of the word’s largest 
photo-masking operations.	
No photo-masking. 
	
No photo-masking. 
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Figure 4.9: Design and Pre-Production Costs 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
 
       
Figure 4.10: Costs of Photo-Masking and Testing (%) 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
TSMC has one of the world‟s most advanced photo-masking technologies in Phase II, 
whereas UMC has not participated in photo-masking activities. A mask is a glass plate 
covered with patterns that represent the negative copy of etching for a wafer. The 
pattern is passed onto each silicon wafer in the lithography process (CLSA Research, 
2012). To create extra values for its customers, TSMC‟s mask services are connected 
with its manufacturing through a computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) system. 
TSMC also has an online database (TSMC-Online) where information about mask 
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designs is accessible. This allows high accuracy of the manufacturing process, with very 
fast turnaround time for customers (CLSA Research, 2012). 
TSMC is not only participating in the photo-masking process but also seeking to 
advance the frontier of the respective technology. In Phase II, process miniaturization 
has resulted in more densely crammed chips requiring increasingly finer etching designs, 
which has caused issues in the lithography process. Manufacturers often struggled with 
etching precision due to the extremely fine nature of the etching designs. TSMC 
introduced a process called optical proximity correction (OPC) to solve the lithographic 
issue. This technology is able to anticipate the irregularities of shape and size and to 
correct the photo-mask images. It then produces a light beam that more precisely 
approximates the intended shapes. This new process introduced by TSMC has 
facilitated faster design changes, which has been critical in the progress of the IC 
industry. 
UMC has tried to follow TSMC‟s strategy for virtual vertical integration, although the 
vertical scope of its activities has not been as comprehensive as TSMC‟s. UMC has a 
strong IP library (more details will be discussed later) and the foundry has invested in a 
number of fabless firms. The list of UMC-related fabless firms includes Novatek 
(10.6% ownership), PixArt (12.4% ownership), Holtek (16.4% ownership), SiS (16.4% 
ownership) and Faraday (15.9%). Most of the chips fabricated in UMC are shipped to 
OSATs for backend packaging and testing. UMC only has 3.17% of ownership in an 
OSAT firm – KYEC. Although these subsidiaries are not consolidated into UMC‟s 
main operations, they nevertheless provide UMC some access to knowledge in these 
respective areas. 
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(b) Vertical upgrading by Taiwanese OSAT 
ASE has remained dedicated to the R&D of new material technologies, such as, copper 
wire bonding, flip-chip and copper pillar bumping. Figure 4.11 shows that its capital 
expenditure and R&D spending accounted for 40% and 58% respectively of the world‟s 
top-four OSATs (i.e. ASE, Amkor, SPIL and STATS ChipPAC) in 2010. 
 
Figure 4.11: Share of ASE Capital and R&D Expenditure among World‟s Top-Four    
OSATs, 2005-2010 (%) 
Source: Credit Suisse (2012); Gartner (2013) 
With the advancement of packaging technology, the need for stronger integration within 
the IC supply chain has increased. As the required knowledge and skills for back-end 
manufacturing have extended to wafer processing and substrate areas, higher values 
flow to the mid-end processes. Although an advanced foundry like TSMC is vertically 
integrating as it can increase its wafer bumping capacity and undertake packaging in-
house so that these activities are technologically in sync with node miniaturization, 
advanced OSAT firms like ASE also conduct R&D on 3D packaging to integrate the 
new technologies into its chip packages. Advanced packaging technologies like „wafer-
level packaging‟ (WLP) and „through-silicon-via‟ (TSV), which utilize specialized 
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wafer-foundry knowledge such as wafer bumping and wafer drilling, induce foundries 
and OSATs to integrate into the mid-end stages in the IC value chain. TSMC and ASE 
were the only foundry and OSAT equipped with the technological capabilities to 
participate in these activities as of 2012.  
R&D-driven foundries like TSMC also capture mid-end manufacturing opportunities 
due to their know-how of wafer-level technologies. OSATs like ASE require high 
technological capabilities to compete with foundries whereas smaller OSATs are largely 
disadvantaged. Meanwhile, embedded die packaging, where know-how pertaining to 
substrate features (such as circuit distribution and cavity techniques) is critical, has 
increased the value-add of substrate suppliers (CLSA Research, 2012). OSAT players 
with close cooperation or vertical integration into these activities enjoy a competitive 
advantage over the others. Besides a series of aggressive mergers and acquisitions, ASE 
also integrated ASE Chung Li and ASE Material in 2003. ASE Material has become an 
integral part of ASE‟s business model, as the value-addition of chip packaging is 
migrating towards chip substrates.  
As the industry‟s most advanced OSAT, ASE established strong collaborations with 
upstream customers and has been able to capture a large share of the value that flows 
towards the mid-end manufacturing segment. On top of that, the firm has advantages 
over its competitors in the advanced back-end segment, such as 3D packaging, since the 
firm has accumulated deep knowledge of wafer sorting and packaging processes. 
Although its largest competitor - Amkor Technology – tried to integrate into the 
foundry business in the late 1990s, ASE remains focused as a back-end contract 
manufacturer, without trespassing into foundries‟ specialization. ASE also built a more 
comprehensive list of packaging technologies as compared to smaller OSATs like 
Globetronics and Inari (Appendix A). 
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4.4.2.2 Limited Vertical Upgrading by Malaysian Latecomers 
As compared to advanced foundries, Silterra has not expanded its vertical chain of 
operations. The latecomer firm has not moved beyond Dimension I in the proposed 
framework. Its activities are mainly confined within the original specialization, with a 
fair amount of IP collections. By 2006, Silterra was the second largest wafer fabrication 
house in Southeast Asia. While industry leaders like TSMC, Samsung and Global 
Foundries invested incessantly in the development of 32 and 28nanometer (nm) 
technology in 2010, Silterra was mainly targeting the “sweet spots” of the market by 
producing chips at 180nm-110nm. As a latecomer, Silterra carefully strategized the 
types of technology to be built in Phase II in order to secure its position in the GVC 
under intense competition. The most popular nodes for 200 mm wafer foundries in 2010 
were 180 nm and 130 nm. In fact, Silterra mainly pursued More than Moore‟s Law, 
which was to add functional features to each existing node instead of participating in the 
miniaturization race. 
Silterra has a joint technology development project with ProMos Technologies 
(Taiwan). While Silterra transferred its 0.13-micron and 0.11-micron High-Voltage 
(HV) process technology for small-panel LCD driver IC applications to ProMOS, 
ProMOS opened up its wafer fab in Taichung, Taiwan for Silterra and provided 
technological support for 12” fabrication facilities. Through this collaboration, 
technology transfer took place between the two firms and both are able to share the pie 
of the fast growing smart phone market. However, such collaboration does not involve 
knowledge exchange between upstream and downstream firms. Instead, the two 
foundries collaborated based on reasoning related to transaction cost, combined capacity 
and scale, as well as, market gains.  
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The Malaysian owned Globetronics and Inari Amertron also made great efforts to insert 
themselves into more stages in the global value chain. Globetronics expanded into new 
product and process technology segments, including from burn-in services to plastic 
package assembly, to ceramics assembly, to module assembly, to customized LED and 
to sensor packages. Also, the firm expanded from memory devices to transistor 
products, to IC, to LED products, to timing devices, to sensors (see Table 4.4). In terms 
of consumer electronics products, the firm expanded from customized products to smart 
phones, to LED lighting products. Globetronics also collaborates with its supply chain 
partners to develop new material and processes. 
Inari Amertron carried out a series of business expansions and acquisitions. CEEDTec 
Sdn Bhd is a 51% own subsidiary of Inari acquired in January 2012 with Agilent 
Technologies being the major customer. Inari South Keytech Sdn Bhd (ISK), 
incorporated in June 2012, is a fiber-optic division supplies mainly to Avago. The key 
activities conducted by Inari Amertron as an OSAT include direct current and RF wafer 
testing, wafer back-grinding, wafer sawing, wire bonding, substrate molding and 
substrate sawing (see Figure 4.3). In 2013, the company decided to upgrade its process 
technology to include advanced packaging in the form of fine pitch flip-chip IC since 
the market growth of wireless devices and smart devices has increased the demand for 
RF flip chip IC.  
Inari Amertron has also become the first in the industry to introduce the „back-end laser 
marking‟ at wafer-level process and the first to introduce the „3D solder paste inspection‟ 
process in semiconductor manufacturing. The company‟s technical personnel are sent to 
Singapore for training programs for technology transfer from Avago. Inari Technology, 
a subsidiary of the group, has also collaborated with a local automation manufacturer – 
ViTrox Technologies to develop ViTrox‟s machines to conduct „3D X-ray Inspection‟. 
This new development opened up windows of opportunity for ViTrox to enter 3D X-ray 
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– a segment that ViTrox has not explored before. The technological deepening efforts 
by Inari Amertron also enable the collaborative partner to manufacture high-end 
products to export to the global market. It allows the firm to compete globally. Inari 
Amertron Group products are used in a variety of high-technology wireless 
telecommunications products such as smartphones, tablet computers, and wireless 
modems; optoelectronics, sensors, and fibre optics.  
Nevertheless, Globetronics and Inari have limited vertical upgrading and their catch-ups 
have not progressed beyond Dimension III(a). Both of the firms do not own an IP 
library. Nevertheless, through collaborations with customers, they are able to participate 
in their customers‟ chip designing process by providing quick prototyping or New 
Product Introductions (NPIs) for testing. For instance, Globetronics provides NPIs to 
customers such as EPSON, Avago and Heptagon whereas Inari provides NPIs to Avago, 
OSRAM and Agilent. The examples of vertical upgrading by OSAT firms are 
summarized in Figure 4.12. Meanwhile, the findings of organizational business models 
and resource acquisitions strategies are summarized in Table 4.4. 
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Figure 4.12: Vertical Upgrading of Back-End Manufacturing Firms 
Source: Interview findings, 2012-2013. 
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Table 4.4: Phase II – Catching up in the Context of Virtual Vertical Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on interview findings, 2012-2013 
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Towards Virtual Vertical 
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Dimension III(b) 
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Dimension I 
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Inari Amertron 
Dimension III(a) 
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Business model 
Contract 
manufacturer 
Pure-play foundry, 
one-stop center 
Pure-play foundry OSAT Pure-play foundry OSAT OSAT 
Production 
specialization 
Front-end wafer 
fabrication, virtual 
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Front-end wafer 
fabrication, limited 
virtual vertical 
integration 
Back-end 
packaging and 
testing, backward 
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integration 
Front-end wafer 
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Back-end 
packaging and 
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Back-end 
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testing, forward 
integration 
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customers 
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design houses, 
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integration firms 
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integration firms 
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ICs to 
microprocessors 
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mobile products, 
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devices, LEDs, 
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Fine Pitch flip-chip.  
Wireless telco 
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Competitive 
among smaller 
foundries 
Competitive  
(price cut, etc.) 
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4.4.2.3 Changing Value Systems 
In Phase II, there are increasing open innovations among smaller firms in the industry to 
gather resources and knowledge in order to keep up with the rapid technological 
progress. Open innovations take place between smaller firms and their peers, as well as, 
between upstream and downstream firms. Leading firms also participate in open 
innovations that facilitate them to vertically integrate the scope of activities. Moreover, 
leading firms in the industry form consortiums among themselves and participate in 
alliances to solve technical issues and to push the frontier of technologies. The 
collective vision is to create values for each participant within a particular value 
network and to maintain a wide technological gap between themselves and smaller 
firms.  
The formation of virtual vertical integration among leading firms has led to industry 
concentration, especially towards the later part of Phase II. In time, latecomers that 
deploy this strategy can seek to close the gap with frontier IDMs, despite being contract 
manufacturers. However, not every latecomer can achieve this. Among the selected 
cases for this study, TSMC‟s catch-up experience has demonstrated this process. 
Smaller firms that are not able to progress into Dimension III (b) remain adding values 
step by step to the vertical chain of production. Despite increasing open innovations, 
core competency remains important to leading firms like TSMC, since its main value 
creation for customers is offering advanced process technologies for wafer fabrication. 
Moreover, there is competition among the leading firms in the respective collaborations. 
(a) Stronger ties between upstream and downstream firms 
Advanced firms in the industry have also participated in open research institutes or 
collaborative organizations to gain access to external knowledge. Important examples of 
open research institutes include IMEC, SEMATECH, Selete in Japan (part of AIST 
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National Institute), the University at Albany‟s Center for Semiconductor Research in 
New York, the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) with its Global Research 
Collaboration, Focus Center Research Program, and the Nanoelectronics Research 
Initiative (IC Insights, 2014). These open innovation platforms have enabled 
participants to discover, select and develop new IC technologies.  
Figure 4.13 shows another critical example of an open innovation platform. Although 
IMEC was founded in 1984, the research institute gained increasing prominence since 
Phase II. As of 2013, IMEC is one of the world‟s largest groups of firms collaborating 
in semiconductor R&D. As shown in Figure 4.13, IMEC semiconductor R&D 
partnership ecosystem consists of upstream and downstream firms specializing in 
different expertise, including 17 of the industry‟s most prominent IDMs, pure-play 
foundries, and fabless and fab-lite suppliers. In addition, other semiconductor firms 
participating in this R&D ecosystem include approximately 80 leading suppliers of 
materials, equipment, chip design tools and services, and device assembly and test 
services (IC Insights, 2014). TSMC, Samsung and GlobalFoundries are the only 
foundries participating in this open platform.  
The ecosystem has enabled the foundries to acquire IC designing knowledge from 
leading fabless firms, including Qualcomm, Xilinx, Nvidia and Altera. The prominent 
IDMs that are willing to share relevant knowledge in this research platform include Intel, 
Panasonic, Samsung, Micron, SK Hynix, Toshiba and ON Semiconductor. However, 
the increasing technological interrelatedness between IC upstream and downstream 
firms has resulted in the need for material and equipment suppliers to also participate 
with the IC firms in order to drive technological development. This ecosystem has 
connected relatively larger firms to come together, despite specializing in different 
segments of the industry.  
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Figure 4.13: Integrated Semiconductor R&D Ecosystem in IMEC 
Source: IMEC, 2012, IC Insights, 2014. 
 
 
(b) Collaborations to push technological frontier              
In Phase II, although TSMC‟s logic chip fabrication remains its core competency, the 
foundry has also integrated into frontier technology of semiconductor equipment as part 
of its effort to pursue virtual vertical integration. One of the most important and costly 
pieces of equipment that contributes to the rising cost of new fabs is the lithography 
system. Figure 4.14 shows the rising cost of the critical exposure system as the industry 
migrates to bigger wafer sizes in tandem with smaller process linewidth. Towards the 
late 2000s, the latest lithography systems for 450 mm-wafer manufacturing are 
estimated to cost more than $ 125 million for each tool. However, a number of 
challenges need to overcome in order to commercialize the Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) 
systems. For instance, firms face increasing difficulty to decrease mask defect densities 
and improve system throughput.  
To push the technology frontier of the new generation of EUV systems to achieve 126 
wafers per hour, leading IC foundries in the industry have come together to cooperate to 
develop the required masks and resist materials. On top of that, IC manufacturers also 
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collaborate and work closely with equipment makers to push the technology frontier 
and maximize the usage of the equipment. The collective outcomes including improved 
optics and enhanced illumination technologies have allowed manufacturers to extend 
the life of 248nm KrF laser technology so that it can be used to produce non-critical 
layers of 22/20nm-generation ICs (IC Insights, 2014). Moreover, collaborations among 
IC manufacturers and equipment makers have also led to improvements in throughput 
rates that have mitigated the increasing costs of lithography.  
 
Figure 4.14: Critical Exposure System Cost Trend 
Source: IC Insights, 2014. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the co-invested R&D between the three largest IC foundries and the 
world‟s largest IC equipment maker – ASML – to develop the latest EUV technology 
system for 450mm manufacturing. In July 2012, Intel announced it would allocate $ 1 
billion over the next five years to conduct R&D with ASML to accelerate development 
(IC Insights, 2014). In August 2012, TSMC announced it would allocate approximately 
$ 1 billion to join the cooperative program and gain 5% ownership of ASML. 
Meanwhile, TSMC also allocated approximately US$ 337 million for the R&D for four 
years (2013 – 2017) whereas Samsung decided to invest US$ 330 million into the R&D. 
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Collectively, Intel, TSMC and Samsung account for 23% of ASML. This collaboration 
only consists of leading large firms, of which the objective of TSMC is to push the 
technology frontier of IC equipment makers and to further widen its gaps with 
competitors lagging in technology. 
Table 4.5 ASML‟s Co-Investment Program for EUV and 450mm Technology Migration 
Company Equity Investment 
(USD billion) 
Ownership 
(Percentage %) 
R&D Investment 
(2013-2017)  
(USD billion) 
Intel 2.98 15 0.99 
TSMC 1 5 0.33 
Samsung 0.6 3 0.33 
Total 4.58 23 1.65 
Source: ASML, 2012. 
 
(c) Value creation and value capture 
By participating in various IP alliances, TSMC collaborated closely with selected 
alliance members to implement TSMC‟s design. These alliances include the IP Library 
Alliance, the EDA Alliance, and the Design Center Alliance. The Design Center 
Alliance is a network of worldwide experienced, qualified IC design centers. It 
combines technological capabilities and capacity to reduce significantly the risks of 
designing, manufacturing and time-to-market for customers.   
Another important example of collaborations is IP sharing between TSMC and the 
firm‟s IP partners. “Quickstart” is a free IP prototyping programme introduced by 
TSMC. The objective of this programme is to accelerate chip prototyping to production 
and to shorten design cycle time (CLSA Research, 2012). TSMC and its IP partners (e.g. 
Cadence Design Systems, Mentor Graphics, and Barcelona Design) supply a pool of 
free IPs to the IP portfolio in this programme. Qualified customers are not required to 
pay licensing fees to IP providers until the production of their designs begin. Hence, 
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customers are allowed to receive prototypes at no cost and the development risk is 
greatly reduced. These collaborations create additional benefits for the foundry, the 
customers and the IP partners; each participant within the value network captures part of 
the collective values. 
Through collaboration with EDA and other design infrastructure partners, TSMC has 
developed the UDFM to provide unified access to TSMC‟s foundry data (CLSA 
Research, 2012). As customers are provided with an exact copy of TSMC‟s factory tool 
chain and process models, the process makes the increasing manufacturing variances in 
advanced process technologies easier to be managed. Customers can improve design 
alignment between simulated hotspots and actual manufacturing hotspots easily, which 
ensure higher accuracy. This is another critical value created by TSMC to its customers.  
In Phase II, foundries that are not able to move into Dimension III(b) find increasing 
difficulty to keep up with leading foundries. This is because more services are required 
by the designing firms to integrate a design with a process. As the design complexities 
increase, foundries are increasingly expected to provide assistance with SoC integration 
and IP services. Foundries that pursue the virtual vertical integration model participate 
in different segmentations of the foundry sector (see Figure 4.15). A full service 
foundry that participates in different segments also means that the foundry has to work 
closely with its partners, especially the upstream designing firms. The full-service 
foundry will have higher process expertise that distinguishes itself from other foundries, 
creating higher values to its networked partners and capturing higher values in return. 
116 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Segmentation of Foundry Sector 
Source: CLSA Emerging Markets, 2005. 
 
(d) Collaborations for technology migration 
IC firms have also participated in research activities conducted at the CNSE‟s Albany 
NanoTech Complex, University of Albany. Research includes nanoscale lithography, 
nanoelectronic materials, and advanced interconnects. SEMATECH has moved its 
headquarters and almost all of its activities to the NanoTech complex and Albany since 
2007. Table 4.6 shows the facilities built in CNSE‟s Albany NanoTech Complex. The 
facility houses vertically integrated R&D, prototyping, and educational activities. It 
provides strategic support to facilitate technology acceleration, business incubation, 
pilot prototyping, test-based integration, and other “next generation” nanotechnology 
research activities for the participant firms (CNSE, 2012). There are more than 300 
global corporate partners, including Applied Materials, ASML, GlobalFoundries, IBM, 
Intel, Samsung, Toshiba and TSMC. Large-scale and capital intensive facilities were 
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aggressively built towards the end of Phase II, when new practice of open innovation 
began to gain prominence. The NanoFab Xtension was completed in 2013 with the 
objective to house the Global 450mm Consortium. However, as discussed in the earlier, 
only four IC firms have sufficient knowledge and resources to become early adopters of 
450mm fabrication, namely Intel, Samsung, TSMC and GlobalFoundries (IC Insights, 
2014). Other technology followers are facing difficulties to conduct the required R&D 
for 450mm wafers. 
Table 4.6: CNSE‟s Albany NanoTech Complex 
Facility Year of 
completion 
Investment 
(US$ million) 
Technological Development 
NanoFab Xtension 
(or “West”) 
2013 365 - 450mm wafer fabrication and 
other next-generation 
technologies 
- Houses the Global 450mm 
Consortium 
NanoFab Central 
and NanoFab East 
March 2009 150 - 300mm wafer fabrication 
technologies 
NanoFab North December 
2005 
225 - 300mm wafer fabrication 
technologies 
- Houses the world‟s first EUV 
Alpha Demo tool 
NanoFab South March 2004 50 - Cleanroom space, classroom 
and office building 
NanoFab 200 (also 
knows as CESTM) 
June 1997 16.5 - Cleanroom space, R&D 
laboratory, classroom, and 
office building 
Source: CNSE, 2012; IC Insights, 2014 
 
While the technology leaders are collaborating to push the technology frontier of 
production wafer size, technology followers in the industry are also collaborating to 
share the knowledge of 300mm wafer technology. One of the most important platforms 
is the CNSE‟s Albany NanoTech Complex, which also houses NanoFab Central 
(completed in 2009), Nanofab East (completed in 2009), and NanoFab North 
(completed in 2005).  
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(e) Industry concentration 
Technological changes in the IC industry have also reversed the industry‟s value system 
from decentralization to industry concentration. Towards the end of Phase II as 
advanced firms form virtual vertical integration with upstream and downstream firms, 
the IC industry became highly concentrated in capacity, capital expenditure and 
revenues. Figure 4.16 shows that the revenue per wafer for 300mm production coupled 
with smaller technology nodes is stunningly higher than that for 200mm production 
with larger process nodes.  However, only 36% of the firms that operate a 200mm wafer 
fab have upgraded to a 300mm wafer fab (IC Insights, 2014). As Figure 4.17 presents, 
the top five leaders in the IC industry account for 67% of the world‟s 300mm wafer 
capacity as of 2013. The second top five firms account for only 23%, followed by the 
third tier of firms (the third top five firms) which only accounted for an additional 6%. 
Only 4% of the values of 300mm manufacturing are captured by small and fragmented 
foundries in the industry.  
 
Figure 4.16: Typical Pure-Play Foundry Revenue per Logic Wafer in 2013 
Source: IC Insights, 2014. 
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Figure 4.17: Worldwide 300mm Wafer Capacity of Industry Leaders, 2013 (%) 
Source: Gartner, 2013; IC Insights, 2014. 
 
Towards the end of Phase I (year 2005), the top five leaders in the IC industry 
accounted for 40% of the industry‟s total capital expenditure. Whereas the second tier 
firms (the second top five firms) made up for 15%, the third tier firms made up for only 
12% (see Figure 4.18). In 2011, TSMC alone accounted for 49% of the foundry market 
share (see Figure 4.19). The segment for OSAT services also became concentrated in 
Phase II, with the two largest service providers accounting for almost 50% of the 
industry‟s market share in 2013 (see Figure 4.20).   
 
Figure 4.18: Worldwide Capital Expenditure, IC Industry, 2005 (%) 
Source: IC Insights, 2012. 
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Figure 4.19: Foundry Market Share Breakdown by Revenue, 2011 (%)     
Source: Gartner, 2013. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Top 10 OSAT Firms, 2013 (%) 
Source: IC Insights, 2014 
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(f) Closing the gap with frontier IDMs 
In Phase II, TSMC has progressed into Dimension IV (b) by reducing its technological 
gap with the world‟s leading IDMs. Figure 4.21 shows the time gap between TSMC and 
Intel and Samsung. In logic ICs, Samsung lagged TSMC by more than one year at 90nm. 
TSMC was also ahead of Samsung at all subsequent technology nodes. TSMC was 
behind Intel by less than a year for every new technology nodes. At 20nm, TSMC used 
CoWoS technology and was lagged behind Intel in 2012 only by a few months. TSMC 
introduced the first 16nm 3D finFET technology around the third quarter of 2013, while 
Intel introduced its 14nm technology in early 2014 (CLSA Research, 2012). However, it 
is important to note that the measurements used to classify “technology generations” are 
not as clear-cut as before. TSMC‟s first 3D finFET technology is viewed as competitive 
as Intel‟s 14nm finFET products (IC Insights, 2014). The 16nm finFET technology can 
deliver a 25% speed increase with the same standby power consumption as its 20nm 
planar transistor technology.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Process Technology Development by Leading Foundries 
Source: CLSA Research, 2012.  
 
Despite being a contract manufacturer, TSMC has also reduced its gap with frontier 
IDMs in terms of economic performance. Because TSMC provides services to IDMs 
and fabless customers, direct comparison between the firm and the branded 
manufacturing firms is difficult. Industry analysis estimated the increasing role that 
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foundries gain in the industry by applying a sales multiplier to TSMC‟s revenue. The 
formulation of the sales multiplier is as follows. TSMC‟s sales are significantly 
weighted toward leading-edge devices (e.g. application processors for Qualcomm) and 
the average gross margin for its customers is 57% - which equates to a 2.33x sales 
multiplier (IC Insights, 2014). Figure 4.22 shows that, using that multiplier, TSMC‟s 
“final” IC sales came close to the world leading IC firm – Intel as of the end of 2012, 
with a gap of USD 2 billion. As of 2013, TSMC‟s “final” IC sales first surpassed Intel‟s 
IC sales. This also means that TSMC has a greater influence on the total IC market than 
any firm in the industry.  
 
 
Note*“Final” sales assume a 57% gross margin for TSMC‟s customers. 
Figure 4.22: Final Market Value of Semiconductor Sales, TSMC and Intel 
Source: IC Insights, 2014.  
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Table 4.7: Semiconductor Capital Expenditure by Top 25 Firms, 2012-2013. 
Firm 2012 (US$ million) 2013 
(US$ million) 
13/12% 
Change 
Samsung 12,225 11,560 -5% 
Intel 11,000 10,611 -4% 
TSMC* 8,341 9,709 16% 
GlobalFoundries* 3,800 4,500 18% 
SK Hynix 3,363 3,146 -6% 
Micron 2,184 1,935 -11% 
Toshiba 1,137 1,630 43% 
SanDisk 979 859 -12% 
UMC* 1,770 1,098 -38% 
SMIC* 499 651 -30% 
Infineon 807 490 -39% 
ASE** 1,007 668 -34% 
ST 476 531 12% 
Sony 1,047 574 -45% 
TI 494 412 -17% 
STATS ChipPAC** 410 508 24% 
AMKOR** 533 566 6% 
IBM 500 450 -10% 
Nanya 141 298 111% 
Rohm 535 265 -50% 
Hua Hong Grace* 245 300 22% 
SPIL* 513 505 -2% 
Powertech** 213 236 11% 
Avago 254 235 -7% 
NXP 251 215 -14% 
Top 25 Total 52,724 51,592 -1% 
Others 6,316 5,478 -13% 
Total Cap Spending 59,040 57,430 -3% 
* Foundry  **OSAT firm 
Source: Credit Suisse, 2013; IC Insights, 2014. 
 
Moreover, TSMC has also come close to Intel in terms of capital expenditure. As shown 
in Table 4.7, the firm spent US$ 9.7 billion on capital expenditure in 2013, as compared 
to Intel which spent US$ 10.6 billion (IC Insights, 2014). Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that Intel gets more leverage from its capital spending, given that the firm earns 
both a manufacturing and design margin while TSMC only earns from the foundry 
service. Hence, it appears that Intel has a lower capital expenditure to sales. However, 
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because TSMC‟s customers earn the “design margin”, by applying 50% gross margin to 
these customers, TSMC‟s adjusted capital expenditure to sales ratio is approximately 
25%, which is similar to Intel‟s.  
(g) Organizational core competency 
The above analysis of TSMC and Intel is not to compare the two firms‟ technological 
capabilities and economic performance. Instead, the study seeks to highlight that there 
is a certain level of “value constellation” practice among leading foundries (such as 
TSMC) and their customers, in order to ensure that collective end values are created 
within individual value networks. Moreover, the collective values are competitive as 
compared to other individual networks. In this case, TSMC has to create values for its 
fabless or IDM customers by providing frontier process technologies and advanced 
manufacturing capabilities at competitive costs. In return, its customers also have to 
provide advanced chip designing technologies that improve the functionalities of chips 
and provide demand to TSMC. The overall created values allow increasing capital 
expenditure and technological complexities to be viable options for both the advanced 
foundries and customers.  
On the other side of the coin, around two-thirds of IDMs‟ final value of ICs derives 
from the design and less than one-third from manufacturing (CLSA Research, 2012). 
Hence, IDMs are allocating more towards design R&D instead of wafer fab building 
and the development of process technologies. Therefore, IDM customers outsource to 
foundries not only for immediate capacity, but also to gain the support of advanced 
process technologies.  
Although open innovation indicates decreasing prominence of core competency as firms 
open up themselves for knowledge exchange, the high level of interdependency between 
upstream and downstream firms in the IC industry means that each participant seeks to 
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strengthen their specializations. Hence, organizational core competency remains 
relevant in an environment which firms practice open innovation to form virtual vertical 
integration.  
Despite the fact that Intel, TSMC and Samsung are collaborating with each other in a 
number of partnerships that involve horizontal scope of technological activities 
(including participating in ASML‟s equipment R&D and IMEC‟s partnership 
ecosystem), competition exist among these firms such as the race for process 
miniaturization. Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) refer to this phenomena as “co-
opetition” - firms in the industry collaborate but stay competitive with each other. 
4.5 Discussion 
Because latecomers lack technological capabilities, they are forced to seek external 
knowledge through various forms of outsourcing at the earlier stage of catch-up. By this 
means, firms in developing countries can leverage off their temporary low-cost 
comparative advantage to offer goods and services that are complementary to the 
incumbents while sourcing knowledge and obsolete technologies of the more advanced 
firms. Thus, these latecomers are able to capture latecomer effects by overcoming their 
disadvantages and exploiting their latecomer advantages. This has been the case during 
the initial stage when third-party outsourcing services (vertical disintegration) became 
available in the IC industry. Most latecomer cases in this study have pursued this 
strategy at the beginning of their catch-up. These practices demonstrate the traditional 
way of value distribution, e.g. the „industrial view‟ of value chains as value creation is 
sequential, unidirectionally transitive and cumulative from one production stage to the 
other (Ramirez, 1999). However, in time as technology progressed, firms in the industry 
operated under an environment with increasing open innovation practices that have led 
to changing industrial structures and value systems.  
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4.5.1 Business Models and Resource Acquisition Strategies 
By providing low-cost manufacturing services, latecomers make use of all the resources 
they can acquire and leverage from the advanced MNCs during the early stage of their 
catch-up. For such a trade-off to work, latecomer firms must consciously make strategic 
choices.  By entering into the GVC, some contract manufacturers can develop the 
potential for upgrading beyond the firm to the national level. It needs to be recognized, 
however, that not all firms have that organizational capability, and that such 
opportunities for upgrading may not present themselves. To catch up, latecomers deploy 
strategies for linking and leveraging more advanced knowledge as posited by Mathew 
(2002, 2006). However, the findings in this study show that the Taiwanese latecomers 
did not source for common technologies in Dimension I. The argument as outlined in 
Mathew‟s resource acquisition framework (i.e. latecomers to seek least rare, most 
imitable and most transferable technology) does not hold through different phases due 
to the changes in industry structure. The Malaysian foundry, although sourced for the 
most common technology, did not manage to catch up with the world‟s frontier 
technology when existing firms in the industry already cumulated the knowledge and 
capabilities in them. 
TSMC created a business model, which enabled the firm to create values for its 
customers. It was a strategic way to insert itself into the global value chain by reducing 
the cost burden of its customers. By being the world‟s first pure-play foundry, it not 
only created values for its customers, but also created new customers, especially in 
fabless form. The fabless firms in the US outsourced to the first pure-play foundry 
(TSMC) not because of lower cost of manufacturing, but because of the ability to avoid 
manufacturing at all. Such a business model did not exist until the Taiwanese foundry 
created a path-creating strategy to insert itself into the global value chain. 
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As informed by earlier literature, innovation has to some extent been open. Using the 
proposed framework, this study suggests that the practices of open innovation should 
have at least started to form during Phase I, Dimension III(a) – a period that took place 
before industry players began to form virtual vertical integration with other actors in 
their value network. At this point, the concept for value creating system changed. The 
resource-based view of firms becomes less critical as firms began to form linkages and 
exchange knowledge with other agents in the value system to achieve collective values. 
The critical source for organizational competitiveness lies in the ability to integrate 
internal and external knowledge.  
In Phase II, the Taiwanese latecomer firms followed through the practices of open 
innovation. It is imperative for these latecomer firms to continuously create values for 
their customers. Latecomer firms can do that in an open innovation environment by 
pursuing (at least partial) vertical integration. With that, the latecomer firms are able to 
participate in more production stages and extend their role across the value system. As 
the latecomer firms build up higher technological capabilities, these firms can offer 
knowledge in return to the more advanced incumbents, which secure themselves with 
more linkages to external advanced parties.  
 
4.5.2 Catching Up in Changing Value Systems 
The idea of „outsourcing‟ evolved from the perspective of the incumbents during this 
period of time. In Phase I, „outsourcing‟ takes place in two separate forms. On the one 
hand, the objective of „outsourcing‟ by incumbents to OSATs in Dimension I is to seek 
lower cost of production by passing some of the back-end manufacturing to third parties. 
On the other hand, fabless firms „outsourced‟ front-end activities to foundries in 
Dimension I not because it is cheaper than producing on their own, but to have their 
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production secured since they do not have any fab. The pure-play foundry model 
exempts the fabless firms from manufacturing.  
In the latter part of Phase I as latecomer firms began to move into Dimension III, 
incumbent IDMs outsource their wafer fabrication activities to pure-play foundries in 
order to save costs of production as the latecomer foundries have caught up in terms of 
technological capabilities. As the industry progressed, within the same dimension, more 
and more incumbent IDMs eventually closed down their fabs to pursue the fab-lite 
model. As large firms in the industry began to form virtual vertical integration in 
Dimension III(b), some IDMs have even become fabless. Outsourcing to foundries is no 
longer an option to save cost, but it has become the principal that underpins the business 
model of these incumbents.    
In time, latecomer firms that look up to virtual vertical integration as a mean to catch up 
will find themselves a more influential role in their value system in Phase II. In 
Dimension III(b), TSMC increasingly pursued integration across the vertical chain 
without compromising the values created for customers. The strategies deployed in 
Dimension III(b) allow firms to move into Dimension IV(b), of which their 
technological level becomes at par with their customers. TSMC showcases this 
phenomenon, of which the introduction of new products of its customers depends on its 
manufacturing capabilities and process technology development. The relationship 
between the firm and its customers or suppliers becomes highly interdependent.  
In Dimension IV(b), the proposed framework distinguishes the concepts for value 
constellations. Whereas the previous literature argues that a value constellation is a 
value creating system in which the coordination of the distribution of values is governed 
by a „leader‟ in that system, the findings in this chapter show that, virtual vertical 
integration among large firms in the industry leads to high level of interdependency 
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between partners and so the absence of a dominant leader in that value network. In 
Phase II, as Taiwanese latecomers gradually formed virtual vertical integration with 
their networked partners in Dimension III(b), latecomers that arrive even later (in this 
case, the Malaysian firms) need to break from Dimension III(a) to expand into more 
production stages so as not to lag further behind.  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter provided a six-dimensional framework to analyze the dynamic catch-up 
environment that latecomers faced, as the technology-intensive industry experienced 
vertical disintegration and virtual vertical integration. Throughout different phases, the 
firms have to revise and deploy different strategies for resource or knowledge 
acquisitions. Taiwanese latecomers constantly strategize so that the combination of the 
external knowledge they acquire and the internal knowledge they build complements 
each other. Such knowledge integration helped the latecomer firms move up the value 
chain so as to participate in more production stages and extend their role across the 
GVC, which in return also attracted various collaborations with external actors. This 
provided the Taiwanese latecomers with new gateways to more external knowledge. 
Latecomer firms shape their business model and resource acquisition strategies in ways 
that can create values for their upstream customers and downstream suppliers within 
their value network. However, the concept of value creation also varies as firms travel 
through different phases and as the industry experiences structural change. The 
framework and the findings in this chapter suggest that the new phase of value system 
has allowed latecomers to catch up with frontier technologies, even though they are not 
OBMs. To make that happen, latecomer firms should at least take into account the 
different dimensions of resource acquisitions as suggested in this chapter, as well as, the 
dynamic value systems and industrial structural changes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ESCAPING FROM ORGANIZATIONAL PATH DEPENDENCE BY 
ENDOGENOUS COEVOLUTIONARY LOCK-IN WITH INDUSTRY 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter analyses the research proposition that if coevolutionary lock-ins enable a 
firm to control its external environment and to dictate the progress of the industry, 
whereas „vision‟ offers the possibilities of path breaking, and a firm‟s technological 
trajectory depends very much on the strategic interpretations of actors and its absorptive 
capacity; actors thus can lead firms to escape from organizational path dependence 
through coevolutionary lock ins. What lies at the heart of the generative process has 
important managerial implications.   
5.2 Analytical Framework 
Figure 5.1 shows how organizations can skip or break away from the path dependence 
stage through endogenous coevolutionary lock-in with the external environment, i.e. the 
industry. This study extends the previous framework beyond the boundary of 
organizations by linking organizational stages with the evolution of the industry. The 
proposed framework introduces the element of endogenous forces. Because 
technological opportunities can be endogenous and is firm-specific (Teece et al., 1997), 
this study refers to endogenous forces as forces unleashed by an organization into the 
industry with the objective to generate impact, and to shape and control the technical 
progress of the industry, often under the top management‟s discretion. Endogenous 
forces can be unleashed at different stages to disturb the status quo so as to engender a 
coevolutionary reaction between the organization and the industry. Positive feedbacks 
from the industry act as external forces affecting the organization and result in mutual-
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reinforced mechanism (Dobusch & Schüβler, 2012) that leads to inter-path dependence 
between the organization and the industry over time.  
Endogenous forces unleashed with the specific objective of countering organizational 
lock-in can engender coevolutionary lock-in between the organization and the industry. 
At that juncture, coevolutionary lock-in works as if the key to unlock organizational 
path dependence because the coevolutionary lock-in is virtually the firm‟s path-breaking 
process. If an endogenous force is unleashed before the organization progresses into the 
path dependence stage (i.e. Stage III), it is referred to as the visionary key given that 
vision is constructed based on the beliefs which shape the leaders‟ views regarding how 
the firm should compete in the future (Fransman, 1994, 1999). The visionary key can be 
explained as the moment where preventive actions are taken by the leaders to avoid the 
potential lock-in. The visionary key can engender coevolutionary lock-in that it allows 
firms to virtually skip an entire organizational path dependence stage, and hence the 
organizational path-breaking process so as to forge directly into coevolutionary lock-in 
(see Figure 5.1).  
Because a firm unleashes endogenous forces to generate impact, and to shape and 
control the progress of the industry; the firm is able to dictate the strategic changes that 
other agents in the industry – customers, competitors, suppliers, and complementors – 
must adhere to (Burgelman, 2002, p.350). The industry progresses together with the 
firm and the coevolutionary lock-in allows the firm to skip to Stage I of its next cycle, 
where new sets of choices and technological opportunities await.  
However, not all firms are able to skip or break away from organizational path 
dependence through coevolutionary lock-in. First, the organizational leaders need to 
have the capabilities to envision how the firm should be like in the future by interpreting 
the external technological opportunities and the firm‟s existing knowledge base (Cohen 
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& Levinthal, 1990). The organization then needs to be equipped with the required 
knowledge base and intensified R&D to pull off the plans. Therefore, endogenous 
forces are also able to result in higher absorptive capacity of the firm. 
The premise is that, organizational path dependence is a fluid process in terms of time. 
As indicated by Sydow et al. (2009), the duration of each stage does not have to be 
equal. In addition, there is no clearly demarcated boundary between any two stages and 
this phenomenon is most apparent when the study incorporates the conditions of the 
endogenous forces, the visionary key, and the possibility of escaping from path 
dependence through coevolutionary lock-in with the external environment. This is 
because: (1) endogenous forces from firms can be engineered any time throughout the 
stages as they are strategies under managerial discretion at different points in time; (2) 
the visionary key takes place before the path dependence stage (i.e. organizational lock-
in); (3) coevolutionary lock-in with the industry is a phenomenon that requires an on-
going interactive process between the organization and the external environment and 
there is no generalizable point of time in the trajectory that this process should or must 
begin.     
In addition, this framework incorporates two levels of analysis, i.e. organization and 
industry. Because these two levels of mechanisms evolve at a different pace and 
because the system as a whole can never lock into a specific path (Coriat & Dosi, 1998; 
Bassanini & Dosi, 2001), it is often impossible for the two to be perfectly harmonized at 
a particular point in time (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). To simplify the study, the analysis is 
done under the condition that the two are harmonized by incorporating only positive 
feedbacks from the industry that respond to the firm‟s specific endogenous forces in an 
environment with no externalities.  
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Figure 5.1: Escaping from Organizational Path Dependence through Coevolutionary Lock-In with Industry 
Source: Extended from Sydow et al. (2009).  
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5.3 Research Method 
The study adopts the method of „meta-ethnography‟ to review and synthesize the 
existing studies (Noblit & Hare, 1988). The sample used is purposive since the objective 
is interpretive (Doyle, 2003, p. 326). The resultant synthesis is a reconceptualization 
across the cases that are related to the research question. This method therefore provides 
the theoretical and empirical basis for the proposed framework and its propositions.  
The chapter examines the propositions through a revelatory case study (Yin, 2014). The 
case of TSMC has no doubt been studied to unravel the role of Taiwan‟s institutions 
during the nation‟s catch-up stage. However, „how‟ and „why‟ the firm managed to 
leapfrog the incumbents and continued to be the industry leader has not been 
comprehensively unravelled. Non-quantifiable factors like strategic choices and 
leadership are taken into account.    
Specifically, the approach is known as a prototypical case study. A prototypical case is 
selected because it is expected to become so - its present can be the future of those who 
read or learn about the case (Rose, 1991, p. 459). Not only the early example allows 
better understanding of a phenomenon of growing significance, the case can exemplify 
an archetype of a phenomenon (Rose, 1991) and be particularly useful when there is a 
„proto-theory‟ to be tested or refined. A prototypical case study can lead to theory-
generating and the case of TSMC is critical for practical lesson-drawing. 
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Table 5.1: List of Interviews 
Organization 
type 
Organization Position Key expertise Main questions 
R&D 
institutes/ 
Government 
agencies 
1.Bell 
Laboratories, 
New Jersey 
R&D engineer  
(1963-1989)
A
 
Co-invented the non-volatile semiconductor 
memory which enabled the development of 
all modern electronic systems. He was called 
by the Taiwanese government to return to 
Taiwan in 1990 to nurture engineering 
students.  
 
- Key highlights of the IC industry 
- History of TSMC‟s establishment 
- TSMC‟s success factors 
 
 2.ITRI 
 
Former engineer in ERSO 
to President of ITRI  
(1976-2003)
B 
 
One of the seven engineers who was sent by 
the Taiwanese government to US in the 
1970s to be trained under the RCA 
technology transfer programme.  
 
- Programs and incentives administered 
- History of the agencies 
- Details of technology transfer  
- History of TSMC‟s establishment 
- TSMC‟s success factors 
- Key highlights of the IC industry 
 
3.ERSO Chief Director  
(late 1980s)
C
 
Led Taiwan‟s largest and most ambitious 
National R&D „Submicron Project‟. The 
project developed Taiwan first 8-inch 
CMOS submicron manufacturing 
technology and transformed Taiwanese IC 
industry to global standard.  
- Details of how ERSO developed the 
CMOS technology 
- Key highlights of the IC industry  
Academia 4.NCTU  
 
National Endowed Chair 
Professor and UMC Chair 
Professor
A
 
Called by the Taiwanese government to 
return to Taiwan from Bell Lab in 1990 to 
nurture engineering students. 
- Key highlights of the IC industry  
- TSMC‟s success factors 
 
  
5.Tsing Hua 
University 
 
Professor of Technology 
Management, Morris 
Chang Chair Professor
B
 
 
Taiwan‟s leading professor in Technology 
Management  
 
- Key highlights of the IC industry  
-TSMC‟s success factors 
IC Firms 6.Macronix President 
C
 Led Macronix to be the world‟s fourth 
largest IDM that specialized in non-volatile 
memory industry. 
-How organizational leaders make 
strategic  choices 
- Key highlights of the IC industry 
-Firm visions, leadership and strategies 
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Table 5.1, continued: List of Interviews 
Organization 
type 
Organization Position Key expertise Main questions 
 7.TSMC  Senior Executive of 
Integrated Technology  
The leader of the Integrated Technology 
division of TSMC. He has been leading the 
R&D and technological development of 
Moore‟s Law in TSMC for the past 16 
years. 
 
- TSMC‟s visions, leadership and strategies 
- TSMC‟s R&D projects, technology 
development 
- TSMC‟s technological capabilities building 
 
 8.Vanguard  Co-founder then President Vanguard International Semiconductor 
(VIS) Corporation is a subsidiary of 
TSMC. It was co-founded by Morris 
Chang.  
 
- TSMC‟s visions, leadership and strategies 
 
 9.UMC Manager of Asia Sales 
Division and Business 
Management 
A key leader in UMC‟s top management.  - UMC‟s strategies 
- TSMC‟s technology development  
- TSMC‟s competitiveness in the industry 
  Two ex-senior engineers 
 
Involved in UMC‟s R&D projects. -UMC‟s R&D projects, technology 
development 
 
 10. ASE R&D Director Leads ASE‟s global R&D projects. Also a 
researcher in technology management. 
ASE is the world‟s largest and most 
advanced service provider of 
semiconductor packaging and testing. 
- ASE‟s visions, leadership and strategies 
-ASE‟s R&D projects, technology 
development 
- TSMC‟s technology development  
- TSMC‟s competitiveness in the industry 
Market 
research 
firms 
11.CLSA Asia-
Pacific Markets 
Technology consultant and 
guest author for CLSA 
semiconductor technology 
reports (official email 
communications) 
 
Semiconductor lithography. Besides 
professing at University of Texas (Austin), 
his experience ranged from working in 
established technological organizations 
including National Security Agency and 
SEMATECH.  
 
 
- Technology key performance indicators. 
- Industry‟s technology progress and trends 
- Industry competition 
- TSMC‟s competitiveness in the industry 
- Conditions of TSMC‟s peers   
12.Macquarie 
Securities Korea 
Limited 
 
Managing director – Korea 
Technology Hardware 
Research 
 
Technology analysis of semiconductor 
industry.  
Note: A, B, C = Change of professional roles in the industry. 
Source: Interviews, 2012 – 2013. 
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The prototypical case study is embedded and longitudinal multi-staged. The unit of 
analysis is TSMC whereas embedded units including top management and R&D 
engineers are included. The time period of this study is from 1987 to 2013 and it is 
divided into two epochs. Epoch 1 covers from 1987 to 1999 which is the period when 
TSMC was catching-up; epoch II covers from 2000 to 2013 which is the period when 
TSMC began to and continued to lead the industry. Each epoch consists of one cycle of 
the organizational path as depicted in Figure 5.1. To simplify the analysis, the study 
includes only external events that act as positive feedbacks from the industry that 
respond to the firm‟s specific endogenous forces. Since contextual conditions are 
important, the study is wary of changes in the industry including market trends and 
technology demands. Any fact related to the stream of events describing the 
phenomenon is considered important (Yin, 2014). 
One way to examine the propositions is by identifying the „key informants‟ to be 
interviewed (Yin, 2014). The primary data are gained from in-depth interviews and 
official email exchanges with the key informants. Table 5.1 shows the list of semi-
structured interviews undertaken from 2012 – 2013 for the study. These industry experts 
provide the researcher with perceived causal inferences and help relate the details to the 
key concepts in the proposed framework. The informants in this study vary in 
background and represent different R&D institutes, government agencies, academia, IC 
firms and market research firms. The proposed framework and propositions are also 
discussed and validated by these key informants. The study complements the above 
interviews with secondary data obtained from archival records, official documentation 
and statistical databases.  
Firstly, the collected data were organized using the qualitative content analysis method 
as posited by Gläser and Laudel (2013). This method extracts and processes only the 
relevant data or information using categories derived ex ante from the prior theoretical 
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framework. Patterns in the extracted data are identified and integrated (Yin, 2011). To 
ensure the classifications match both the theory and data, theory was modified in this 
process if needed.  
This study also goes further to produce a stronger test of the first framework. It seeks to 
treat not just the occurrence of an event, but also how and why an event appeared to 
have produced a subsequent event (Yin, 2014). To do so, the chapter then examines the 
„transitions‟ of the events in the first framework to explain how organizations transit 
from one particular stage to coevolutionary lock-in, and then to another new cycle of 
organizational path. The study compares the consistency between the data and the 
originally stipulated sequence for each event, modifying the latter if needed with 
additional evidence. In Section 5.4, the organization-level mechanism is explained in 
Table 5.3 as the study classifies the sequences of events that lead to the generation of 
endogenous forces. The study also explains industry-level mechanism in Table 5.4 as it 
classifies the sequences of events that lead to the formation of inter-path dependence 
and coevolutionary lock-in. Finally, the chapter puts forward a schematic representation 
of its findings in Figure 5.5, which becomes a new framework for the mechanistic 
explanation.  
5.4 Organizational Path Dependence and Coevolutionary Lock-In 
Through the analysis of TSMC‟s organizational path, the study shows how TSMC‟s 
endogenous forces interfaced with the industry and resulted in interpath-dependence 
that caused coevolutionary lock-in with the industry. The latecomer firm encountered 
different experiences in the two epochs. The study divides the analysis into two epochs. 
Epoch I is the time period when TSMC was catching up and keeping up with the IC 
technological development. Epoch II is the time period when TSMC outplayed its 
competitors and continued to be the leader in logic IC. 
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5.4.1 TSMC Epoch I: Catch-Up and Keep-Up 
5.4.1.1 Stage I: Path Creation (1987-1994)  
The founder of TSMC, Morris Chang, received his education in the United States and 
worked there, rising to the position of Senior Vice President at Texas Instruments. He 
not only brought with him the tacit knowledge of managing a technology-intensive firm 
in the same product line but also enjoyed tacit links with the R&D labs, designers, 
suppliers and buyer firms. While UMC continued to develop the RCA-based (high-
voltage) technologies provided by ITRI, Morris Chang envisioned that the RCA-based 
technologies would not be sustainable in the subsequent years as the process node scales 
down. Morris Chang therefore led TSMC to form a JV with Philips. His knowledge to 
envision the limitations of the RCA-based technologies from the beginning is also 
largely due to his vast experience as the president of ITRI, and since 1980 the President 
of Hsinchu Science Park. 
TSMC began as a latecomer in the IC industry in 1987 but it was determined to be the 
world‟s first pure-play foundry. In the 1980s, design-only (fabless) firms outsourced the 
fabrication of their chips to MNCs that operated as IDMs due to the high cost of 
production.
 
However, IDMs insisted on the fabless firms transferring the designs via 
contracts so the IDMs could produce competing chips with their own brand names if a 
product became successful. Moreover, designs by fabless firms were only fabricated 
when the IDMs had excess capacity (ITIS, 1999). 
Morris Chang, together with other key experts from ITRI who were passionate about 
developing Taiwan‟s IC industry at that time, interpreted the technological opportunities 
and reviewed the knowledge base the new firm could have in Taiwan. It was envisioned 
that an IC firm could seize the market opportunity given the large number of fabless 
firms by masterminding a dedicated IC manufacturer to fabricate the designed chips. In 
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the 1960s, Taiwan had very limited experience in IC design, sales and marketing 
compared to its experience in process technology at that time. It therefore appeared to 
Morris Chang and the key experts that Taiwan could develop significant strength in the 
area of fabrication and a foundry business was built around that strength. The National 
Endowed Chair Professor stated: 
Taiwan is a country with very limited lands, no natural resources and dense 
population. […] In the 1960s, Taiwan did not have anything strategic to develop 
its economy but it had high quality of human capital in the electronics industry 
and sufficient manufacturing experience in process technologies. This was a 
critical factor why the second spin-off from ITRI (TSMC) was targeted to be a 
contract manufacturer for chip fabrication. 
 
It was the first endogenous force unleashed into the IC foundry industry by TSMC. 
Fabless firms that fully adopted the services of foundries included Nvidia, Adaptec, 
Altera, Chips and Technologies, Cirrus Logic, and Xilinx. There was an increasingly 
popular business model and the technological development of the IC industry was 
quickened, as most fabless firms could by then concentrate their resources on R&D. The 
former Chief Director of ERSO stated: 
TSMC created a path for itself. For the first time, it offered the design firms the 
support of a dedicated contract manufacturer. Because it was not an IDM, it 
would not compete with the design firms or prioritize its own manufacturing 
orders. That created a huge advantage for TSMC because the firm was launching 
a technological revolution that changed the IC industry‟s landscape. […] 
TSMC‟s business model allows the „fabless‟ firms to focus solely on R&D, to 
grow without lumpy investments, and to stop sharing their IPs with the IDMs.  
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5.4.1.2 Stage II: Path Shaping (1995-1998)  
The critical juncture of TSMC took place within 1995-1996. Morris Chang led TSMC 
to gain knowledge via the JV with Philips and to develop an alternative process 
technology that replaced the mainstream process technology. According to an ex-senior 
engineer from UMC: 
At 0.25um process technology [within 1995 – 1996], the main material [titanium 
silicide] of the transistor gate was not stable during high-temperature processes 
in deep-submicron technology. […] While titanium silicide was the popular 
process material used by firms including UMC, Morris Chang was able to 
envision the impending problems and began to develop an alternative process 
[CoSi2 gate]. […] TSMC then smoothly scaled down to 0.18 um and for the first 
time, it provided the industry a critical next-generation solution.  
 
That event was TSMC‟s moment of entering into the self-reinforcing process, as it 
began to lead the foundry industry, both in circuitry resolution and management of 
manufacturing capabilities. It was that technological initiative by TSMC that began to 
create a technological gap between the firm and its largest competitor. The ex-engineer 
added: 
UMC, the then world’s second largest pure-play foundry which was also 
TSMC’s largest competitor, spent two years catching up with TSMC in yield 
improvement. ‘Two years’ is too long in the IC technology competition.  
 
TSMC progressed to be the world‟s largest pure-play foundry. It was able to price its 
products at a premium of approximately 10% on a per wafer basis while keeping its 
customers‟ costs competitive on a per die basis due to its high die yield and high 
capacity utilization rates. The firm‟s average yield rate was above 95%, compared to the 
industry‟s average of 80% - 90% (CLSA Emerging Markets, 2005).  
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TSMC‟s success and overall high market growth attracted the entry of new foundries. 
That intensified the industry‟s competition and eventually caused oversupply and falling 
prices. IBM‟s incessant effort in the foundry arena was the biggest threat to TSMC due 
to IBM‟s large IP library, resources and knowledge in system-level integration. 
Meanwhile, choosing the pure-play foundry model causes TSMC to be deprived of IPs 
in its early stage.   
To remain the world‟s largest pure-play foundry, TSMC strategized an endogenous 
force that intensified the demand for foundry services. TSMC aggressively expanded its 
fabrication capacity in 1996 to reach 299,000 wafers per month by 1999, an almost 50% 
increase from 147,000 wafers per month in 1996. A total of 5 wafer fabs built on 
200mm wafer size technology were launched within 1995 – 1998 (Gartner, 2013). 
Having the highest capacity in the industry, TSMC attracted fabless customers with 
increasing volume orders and who became more confident with TSMC looking at its 
rapid expansion. A self-reinforced mechanism developed in TSMC and the scale effect 
was the most important factor. The Chief Director of ERSO stated: 
The promise of high capacity helped TSMC to attract high volume orders, and 
so realized economies of scale in production to maintain high margins.  
 
TSMC created a significant presence for itself in the industry. However, in this period 
of time, the wafer shipment (indicator for volume of customer orders) of TSMC was 
still low. As much as the growth of the fabless firms and their technological innovations 
were highly dependent on TSMC, the firm needed more manufacturing orders from 
these firms for its further development. Outsourcing from IDMs was also a new trend 
which was still not widely accepted. Without more customer orders, TSMC would face 
difficulties to be the first to develop subsequent technologies, due to its previous choice 
of becoming a pure-play foundry. There was a potential organizational lock-in. 
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5.4.1.3 Stage III: Coevolutionary Lock-In (1998-1999)  
As a pure-play foundry which has injected much capital and incurred high R&D costs, 
TSMC had to continue securing itself by keeping up with Moore‟s Law competition. 
Because the sources of growth for a pure-play foundry are the fabless firms and the 
IDMs, TSMC had no choice but to keep growing its customer base by investing 
intensively although it was already the world‟s largest foundry. Because the fabless 
industry was also reliant on TSMC to grow, there was high inter-path dependence 
between TSMC and the industry.  
During Stage III, TSMC had a higher production share from IDMs than in Stage II but it 
was still low. TSMC could get orders from IDMs only when the IDMs did not have 
sufficient production capacity or when they decided to cease a particular fabrication 
technology. The technology consultant at CLSA Research stated:    
That was due to longer time to market and transitional inertia as they [IDMs] 
had to accommodate foundries and standardize processes. […] IDMs with 
sufficient volume wanted to avoid foundry price hikes or capacity constraints 
whereas IP intensive IDMs could better protect their IPs by doing the 
manufacturing themselves.  
 
In 1998, the industry experienced a cyclical downturn due to the Asian financial crisis. 
In September 1998, photo-mask manufacturing at TSMC‟s internal facilities began to 
decrease. Photo-masking is the earliest sales indicator in the IC production cycle. Being 
a pure-play foundry, TSMC found obstacles to develop new technologies with 
decreasing sales. TSMC faced organizational lock-in. 
TSMC was challenged by lower utilization rates, but it decided to reduce its production 
prices for customers who were willing to transfer IP, as part of the firm‟s strategy to 
offer SOC solutions. That was another endogenous force unleashed by TSMC from its 
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top management to increase the organization‟s absorptive capacity and to build the 
strongest IP library in the industry.  
The senior executive of Integrated Technology division at TSMC opined that such 
efforts have eventually led to coevolutionary lock-in between TSMC and the industry 
where new technological opportunities arose for TSMC: 
Customers were willing to transfer IPs as they needed the lower prices at the 
industry‟s down cycles. Because technologies were crucial for us [TSMC] to 
grow our customer base, we had to temporarily accept negative margins. […] 
We used the transferred IPs to develop a strong design-cell [IP] library to help 
customers reduce time-to-market and develop SOC designs.  
 
TSMC‟s strategy of expanding its service portfolio through IP transfers combined with 
a protracted demand and supply imbalance in the foundry segment further lowered 7% 
of its own prices (i.e. half of its premium over its competitor UMC) despite the ramp-up 
of more smaller nodes. The trade-off between lower prices for more sophisticated 
technology and lower utilization rates again lowered the firm‟s margins. Moreover, on 
29 September 1998, TSMC announced its second JV with Philips which exceeded 
TSMC‟s budget plan. TSMC had to continue investing despite the hostile environment. 
While its rivals were contemplating on downsizing and cost-minimizing, TSMC 
incessantly spent on building technological capabilities despite lower margins and lower 
utilization rates. Those were critical endogenous forces unleashed by TSMC into the 
industry during the down cycle to ensure that the foundry industry could progress in 
technology and capacity; hence the advantages of adopting the pure-play model would 
not be jeopardized. Meanwhile, TSMC gathered critical strengths which opened up 
itself to more external technological opportunities and very quickly, to a new era of 
growth. With the strategic discretions of its leaders, the coevolutionary lock-in allowed 
TSMC to escape from the organizational lock-in. 
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5.4.2 TSMC Epoch II: Forging Ahead  
5.4.2.1 Stage I: Generating Momentum (2000-2005)  
TSMC further intensified its R&D and built stronger technological capabilities. 
Meanwhile, the wafer-bumping process became more important in the industry as it is a 
key manufacturing process for the flip-chip market which was expanding.
9
 TSMC 
gained high market shares in advanced nodes but packaging and testing firms like ASE, 
did not expand wafer-bumping capacity enough to meet TSMC‟s customers‟ 
requirements. According to the senior executive of Integrated Technology division, 
TSMC integrated wafer fabrication with wafer-bumping process in 2000:  
The purpose of developing the wafer-bumping in our [TSMC‟s] fab was to 
internalize the relevant knowledge into the organization while quickening 
technical progress in the wafer bumping sector so that it was in sync with the 
speed of the firm‟s node miniaturization. 
 
Since bumping is a wafer-based process, knowledge- and technology-intensive 
foundries have an advantage over packaging and testing firms as technology barriers 
increase. Wafer-bumping also has a similar equipment and cost structure with wafer 
fabrication. Morris Chang was aware of the potential obstacles facing technology 
migration into smaller nodes; and he too was aware of the organization‟s existing 
knowledge base and financial structure which could afford the additional venture. 
TSMC‟s integration of advanced bumping was another endogenous force unleashed 
upon the industry. The firm turned a constraint into an opportunity. It built its own 
wafer-bumping capacity, especially at technology-intensive nodes to solve production 
bottlenecks that it would otherwise face and overall to avoid any deceleration of the 
industry‟s technology migration.  
                                                          
9 Bumping is a process immediately after fabrication, which takes place before packaging and testing (CLSA Research, 2012). After 
fabrication, wafers are sent to packaging and testing firms for subsequent processes. 
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TSMC‟s miniaturization technology caught up with the world‟s frontier in 1998. Since 
then TSMC has led the industry‟s process roadmap, overtaking the MNC incumbents. 
Leading fabless firms were increasingly seeking foundries to prototype their advanced 
circuit designs. The senior executive of TSMC‟s Integrated Technology division added: 
Foundries have diverse customer bases. This means we [TSMC] can learn the 
full range of IPs and manufacturing processes better than the IDMs. […] The 
technological gap between foundries and IDMs began narrowing quickly so 
much so that the process technology of advanced foundries, especially us 
[TSMC], had caught up with that of the top-tier IDMs.  
 
TSMC‟s progressive technology was an endogenous force that has hastened the speed 
of node miniaturization, resulting in higher market needs for smaller nodes. This is an 
example of industry‟s feedback as an external force to TSMC. TSMC continued to push 
the frontier of node miniaturization. Such mutually-reinforced mechanisms resulted in 
the need for IDMs to outsource to foundries due to the escalating costs of setting up 
fabs catering to the production of smaller nodes as the industry progressed (see Figure 
5.2). Endogenous forces unleashed by TSMC resulted in inter-path dependence between 
TSMC and the industry. 
TSMC‟s knowledge in node miniaturization led the firm to easily build the most 
extensive process technology portfolios and service offerings. It became a one-stop total 
solutions provider. For instance, 90% of TSMC‟s customers utilized the foundry‟s 
photo-masking services and these customers were highly dependent on TSMC since 
photo-masks are generally non-portable (CLSA Research, 2012). 
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The senior executive of TSMC‟s Integrated Technology division added: 
Our progressive R&D in node miniaturization led us to easily extend the R&D 
scope to add features and services to each existing node. We are leading both in 
Moore‟s Law and More than Moore‟s Law. […] This is crucial to avoid excess 
capacity that lowers our production scale effect. […] We now have the most 
extensive process technology portfolios and service offerings as a one-stop 
solution provider. 
 
IDMs encountered stiff competitions from fabless firms as the fabless model does not 
require high fixed costs and they had better production yields and pricing by 
outsourcing to foundries. Fabless firms were also more competitive with more cost 
effective designs. A number of IDMs became relying on TSMC for advanced nodes, 
larger wafers, and strong integration capabilities. 
 
     Figure 5.2: Cost of Setting Up a Wafer Fabrication Plant, 1983-2009 
     Source: CLSA Research (2012). 
 
5.4.2.2 Stage II: Path Shaping (2006-2010)  
Since TSMC began to lead the technologies in the logic IC industry, it had to risk the 
high costs involved to develop new processes including the initial phase of equipment 
inefficiency. However, driven by Morris Chang‟s visions, TSMC continued to lead 
node miniaturization. TSMC was challenged with yield instability in the development 
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phase of increasingly smaller nodes. The firm‟s profitability was hampered and its cost 
savings was jeopardized. Meanwhile, many IDMs began to cease their wafer fabrication 
due to less economy of scale compared to TSMC. These firms could not achieve 
optimal production scale as they did not open up their fabs to offer foundry sevices. 
According to the Morris Chang Chair Professor: 
IDMs only produce their own branded chips. Those [IDMs] with smaller scale 
face higher cost per unit as pure-play foundries like TSMC produce large 
volumes. A large foundry arm of an IDM could have similar strength; but IDMs 
still had to choose spending on R&D and designing over production. Many 
IDMs eventually moved towards a fab-lite or a fabless model.  
 
As IDMs stopped building their own fabs and gradually adopted the fab-lite model, they 
increasingly outsourced to foundries. When TSMC arrived at 28nm, only five IDMs 
worldwide were able to survive, as compared to 10 IDMs at 45nm and 16 IDMs at 
90nm node (CLSA Research, 2012).  
TSMC was the first to launch 65nm node and that was the critical juncture for TSMC as 
it led to self-reinforced effects in subsequent periods. The pricing of each node is the 
highest at the first quarter of every introduction and fell dramatically through the 
subsequent quarters. Latecomers of technology nodes are constrained by lower prices 
and discount offers, thus having less ability to recoup their investments. The President 
of Macronix commented: 
The premiums earned for being the first-mover of a new technology node also 
assisted TSMC to have sufficient resources to invest in the subsequent smaller 
nodes, related R&D and production capacity. 
 
This cumulative, self-reinforced mechanism has enabled TSMC to be the R&D 
frontrunner in logic IC (see Figure 5.3); all of which allowed TSMC to unleash more 
endogenous forces to push the technological frontier of the industry. TSMC was also 
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the first to sell at 45nm and 28nm.
10
 It is almost unviable for UMC to further venture 
into 22nm as the firm‟s average return on gross equity for that node is merely 2% versus 
9% for TSMC (CLSA Research, 2012). The manager of Asia Sales Division at UMC 
noted: 
TSMC raised the bar of R&D expenditure among industry players and was the 
first to build massive capacity. […] TSMC keeps widening its technological and 
time gap with its peers. We [UMC] cannot keep up with the race but we still 
have to follow TSMC‟s technology.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: R&D Expenditure of the Largest Pure-Play Foundries, 2000-2010 
         Source: CLSA Research, 2012. 
 
While other foundries were trying to expand the lifetime of their existing fabs to avoid 
capital spending, TSMC disrupted the industry‟s status quo by continuously building 
more fabs. By 2012, TSMC owned a total of 19 operating wafer fabs. 10 of the wafer 
fabs began production in 2004 and after, which was when the building costs were 
skyrocketing (CLSA Research, 2012). Figure 5.4 shows TSMC‟s capital spending 
compared to its competitors.  
 
                                                          
10 Miniaturization of memory chips is faster and costs much less than logic chips as its fabrication involves building transistors in 
repetitive structures in contrast to complex built-up of individually-located transistors in logic chips (CLSA Research, 2012). 
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Figure 5.4 Capital Expenditure by the Largest Pure-Play Foundries, 2000 – 2010 
      Source: CLSA Research (2012). 
 
5.4.2.3 Stage III: Coevolutionary Lock-In (2011 – mid 2013)  
Morris Chang envisioned in 2007 that the industry would face major structural change 
as Moore‟s Law will be obstructed by unsolvable technical challenges in the following 
six to eight years. Such bottlenecks would cause TSMC to lose all its self-reinforced 
benefits accumulated from its technological leadership. Morris Chang and the top 
managers strategized to interfere with the industry‟s status quo to prevent negative 
impacts likely to hit the firm. He envisioned that it was crucial for TSMC to vertically 
integrate its technological activities to counter Moore‟s Law bottlenecks.11 In fact, this 
was the period of time when TSMC began to pursue virtual vertical integration, as 
discussed in earlier chapters.  
Morris Chang revised the firm‟s business model and interpreted that, TSMC has wafer-
level knowledge to integrate into advanced wafer-level packaging such as 3D packaging 
and CoWoS. Morris Chang then announced in a number of press conferences in 2007 
                                                          
11 Although the event of visionary key took place in 2007, the topic is discussed together with Stage III in order to explain how the 
visionary key helps the firm mitigate the technology bottlenecks caused by the challenges to Moore‟s Law. 
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that TSMC would vertically integrate its scope of technologies (Chang, 2007; CLSA 
Research, 2012). The President of Macronix commented that: 
It was important for TSMC to secure its leading position because of all the 
cumulative advantages. Moore‟s Law bottlenecks are „red lights‟ to TSMC. […] 
The firm definitely has the relevant knowledge and skills to integrate into 
advanced 3D packaging.  
 
The senior executive of Integrated Technology division noted how the CoWoS 
technology created new opportunities for TSMC: 
We [TSMC] integrated wafer manufacturing with 3D packaging of finished 
products to deliver successful customers‟ product development and to achieve 
faster time-to-market with improved system performance.  
 
The Morris Chang Chair Professor noted: 
With 3D packaging capabilities, TSMC is creating new values across the value 
chain and these values belong to TSMC. 
 
The R&D director of ASE added: 
We cannot keep up with TSMC‟s CoWoS development but we are definitely 
following this [CoWoS]. We have started the internal R&D.  
 
Being the leader in Moore‟s Law competition, CoWoS was introduced to escape from a 
potential organizational lock-in. Such endogenous force is reckoned as the visionary 
key of TSMC. By 2012, TSMC was the first and only foundry to officially initiate 
production for CoWoS. In that year, almost 50% of chips larger than 120mm were 
transforming to adopt CoWoS (CLSA Research, 2012). This endogenous force by 
TSMC is capable of changing the industry landscape and allowing TSMC to be in 
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further control of the industry. TSMC skipped the internal lock-in caused by 
deceleration of Moore‟s Law via the coevolutionary lock-in. 
In 2012, Intel began shipments of its 22nm chips which were produced with the FinFET 
process.
12
 Under Morris Chang‟s leadership, TSMC had the knowledge base and 
existing capacity to conduct FinFET R&D. In April 2013, TSMC announced the first 
tape-out of a processor co-developed with ARM using TSMC‟s 16nm FinFET 
technology. However, fabless firms in the industry faced difficulties to design circuits 
with FinFET as the EDA vendors who supplied chip design tools were not ready to cope 
with the 3D transistor structure. TSMC again interfered with the industry‟s progress by 
facilitating the industry‟s adoption of the new technology. The senior executive of 
TSMC noted:  
We [TSMC] certified the list of custom and digital design tools from Synopsys 
for 16nm FinFET Design Rule Manual […] The certification provides the early 
adopters access to our [TSMC‟s] advanced process and to facilitate the 
industry‟s deployment of FinFET. 
 
Such endogenous force contributed to TSMC‟s coevolutionary lock-in with the industry. 
As much as TSMC had to commercialize FinFET in the IC industry to avoid internal 
production bottlenecks, the industry needs FinFET to continue to progress as Moore‟s 
Law slows down. The findings are summarized in Table 5.2. 
                                                          
12 FinFET is a multigate transistor architecture developed to solve scalability bottlenecks when the IC industry migrates beyond 
20nm (CLSA Research, 2012). 
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Table 5.2: TSMC‟s Organizational Path, Inter-Path Dependence and Coevolutionary Lock-In with the Industry
Source: Interviews, 2012-2013.  
Epoch Epoch I (1987 - 1999) Epoch II (2000 - 2013) 
TSMC Path creation 
(1987 - 1994) 
Path shaping 
(1995 - 1998) 
Coevolutionary lock-in 
(1998 - 1999) 
Generating 
momentum  
(2000 - 2005) 
Path shaping 
(2006 - 2010) 
Coevolutionary lock-in 
(2011 – 2013) 
TSMC’s 
endogenous 
forces 
Became the first 
pure-play 
foundry. 
Developed the 
alternative process to 
solve thermal issue and 
for the first time 
provided the critical 
next-generation 
solution (critical 
juncture). Expanded 
production capacity. 
 
Began building the 
strongest IP library by 
reducing prices to 
customer willing to 
transfer IPs; invested in 
technologies and 
manufacturing capacity 
despite industry downturn. 
Intensified its R&D 
and integrated into 
wafer bumping; built 
the most extensive 
process technology 
portfolios and service 
offerings. 
Pushed the frontier of 
node miniaturization, 
wafer size, and 
production yield. 
Envisioned to 
vertically integrate the 
firm‟s technology 
offerings (the visionary 
key) and began to 
pursue virtual vertical 
integration in 2007. 
 
Integrated into advanced 
packaging (CoWoS); 
certified EDA design tools 
to facilitate industry-wide 
adoption of FinFET 
technologies to counter 
Moore‟s Law bottlenecks. 
TSMC and 
Industry 
Inter-path dependence  Coevolutionary lock-in Inter-path dependence Coevolutionary lock-in 
Industry’s 
positive 
feedbacks 
Fabless firms 
began to 
outsource to 
foundries. 
Fabless firms relied on 
TSMC‟s large capacity 
to produce at larger 
volumes. 
Lower demand at industry 
downturn; customers had 
to transfer IPs to TSMC to 
get lower prices. 
Firms‟ miniaturization 
relied on TSMC‟s 
production capabilities.  
More IDMs outsourced 
to foundries due to high 
fab costs and stiff 
competition from 
fabless firms as they 
have better yields. 
A large number of 
fabless and IDMs 
relied on TSMC for 
success; as more IDMs 
went fab-lite or fabless. 
Advanced fabless firms 
and IDMs adopted CoWoS 
and FinFET technologies 
to mitigate production 
bottlenecks. 
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5.5 Discussion 
The IC industry is a technologically complex industry. Hence, it will be too ambitious 
to incorporate all technological aspects of the industry into this chapter. However, the 
technological events selected for this study are the fundamental pillars of the IC 
industry and are critical features that contribute to the development of the industry.  
The Epoch I of TSMC case is an example of how a leading firm escaped from 
organizational lock-in in a short period of time by unleashing endogenous forces into 
the industry, which eventually led to a coevolutionary lock-in. The Epoch II of the firm 
is an example of how a leading firm unleashes endogenous forces targeted at countering 
a specific impending organizational lock-in during the path shaping process (Phase II). 
Table 5.3 presents the findings on TSMC‟s firm-level generative process of endogenous 
forces whereas Table 5.4 presents the formation process of TSMC‟s inter-path 
dependence and coevolutionary lock-in with the industry. The new framework that 
shows the process of engendering endogenous forces and coevolutionary lock-in is 
presented in Figure 5.5. 
If the industry‟s feedback on the organization‟s endogenous forces is positive, the 
mutually reinforced mechanisms can disturb the status quo and lead to inter-path 
dependence between the organization and the industry. Some inter-path dependence 
may eventually progress into coevolutionary lock-in of the organization and the industry 
while some may not. Nonetheless, inter-path dependence opens up new technological 
opportunities for the organization. Endogenous forces unleashed during the phase of 
organizational lock-in that leads to coevolutionary lock-in help the firm break away 
quickly from internal path dependence. At this juncture, the coevolutionary lock-in 
works as the un-locking key.  
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When endogenous forces are unleashed before the internal lock-in, they are referred to 
as the visionary key. Instead of going through organizational path dependence, 
visionary key allows industry leaders to virtually skip the entire organizational lock-in 
phase and progress directly into coevolutionary lock-in with the industry. Because 
endogenous forces unleashed by the firms are able to generate impact, and to shape and 
control the technical progress of the industry, these firms are also able to skip the 
organizational path-breaking process as the industry progresses concurrently with the 
steps of the leading firms.  
Path dependence emphasizes how history carries through time in the genesis of novelty 
but not so much the role of actors in the process of that genesis, which is also important 
for the understanding of sources that shape history, path breaking and path creation 
(Garud & Karnøe, 2001). The study‟s approach sheds light on the leader‟s role by 
conceptualizing the generative process of organizational path breaking and path creation. 
The key factors that contribute to successful endogenous forces include vision 
constructions of the firm leaders and the firm‟s absorptive capacity. Successful 
endogenous forces are well-planned strategies appropriated by firm leaders based on 
their ability to envision how the firm should be in the future by interpreting the external 
technological opportunities, the firm‟s existing knowledge base, and how the two can be 
synergized. The organization needs to have the requisite knowledge base to set in 
motion the well-planned endogenous forces. However, vision reconstruction is also 
needed if an endogenous force does not yield positive feedbacks from the industry that 
can progress into productive outcomes. 
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Table 5.3: TSMC‟s Generative Process of Endogenous Forces 
Source: Interviews, 2012-2013. 
[Potential] organizational 
lock-in 
Interpreting 
external environment 
Interpreting existing 
knowledge base 
Vision construction Endogenous forces R&D 
intensity 
N/A Fabless firms faced 
constraints by subcontracting 
to IDMs 
Taiwan had process 
manufacturing capabilities 
A pure-play foundry can tap 
the fabless market 
The world‟s first pure-
play foundry 
+ 
The use of titanium silicide 
would not be sustainable 
It was the mainstream 
material 
TSMC could learn from 
Philips through the JV 
To be the first to give 
solution to the industry 
Developed the critical 
alternative  
+ 
IBM foundry as a threat due 
to system-level IPs, resources 
and knowledge  
The demand for TSMC‟s 
service could increase if it 
had higher capacity 
Could handle higher 
production due to strong 
human resource 
To be the foundry with 
highest production capacity 
Aggressively expanded 
production capacity 
Not 
applicable 
TSMC‟s growth was 
jeopardized without enough 
orders at downturn 
Industry downturn and 
customers needed lower 
prices  
Experience with customers 
allowed TSMC to 
assimilate the transferred 
IPs 
To build the strongest 
design cell libraries in the 
foundry industry  
Transferred IPs from 
customers and built the 
strongest IP library  
+ 
Technology deceleration as 
packaging firms could not 
keep up with TSMC‟s speed 
of miniaturization  
No foundry house was 
operating wafer-bumping  
TSMC has high level of 
skills in wafer-level 
technologies 
To provide wafer-bumping 
in-house to avoid 
technology deceleration 
Developed in-house wafer 
bumping activities and 
pushed the technical 
frontier  
+ 
The need to turn IDMs into 
TSMC‟s customers 
Fabless were less competitive 
compared to IDMs 
TSMC gained strong 
knowledge base in previous 
nodes 
To become a one-stop 
solutions provider by adding 
features at nodes 
Built the most extensive 
technology portfolio and 
services 
+ 
TSMC could not afford to 
lose its pricing advantages 
 
Competitors could not keep 
up in node miniaturization  
TSMC has been leading in 
node miniaturization 
To continue lead Moore‟s 
Law to win pricing 
advantages 
Pushed the miniaturi- 
zation race to create a 
huge gap with rivals 
+ 
Could lose self-reinforced 
benefits due to Moore‟s Law 
bottlenecks 
An increasing technology gap 
between TSMC and the rest  
Most technologies are 
internalized in TSMC 
To counter Moore‟s Law 
bottlenecks  
Vertically integrated 
technology offerings 
(visionary key)  
+ 
Moore‟s Law bottlenecks  
 
Industry needed alternative 
ways  
TSMC‟s strength is wafer-
level technology 
3D packaging as a 
technology alternative  
Introduced CoWoS 
technology 
+ 
Moore‟s Law bottlenecks Customers (fabless) could not 
transit to FinFET smoothly  
Easy to transit to 16nm 
FinFET due to similar 
technologies at 20nm 
Able to tap and be ahead of 
other foundries if facilitate 
EDA tools  
Certified EDA design 
tools from Synopsis 
+ 
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Table 5.4: The Formation Process of TSMC‟s Inter-Path Dependence and Coevolutionary Lock-In with the Industry 
Endogenous forces Positive feedbacks  
from industry 
Mutual- 
reinforcement,  
Status quo disturbed 
Inter-path dependence/  
Lock-in 
[Inter-path 
dependence/ Lock-in] 
Accumulation of 
absorptive capacity  
Became the world‟s 
first pure-play foundry 
Fabless firms relied on TSMC to 
grow 
+ TSMC and the fabless needed 
each other to grow 
Inter-path dependence Not applicable 
Developed an 
alternative for titanium 
silicide 
The industry migrated from the 
mainstream material 
+ Lead the industry in circuitry 
resolution and manufacturing 
management 
Inter-path dependence New technological 
path 
Aggressively expanded 
capacity 
Fabless became more confident 
with TSMC and outsourced more to 
TSMC 
+ TSMC achieved production 
scale as fabless grew larger by 
producing at higher volumes 
Inter-path dependence Path-dependent 
Built the strongest IP 
library in the foundry 
industry 
Industry experienced downturn and 
customers needed lower prices 
+ Customers transferred more IPs 
and TSMC continued to lower 
prices  
Coevolutionary lock-in Deepening 
Developed in-house 
wafer-bumping  
TSMC provided rooms for 
customers to continue miniaturize 
+ More firms relied on TSMC as 
it grew larger  
Inter-path dependence Deepening, 
integration 
Built the most 
extensive technology 
portfolio and services 
Customers became sticky, fabless 
became more competitive, IDMs 
began to rely on TSMC  
+ TSMC strengthened sales and 
capabilities while industry‟s 
progress was accelerated 
Inter-path dependence Deepening, widening 
and integration 
Pushed the node 
miniaturization frontier 
to create a huge gap 
with rivals 
Increased numbers of IDMs went 
fab-lite due to cost disadvantages 
+ IDMs relied on foundries and 
first-mover benefits continued 
to push TSMC to miniaturize 
Inter-path dependence Path-dependent, 
deepening 
Vertically integrated 
technology offerings 
(visionary key) 
Large fabless prefer foundries that 
provide integrated services 
+ TSMC had to stay as the largest 
foundry and customers needed 
an integrated foundry as the 
industry was concentrated 
Coevolutionary lock-in Deepening, 
integration 
Introduced the CoWoS 
technology  
The industry needed 3D packaging 
to mitigate Moore‟s Law 
difficulties 
+ Both industry and TSMC had 
to continue solving Moore‟s 
Law bottlenecks 
Coevolutionary lock-in New technological 
path, integration 
Certified EDA design 
tools from Synopsis 
The industry needed FinFET 
technology to mitigate Moore‟s 
Law difficulties 
+ Both industry and TSMC had 
to continue solving Moore‟s 
Law bottlenecks 
Coevolutionary lock-in Deepening, path-
dependent, 
integration 
Source: Interviews, 2012-2013.
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                 Figure 5.5: Firm-level Generative Process of Endogenous Forces and the Formation of Coevolutionary Lock-In with Industry 
                 Source: Authors.  
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Through higher R&D intensity, endogenous forces should also increase the firm‟s 
absorptive capacity that, because it is cumulative, will be carried through to subsequent 
phases. During Epoch I, TSMC focused on its specialization and intensely built its 
capabilities for process technologies of logic ICs. Therefore, the knowledge and skills 
accumulated were path-dependent, bringing a deepening effect to TSMC‟s 
technological capabilities in Epoch I. Since the middle of Epoch II, TSMC began to 
pursue virtual vertical integration. Such efforts helped TSMC to vertically integrate the 
scope of technological activities while further deepening its core competency.   
5.6 Summary 
This chapter extended the perspective of organizational path dependence to stretch 
beyond the boundary of organizations by integrating firm- and industry-level analysis. 
Rather than concentrating on the theorizing of the organizational path-dependence 
process, the study focused on how organizations can escape from internal lock-in to 
explain why TSMC, although beginning life as a latecomer, has leapfrogged the 
incumbents and has continued to be the world‟s leader in the logic IC industry. TSMC 
was able to take industry leadership by unleashing endogenous forces that interfered 
with the industry‟s progress. Positive feedbacks from the industry caused a mutually 
reinforcing set of mechanisms between the firm and the industry that eventually 
disturbed the status quo. Such inter-path dependence resulted in coevolutionary lock-in 
of the firm and the industry.  
The visionary key allows industry leaders to virtually skip the entire organizational 
lock-in phase, including the path-breaking phase in the Sydow et al. (2009) framework. 
Because the firm is able to generate impact, to shape and dictate the technical progress 
of the industry, the resulting coevolutionary lock-in opens up new technological 
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opportunities for the firm. New technological opportunities thus become endogenous to 
the firm. Through higher intensity of R&D, endogenous forces from firms can also 
increase their absorptive capacity, which will facilitate better interpretation of external 
opportunities. These effects are cumulative and carried through to subsequent phases. 
Industry leaders, such as TSMC, have appropriated the advantages of endogenous 
forces and coevolutionary lock-in to escape from potential inefficiencies caused by 
internal path dependence. Evidence shows that TSMC has focused on this strategy to 
maintain its leading position in the logic IC industry. Firms not able to unleash 
endogenous forces that lead to coevolutionary lock-in are trapped within their internal 
path dependence for a longer time, carrying cumulative inefficiencies into their future. 
The industry followers, such as UMC, Globalfoundries and SMIC, have been following 
the footsteps dictated by TSMC without unleashing significant endogenous forces into 
the industry. The extended Sydow et al. (2009) framework and the new framework 
introduced in this chapter can be helpful to understand organizational theories and 
industrial dynamics, especially on firm-level endogenous forces and coevolutionary 
lock-in. The new framework also helps shed light on the generative process of path 
breaking and path creation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous research on latecomer catch-up has informed us regarding the critical role of 
institutions and organizational capability building. However, understanding latecomer 
catch-up in a technology-intensive industry also requires a deeper scrutiny of how the 
technological regime works and how the industry structure evolves. This study begins 
with an analysis at the technology-level, with the objective to examine the mechanisms 
of the changing technological regimes of the IC industry. Subsequently, the thesis seeks 
to examine the latecomer resource acquisition strategies to catch up in an industry with 
evolving structures and value systems. The thesis then conducts a case study on the 
world‟s first pure-play foundry to understand how the firm strategized to build its 
technological capabilities so as to lead the industry through different phases. The 
findings of this research provide important implications for theory, firm management 
and policies, which will be described in the latter part of this section. 
6.2 Synthesis of Research  
Driven by the identified research questions, this research developed three different 
frameworks to examine the mechanisms of technological transitions, latecomer resource 
acquisitions in changing industrial structure and value systems, as well as how firms 
build technological capabilities through coevolutionary lock-in. The following 
recapitulates the objectives and main findings of this study. 
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6.2.1 Technological Transitions 
The first analytical framework examines the mechanisms behind the changing 
technological regimes and how industry‟s innovation patterns are affected. It shows 
how technological regimes lead to changing industry driving forces, organizational 
vertical boundaries and network boundaries which together produce a feedback loop in 
the system. Functional roles are assigned across fabless and foundries in the IC industry, 
firms adopt modular or networked modular organization systems according to the 
degree of the industry driving forces. 
The concept of technological regime is useful to understand the mechanisms behind 
industrial progress in the IC foundry industry. The framework first identified the most 
relevant dimensions important in capturing the forces that shape the technological 
regime of the IC industry. Technological interrelatedness, cumulativeness, economies of 
scale, technological opportunities, and technological appropriability are important 
dimensions in the IC industry. 
Empirical analysis shows that higher economies of scale can widen the gap of 
manufacturing capabilities among fab owners. Meanwhile, lower technological 
opportunities among smaller firms but higher technological appropriability among 
larger firms widen the gap of technological capabilities among these firms, which 
happened during Phase II of the IC industry. The factors have resulted in the large 
foundries integrating vertically, though not fully, whereas smaller firms remain as 
specialized but fragmented firms. Overall, these have resulted in an industry 
characterized by high stability of innovators, lower entries but higher exits thus highly 
concentrated innovations.  
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The findings in this chapter have important technological learning implications. It 
examines the transition process of an industry shifting its characteristics between 
Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. In doing so, the study first found that the 
formation of industry‟s technological regime is endogenous as firms make choices to 
their organizational boundaries that create feedback loops to the technological regime. 
In Phase II, large firms react to such conditions by strengthening their external linkages 
in order to secure their leading positions in the market. Such strategies enable firms to 
gain more technological capabilities and synergies among firms, which allow rooms for 
lower R&D cost, higher economies of scale etc.  
Second, examining the transition process allows us to identify specific dimensions of 
technological regime that are appropriate for latecomer firms to strategize for catch-up 
in a Schumpeter Mark I environment. Meanwhile, under a Schumpeter Mark II 
environment, higher degree of economies of scale, lower technological opportunities 
and higher technological appropriability provide promising conditions for latecomers – 
which have successfully caught up - to strategize to leapfrog the large incumbents in 
order to become industry leaders.  
 
6.2.2 Latecomer Resource Acquisitions 
The second analytical framework in the study examined the latecomer resource 
acquisition strategies to catch up in a technology-intensive industry that faced changing 
industrial structures and value creating systems. Latecomers are faced with increasing 
complexities to catch up in a high-tech industry, especially when it comes to acquiring 
external knowledge as large firms in the industry determine the changes of value 
systems. The proposed framework takes into consideration the changing industrial 
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structures and value systems to suggest an alternative view of catch-up strategies in a 
dynamic environment like the IC industry.  
To understand how latecomer firms shape their business models to create values for 
their customers and to extend their role in the GVC across different phases, the analysis 
of the framework incorporates the resource acquisition strategies identified in previous 
research (i.e. linkage, leverage, learning and technological rareness, imitability and 
transferability) (Mathews, 2002, 2006). Using the proposed dimensions in the 
framework, the study is able to craft the catch-up paths taken by the latecomers via 
changing value systems.  
The findings in the study show that, latecomer firms like TSMC and ASE have adopted 
path-creation strategy and acquired the least common technologies during the initial 
stage of their catch-up. Meanwhile, UMC has been a fast-follower. These Taiwanese 
latecomer firms have effectively moved from Dimension I to Dimension III while 
TSMC has arrived at Dimension IV. The fabless firms in the US went to the first pure-
play foundry (TSMC) not because of lower cost of manufacturing, but because they did 
not have to build any expensive wafer fab. It was a path creating strategy to insert into 
the GVC. However, the findings also show that latecomer firms from Malaysia have not 
been able to catch up effectively by being a slow path-follower, despite mimicking the 
Taiwanese strategies. The changing industrial structures and the value systems require 
firms to deploy different strategies to acquire external knowledge at different phases.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, different forms of production specialization and 
different points in time of catch-up lead to different learning processes due to different 
technological regimes faced by the firms. For instance, as compared to the packaging 
and test firms in this study, the foundries faced a technological regime with higher 
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cumulativeness and higher economies of scale. These two dimensions caused the 
foundry industry face very stiff price competition all the time. Such dimensions have 
also led to the fact that, the packaging and test firms are still able to perform financially 
well although they have not achieved significant vertical upgrading. 
6.2.3 Organizational Capability Building 
The third analytical chapter extends the perspective of organizational path dependence 
by integrating firm- and industry-level analysis. Instead of focusing on the theorizing of 
organizational path dependence process, the study focuses on the process of how 
organizations can break away from internal lock-in to explain firm differences. The 
study explains why TSMC, although began as a latecomer, has leapfrogged the 
incumbents and has continued to be the world‟s leader in the logic IC industry. The 
Epoch I of the TSMC case is an example of how a leading firm escaped from 
organizational lock-in in a short period of time by unleashing endogenous forces into 
the industry, which eventually led to a coevolutionary lock-in. The Epoch II of the firm 
is an example of how a leading firm unleashes endogenous forces targeted at countering 
a specific impending organizational lock-in.  
This study argues that, endogenous forces unleashed by organizations into the industry 
that disturb the status quo can result in inter-path dependence between the firm and the 
industry. The industry feeds back onto the organization as external forces and such 
mutually reinforced mechanisms lead to coevolutionary lock-in between the 
organization and its industry. Endogenous forces unleashed during the phase of 
organizational lock-in that leads to coevolutionary lock-in help the firm escape quickly 
from internal path dependence. 
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Through higher intensity of R&D efforts, endogenous forces from firms also increase 
the firm‟s absorptive capacity that is cumulative and carried through to the subsequent 
phases. Industry leaders, such as TSMC, have appropriated coevolutionary lock-in to 
help the organization escape and avoid potential inefficiencies caused by internal path 
dependencies. Evidence shows that TSMC has been appropriating this strategy to 
maintain its leading position. Industry followers like UMC have been following the 
footsteps dictated by TSMC without unleashing any significant endogenous forces into 
the industry. UMC‟s firm-level strategies have been very much bounded by its own 
organizational path dependence. The proposed framework therefore helps shed light on 
the question of “why do firms differ”, despite having a similar experience during their 
start-up and catch-up process.  
6.2.4 Linkages between the Three Analyses 
This study has conducted three key analyses. The first analysis on technological 
transitions provided insights to how technological dimensions in a regime serve as the 
fundamental basis to the progress of a high-tech manufacturing industry. The changes in 
the technological dimensions drive firms to make different choices for their 
organizational boundaries, which also lead to changes in network boundaries as firms 
seek external linkages that overall provide a feedback loop to the regime. The first 
analysis has emphasized the role of external linkages in the feedback loop process, of 
which the IC industry was found to be largely dominated by firms that pursued virtual 
vertical integration towards the end of 2000s. Since latecomers in the IC industry have 
to catch up in changing industrial structures as a result of firms‟ strategies for external 
linkages (i.e. the feedback loops), the first analysis also leads to the significance of 
understanding how exactly latecomers should conduct value coordination in their 
external networks. 
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Therefore, the second analytical framework goes further by dividing the structural 
changes found in the first analysis into six stages (dimensions) while taking into 
account the changes in value coordination. The catch-up process of the latecomers can 
thus be examined in detail at each stage. The second analytical chapter provided an in-
depth analysis to the role of organizational boundaries and external linkages in the 
catch-up and leapfrogging process of Taiwanese latecomers in the IC industry. It 
examined the strategies for business model behind the firms‟ choices for organizational 
boundaries. It also examined how the latecomer firms acquired resources from different 
external linkages by extending the existing latecomer resource acquisition framework. 
The chapter also extended the findings in the first analysis by providing a deeper 
scrutiny to the role of external linkages to the Taiwanese latecomers in terms of outside-
in (indirect) transfer of knowledge and technologies in open innovation context as well 
as strategic value coordination in networks. 
The first and second analyses have therefore emphasized the crucial role of external 
linkages in latecomers‟ catching up and leapfrogging. Furthermore, the first analysis 
emphasized how the change of technological regimes is endogenous to firms‟ actions 
while the second analysis suggests that latecomers could rationally strategize their 
catch-up and leapfrogging paths. This leads to the importance of understanding how 
strategies of firms interact with external linkages to achieve the desired outcomes, i.e. 
how exactly could TSMC‟s endogenous strategies be influential enough to its upstream 
and downstream firms and led to changes of regime that seem to be in favour of its 
leapfrogging process? Hence, the third analysis of the thesis examined how the 
successful firm (i.e. TSMC) achieved the desired result in terms of its managerial 
process. The analysis showed how firms‟ endogenous strategies for external linkages 
could be planned by organizational leaders through revised expectations and vision 
  
168 
 
constructions, and explained that those strategies are effective when the firms‟ suppliers 
and customers are attracted and conformed to those strategies. TSMC‟s catch-up 
strategies and leapfrogging via virtual vertical integration in the IC industry became 
successful when the mutual-reinforcements between the firm‟s endogenous strategies 
and its external linkages progressed into coevolutionary lock-ins. The emphasis on 
external linkages in the first two analyses also indicates the importance of 
organizational absorptive capacity to assimilate external knowledge and technologies. 
The third analysis therefore also took into account the aspect by explaining how 
TSMC‟s strategies for external linkages have complemented its internal strategies for 
building its organizational absorptive capacity.  
To sum up, this research has examined the catch-up and leapfrogging process of 
Taiwanese latecomers in the IC industry by considering the changes of technological 
regimes as the basis that drive firms to strategize for organizational boundaries which 
create feedback loops to the regime when firms seek external linkages. As analysed in 
the thesis, strategic external linkages has played a significant role in catch-up and 
leapfrogging process of Taiwanese foundries as it provides different opportunities for 
latecomers to seek vertical upgrading and virtual vertical integration, especially in an 
environment that evolves into an open innovation context among leading firms. 
However, although these processes are endogenous to firms‟ strategies, they are only 
effective when top management in firms are able to pull off the appropriate strategies at 
the right time so that the endogenous forces receive positive feedbacks from the other 
firms in networks and progress into high inter-path dependence between the firms. The 
success story of TSMC‟s arrival at the technological frontier has not been easily 
replicated because its catch-up and leapfrogging strategies have taken into account the 
appropriate resource acquisition and value coordination strategies for its external 
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linkages, which have led to successful coevolutionary lock-ins in an industry with 
evolving industrial structures and value systems.  
Nevertheless, the catch-up and leapfrogging process of Taiwanese foundries remains 
very important to draw lessons for other latecomers in high-tech manufacturing 
industries, especially the IC industry. The first framework provides a useful template to 
other high-tech manufacturing industries that are driven by the similar technological 
nature, i.e. the similar technological dimensions. The second analytical framework is 
also relevant to latecomers in high-tech manufacturing industries, given its strong 
emphasis on the interface between the OEM latecomers and the advanced MNCs, value 
chain coordination, as well as the progress into an open innovation context. The third 
framework is not only relevant to latecomers‟ catch-up strategies, but also to industry 
leadership strategies in other high-tech manufacturing industries. This is because the 
nature of a high-tech manufacturing industry requires the leading firms to deploy 
strategies that could lead to technological capabilities that are substantial enough to 
interfere the industry‟s status quo, resulting in high inter-path dependence between the 
leading firms and their external linkages as well as coevolutionary lock-ins.  
6.3 Theoretical Implications 
This research provides some important theoretical implications. The analysis of 
technological transitions contributes new theoretical insights to how a technological 
regime is the result of firms‟ strategies. The examination of latecomer resource 
acquisition strategies provides implications to the resource-based view, changing value 
systems, as well as latecomer catch-up theories. Meanwhile, the case study on TSMC 
contributes to the theory of vision construction, path dependence, organizational 
absorptive capacity, as well as coevolutionary lock-in of firms and industry. 
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6.3.1 Technological Transitions 
The first analytical framework has advanced the existing theories on technological 
regime. Each of the identified dimensions affects the different relationships between the 
downstream and the upstream firms in the industry in different ways, leading to 
changing driving forces in the industry. Firms respond to these dynamic changes by 
making strategic decisions for their organizational boundaries accordingly. The 
changing network boundaries lead to different ways of value chain coordination that 
promotes different learning opportunities for firms. Firms‟ coordination of their external 
linkages over time disturb the industry‟s status quo and lead to new technological 
regime under which firms will subsequently revise their strategies for organizational 
boundaries.  
This study has also incorporated the transition process of an industry shifting its 
characteristics between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II. Examining the 
transition process allows us to identify specific dimensions of a technological regime 
that are appropriate for latecomer firms to strategize for catching up in a Schumpeter 
Mark I environment. Under a Schumpeter Mark II environment, greater economies of 
scale, lower technological opportunities and higher technological appropriability 
provide a promising environment for latecomers - who have successfully caught up - to 
strategize and leapfrog the large incumbents in order to become industry leaders. 
This study provides a more comprehensive view of the systemic mechanisms between 
technological regimes and choices of organizational boundaries. It explored the 
mechanisms of the industry‟s endogenous transition to a new technological regime, 
including identifying the critical factors and examining their causal relationships in the 
transition process. The need for knowledge integration across the downstream and the 
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upstream firms gave rise to the virtual vertically integrated value chains, of which firms 
in the industry act as networked modular organizations. It is a flexible organizational 
system that incorporates the merits of modularity and convergence, which provide new 
learning gateways for latecomers. 
6.3.2 Latecomer Resource Acquisitions 
Examining how latecomers catch up in a dynamic industrial structure with changing 
value systems bring several theoretical implications. Most of the existing literature of 
resource-based view has sought to address the changing perspective of organizational 
core-competency in large MNCs as a result of open innovation practices. The study 
modified this by changing the unit of analysis by examining how latecomer firms can 
source external knowledge under such changing environments.  
By incorporating the evolving concepts for organizational core-competency, the study 
found that repeating the steps of resource acquisition as outlined in Mathew (2002, 
2006) is not a sustainable catch-up strategy. This condition will not hold when the 
industry is transiting to Dimension III in the framework, where open innovation 
practices is more prominent than closed innovation and when large MNCs begin to form 
virtual vertically integrated chains with partners in their networked systems. 
The study also seeks to characterize virtual vertical integration as an innovative 
organizational change and business model. Whereas the previous literature has informed 
us that each value constellation in an open innovation platform has a dominant firm to 
lead the coordination of value distribution (Normann & Ramirez, 1993; Vanhaverbeke 
& Cloodt, 2006), the findings in this study show that such a condition does not hold as 
the IC industry progressed further into Phase II. The findings show that the Taiwanese 
pure-play foundries do not rely on one single customer that governs the value 
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distributions. In fact, all the actors in the networked systems are highly interdependent 
with each other. Collectively, these firms form a value system that shapes virtual 
vertical integration, which allows them to source external knowledge from each other.  
The study shows how Taiwanese latecomer firms have successfully moved from 
Dimension I to Dimension III(a). Among them, at least TSMC has arrived at Dimension 
IV(b),  where its technological capabilities allow it to form interdependent relationship 
with its upstream customers. Through the development of virtual vertical integration 
and the evolving concept of value creating system, the Taiwanese latecomer does not 
require to undertake OBM in order to qualify itself as a technology frontier leader. 
Hence, the framework in this study offers an alternative view to latecomer technological 
catch-up. 
The framework in this study also shows how the latecomer firms acquired resources at 
their point of insertion into the GVC, as a rational and careful strategy to secure a 
position in the global network of a high-tech industry. To conduct a greater scrutiny of 
how firms shape their business models to offer values to their networked systems, this 
study also extends the resource acquisition strategies outlined in Mathews (2002, 2006). 
In doing so, it provides greater precision in characterizing the latecomer strategies that 
complement the needs of the vertically integrated incumbents while fulfilling the needs 
of the specialized customers across different industry phases.  
6.3.3 Organizational Capability Building 
The organizational path dependence framework is extended to stretch beyond the 
boundary of organizations by integrating firm- and industry-level analysis. If the 
industry‟s feedback on the organization‟s endogenous forces is positive, the mutually 
reinforced mechanisms can disturb the status quo and lead to inter-path dependence. 
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Endogenous forces unleashed during the phase of organizational lock-in that leads to 
coevolutionary lock-in help the firm break away quickly from the internal 
(organizational) lock-in.  
The second analytical framework in the study introduced the “visionary key” which 
allows industry leaders to virtually skip the entire organizational lock-in phase. Because 
the firm is able to generate impact, to shape and dictate the technical progress of the 
industry, the resulting coevolutionary lock-in opens up new technological opportunities 
for the firm.  
This study also established a new framework to explain the mechanisms of firm-level 
generative process of endogenous forces and the formation process of coevolutionary 
lock-in. In previous studies, path dependence emphasizes how history carries through 
time in the genesis of novelty, but not so much the conceptualization of the actors‟ role 
in the generative process. This study sheds light on a leader‟s considerations in the 
generative process of de-locking from organizational path dependence. 
Successful endogenous forces are well-planned strategies appropriated by firm leaders 
based on their ability to envision how the firm should be in the future by interpreting the 
external technological opportunities, the firm‟s existing knowledge base, and how the 
two can be synergized. Through higher intensity of R&D, endogenous forces should 
have also increased the firm‟s absorptive capacity that is cumulative and is continued 
through to the subsequent phases. 
Nevertheless, vision reconstruction is needed if an endogenous force does not yield 
positive feedbacks from the industry that progress into productive outcomes. The 
frameworks provide an avenue for future studies that enrich the understanding of 
sources and processes associated with path breaking and path creation opportunities. 
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6.4 Managerial Implications  
Each of the analytical chapters in this thesis also provides implications to managers of 
latecomer firms operating in a high-tech industry. Specifically, it contributes more to 
the firm-level knowledge of managers working in the IC industry and seeking to 
leapfrog the incumbents. The following summarizes managerial implications drawn 
from each analytical chapter. 
6.4.1 Technological Transitions 
The technological dimensions that shape the regime of the IC industry is helpful for 
firm managers to understand how the fundamental nature of technology affects the their 
business relationship with downstream and upstream firms. Managers can better 
understood how their choices of organizational boundary can lead to changes in the 
industry, including affecting the network boundary by collaborating with other actors in 
the industry.  
Moreover, firm managers should also comprehend how their competitors or peers 
would react to the driving forces that change the relationships between downstream and 
upstream firms. More importantly, they should be aware that the collective choices on 
network boundary are able to cause impacts and eventually cause changes to the 
technological regime. The study also explains how managers can plan for catch-up and 
leapfrogging strategies in a Mark I and Mark II environment respectively. Each of these 
environments presents different level of competitiveness among the industry players as 
explained and requires careful strategic plans as the regime transits from time to time. 
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6.4.2 Latecomer Resource Acquisitions 
Latecomer firms that are lagged behind should perceive the practice of virtual vertical 
integration as a gateway to external knowledge, which is critical for them to move up 
the value chain and to catch up with frontier technologies. Managers in these firms 
should strategize their business models to extend their role across the GVC in time. In 
addition, the managers should be aware of the changing factors taking place in the 
industry, including the evolving industrial structure, changing value systems, the role of 
organizational core competency, and the different interfaces between themselves and 
the incumbents or advanced MNCs.   
6.4.3 Organizational Capability Building  
The study shows how entrepreneurs can lead a firm to escape from organizational lock-
in that brings inefficiencies to the firm. It also emphasized the role of entrepreneurs in 
directing a firm to catch up with technology and to lead the industry by making 
decisions that disturb the industry‟s status quo. Such a strategy allows the firm and the 
industry to co-evolve and when inter-path dependence is formed, the firm is able to 
control its external environment via coevolutionary lock-in.  
Organizational leaders can build a firm‟s knowledge base, hence absorptive capacity, 
via their visionary strategies and unleashing endogenous forces. This study also shows 
how vision construction and revised expectations on R&D by firm leaders can 
eventually bring new technological opportunities to their firms.  
6.5 Policy Implications  
The formulation of industrial policies has to pay close attention to the issues raised in 
this study. Institutional support and regulatory framework will not be effective without 
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taking into account industrial complexities, such as the evolution of technological 
regime, the dynamic organizational and network boundaries, the changing value 
systems, and the interpath-dependent mechanisms between firms and industry. The 
study also provides a framework of how latecomer firms can catch up and leapfrog the 
incumbents in different value systems, which can be a reference to policy makers 
charting the roadmap for industrial catch-up.  
6.5.1 Technological Transitions 
The analytical framework used to examine the transitions of technological regime can 
help policy makers in latecomer countries understand the mechanisms of the complex 
technological system of a high-tech manufacturing industry. Moreover, understanding 
the technological regime of an industry helps policy makers to decide the kinds of 
innovative activities or R&D that most requires incentives from government including 
research grants, technical trainings and technology licensing. Furthermore, knowing the 
direct and indirect impacts of different technological dimensions in a regime to the 
industrial driving forces - hence the different choices of organizational and network 
boundaries - can help policy makers to identify effectively which technological 
dimension to be interfered to achieve certain desired results.  
Understanding the relationships between the downstream and the upstream firms and 
the industry‟s innovation patterns also help policy makers to identify strategic industry 
segments to be targeted for the country‟s technology roadmap and subsequently, to 
identify the types of business models to be promoted in the country. Furthermore, 
policy makers from latecomer countries should strategically encourage the indigenous 
firms to seek the VVI system model as a gateway to leverage on the knowledge from 
more advanced MNCs. In addition, understanding the value chain coordination of the 
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industry helps policy makers from latecomer countries to strategize how the indigenous 
firms can be “inserted” into the existing system and be able to move up the 
technological value chain.  
6.5.2 Latecomer Resource Acquisitions 
Despite that the Malaysian government tried to mimic the Taiwan catch-up model, 
unlike their Taiwanese counterparts, the Malaysian foundries have failed to catch up 
with the world frontier. The Malaysian government initiated Silterra as part of their 
technological upgrading efforts. However, the firm entered the industry at a less 
advantageous timing and the positioning of the firm did not allow it to catch up 
smoothly. This suggests that institutional support has to be strategic and policy makers 
should take into consideration the issues discussed in the chapter, especially about the 
evolving industrial structure, the changing value systems, and the catch-up strategies 
across different dimensions.   
As discussed, the Malaysian foundry was mainly driven by the growth of 
communication tools; the growing demand for cellular phones in early 2000s; the scarce 
capacity of wafer fabrication worldwide; and the benefits that foundry can bring to 
fabless companies and advantages of a „pure-play foundry‟ over the IDM model. 
However, evidence shows that having initial knowledge towards these areas does not 
guarantee success given the ever-changing forces in the industry.  
Industrial policies targeting to catch up in a high-tech industry like the IC industry 
should seek to promote the types of technology based on the criteria set out and take 
into account the influencing factors identified in this study. To create values to 
customers and suppliers within individual networked systems, the important criteria for 
the types of technologies to be leveraged or built include rareness, imitability, 
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transferability, competitiveness and substitutability. The technology roadmap for 
national catch-up should be insured with a back-up plan like how the Taiwanese 
government strategized. Policy makers should also formulate industrial policies based 
on strategic choices in business model and production specialization.  
6.5.3 Organizational Capability Building 
This study shows that certain strong interpath-dependence between firms and the 
industry can lead to coevolutionary lock-in, which is capable of altering the direction of 
the industry‟s progress. If the policy makers have a clearly defined catch-up roadmap, 
they can promote stronger interdependent linkages among the relevant actors in the 
industry through various kinds of incentives to induce the progress of the plans.  
The organizational study on TSMC has showcased the potential influence of mutual 
reinforcement between firms and external parties. In fact, while designing the catch-up 
roadmap, government can formulate policies that enhance mutual reinforcement 
between relevant actors in targeted industries to induce a more effective progress. 
Moreover, given that the development of organizational absorptive capacity is a path-
dependent process, policy makers need to promote incentives that help firms to source 
for external knowledge that deepen the firm‟s existing internal knowledge. Industrial 
policies that promote the linkages among the relevant firms that complement the 
knowledge of each other should gain further attention. 
6.6 Limitations and Future Direction of Research 
Since the first analytical framework was drawn specifically for the evolutionary IC 
industry, the analysis cannot be easily generalized for other industries because 
technological learning involves differing degrees of specificity, tacitness, complexity 
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and independence and vary across different nature of technologies (Winter, 1987). In 
other industries, different dimensions of technological regime may have more 
prominent roles in determining organizational boundaries. However, if the analysis is 
applied to other high-tech manufacturing industries, most of the identified technological 
dimensions in this analysis remain relevant as the industries are most likely driven by 
similar technological nature. This also means that, for each of the same technological 
dimensions, the responding driving forces and choices of organizational and network 
boundaries could behave in similar patterns in the other high-tech manufacturing 
industries. By identifying the exact sets of technological dimensions for other high-tech 
manufacturing industries in the future would certainly provide more precision to the 
understanding of technological transitions in those industries, while improving the 
generalizability of this study.  
In addition, because the focus of the first analytical chapter is to examine how the 
transitions of the regime are contingent upon the actions of firms in a high-tech 
manufacturing industry, the analysis is done under the condition that the processes take 
place in a static institutional environment with no path-breaking institutional forces 
aimed at interfering the industry‟s status quo. With that condition, the study has not 
explored the potential role of institutions in supporting firms to catch up with or 
leapfrog incumbents by altering the degrees of the technological dimensions. 
Nevertheless, in the event that such external forces exist, the chapter‟s arguments on the 
relationships between the degrees of the technological dimensions, the industrial driving 
forces, as well as the choices of organizational and network boundaries would still be 
relevant. For instance, if a government provides high incentives and financial supports 
to its latecomer OEM firms to shorten their time to migrate to more efficient and higher 
manufacturing capacity, it leads to higher influence of economies of scale in the 
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industry. However, a higher manufacturing gap between vertically integrated firms and 
the OEM firms would still lead to more outsourcing practices by the vertically 
integrated firms and higher growth of the OEMs. Although not all of the changes in the 
technological dimensions might be endogenous to firms (as a result of the feedback 
loops) in that case, the proposed framework still remains as a useful template to 
understand technological systems and transitions, driving forces and relationships 
between upstream and downstream firms, as well as dynamics of organizational 
boundaries and the resultant network boundaries of a high-tech manufacturing industry.  
The second analytical framework offers a parsimonious way to distinguish the phases, 
given the evolution of the industrial structure is an on-going process. The increasingly 
blurred boundaries of organizations make it difficult to clearly craft the moments when 
the processes should begin or end. Besides, this study did not attempt to theorize open 
innovation, as pursued by many existing studies. Instead, to explain the catch-up 
phenomenon, this study uses the concept to discuss the issue of changing value systems 
and bridges the concept to the notion of an emerging industrial structure, i.e. virtual 
vertical integration. Hence, it calls for future research to provide a more profound 
scrutiny in order to enhance the understanding of the issues, which are most likely also 
faced by other high-tech manufacturing industries. 
The extended frameworks for path dependence can be useful for the understanding of 
organizational theories and industrial dynamics of high-tech manufacturing industries, 
especially the IC industry. Nevertheless, to simplify the research, the industry analysis 
is bounded as the research only incorporates positive feedbacks from the industry that 
respond to the firm‟s specific endogenous forces. The research also emphasizes the 
potential of coevolutionary lock-in in helping firms escape from organizational path 
dependence, rather than exploring the potential inertia arising from such lock-in.  It will 
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be useful to incorporate this scope in future studies. The frameworks also provide an 
avenue for more future studies that enrich the understanding of sources and processes 
associated with the emergence of path breaking opportunities. 
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